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Abstract
Nine Old Men and One New Deal; Franklin Delano Roosevelt
and the Supreme Court Crisis of 1937. a political history. is
a review of the development, causes. and resolution of the
Supreme Court Crisis of 1937.
The Supreme Court Crisis of 1937 resulted from the
expression of divergent social and economic theories by the
Supreme Court and the President.
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conflict that resulted fram this expression, and reviews the
resolution of this conflict.
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Preface
This paper represents one product of a continued interest
of mine in the New Deal era.

Specifically, my interest in the

Supreme Court Crisis issue began three years ago, and this work
is a partial result of that interest.

I must emphasize, and

perhaps apologize, that this work is really in unfinished form.
Time constraints have prohibited a complete revision which would
tighten up the language, and style of the wri tinge
more complete

Further and

research is needed in order to extend to the paper

additional insights whi _nh would provide a more thorough explan
ation of the issue.
The purpose of the paper is to explain the Supreme Court
Crisis of 1937.

In this respect, readers may have a difficult

time with the work because

desire for a firm position to

be -t ak en , a theory to be proven, remains unfulfilled.

I hope

to have provided an insight into an extremely complex and im
portant issue.

Paul Conkin, author of The New Deal, wrote, lias

yet, no historian has seriously studied the Court Fight.

Much

the pity, for here was probably the most important issue to arise
in the New Deal."

This paper will serve as my beginning of' a

serious study of the Court Crisis.

The issue is important, not

only in relation to the New Deal, but is also important as an
example of the manner in which our governmental system functions.
This paper has explained the reasons for the formulation of the
issue, and has hinted at the implications of the issue.
This paper has also an academic purpose.

As a Senior

Scholar project the paper is important for the refinement of

ii

writing and research skills.

The Senior Scholar Program is

worthy in the respect that the investigation of such issues
can be undertaken by a student with the help and support of a
faculty member.

The Senior Scholar Program does have flaws,

and if the continuation of such academic investigation is to
be insured, a more supportive role by the College Administra
tion, in a monetary sense, will have to be secured.
I would like to thank some very special people without

whose support this project may never have reached conclusion.
My thanks go to my tutor, Professor Calvin MacKenzie, who was
supportive, willing, and who has brOUght back to his department
the love and sense of the real purpose of teaching.

I

would

also like to thank Professor Clifford Berschneider for his
interest in me and my work and for his careful critiques of
the paper.

I would like to thank Laurel Johnson for her atten

tion to and critique of the paper during its early stages of
development, and to Mark Hubbert and Gayle Amato for their help
in typing the much revised first draft of the paper.

My final

and most grateful thanks go 't o Susan Murphy, the skillful and
accurate typist who has been

80

diligent, courteous and kind to

me and my endeavor.
Dwigh t

Dani el Darrow

May 2, 1979

Chapter One
The Problem and the Crisis
On Inaurguration day, January 1937, Harold L. Ickes wrote
that,
the Chief Justice, when he came to that part
of the oath which required the President to
protect and defend the Constitution of the
United states, spoke slowly and with especial
emphasis. It was noteworthy also that whereas
the Vice-President had simply responded with
"I do," the President gave the full answer and
he, too, spoke with slowness and particular
emphasis when he declared that he would pro
tect and defend the Constitution of the
United states. 1
The two men
January day.

sol~y

faced each other on that rainy

Much had passed between them in the preceding four

years, much would pass between them in the next eight months.
On the one side of the podium stood the re-elected President
Roosevelt.

He was first elected to office during the nation's

most severe economic crisis, during those first four years of of
fice he formulated a plan of national recovery.

The

election of

1936 swept him back into office, the people's mandate was clear;
more of the New Deal.

The New Deal was a legislative program

which enunciated a new economic order, a new active role on the
part of the central Federal government.

It was that New Deal,

it was Roosevelt, which had brOUght the country back from the
depths of depression.

This opinion was now solidified in

Roosevelt's mind; the people had spoken, they were "with him. 1I
On the other side of the podium on that stormy January

-2

day stood the stalwart Chief Supreme Court Justice Charles
Evan HUghes.

He represented the Supreme Court of the United

States of America, which by reason of the life tenure of the
Justices, represented the old economic order.

Roosevelt labeled

those Justices who represented the old economic order a8, "partisans
of a particular economic and political
who appointed them.,,2

philoBoP~Y

held by the man

The JUdicial branch and the Executive had

clashed and were again to clash, embroiling themselves, the leg
islative branch and people in a bitter prolonged dispute which just
may have been the most acute Constitutional controversy of our
times.
Whereas the President and his New Deal stood for a strong,
powerful and active central government, the Supreme Court Justices,
by 'a slim majority, kept enunciating their belief in a limited
relatively powerless Federal government.

As Wesley McCune, author

of Nine Young Men, observed, "Never before Franklin Roosevelt·s
time had the Court taken almost the entire governmental program of
a cont.emporary President plus his (the pronoun is accurate) Congress
and vetoed it law by law as the Supreme Court Justices did with
the first New Deal. It 3
Roosevelt's reaction to the repeated invalidation of his
New Deal legislation, beginning with the invalidation of the
'Hot Oil' code in the National Industrial Recovery Act in
January 1935 and culminating with the invalidation of the National
Recovery Act in June of 1935 and of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act on January 6, 1936, was the Court Reorganization Plan of
1937.

The reasons for the Court

R~organization

Plan proposal

can be traced as far back as 1928 when the old economic

-3
order failed.

Principally, the Court Reorganization Plan can

be seen as a reaction to the United States Supreme Court's
invalidation of New Deal legislation.

This legislation was

itself a product of the circumstances of the times in which
Roosevelt assumed the powers, duties, and responsibilities of
the Presidency.
In order to understand more fully the significance of
the Constitutional crisis precipitated by the Court Reor
ganization Plan proposal, it is necessary first to recapture
the mood of the times.

Here we must recreate the historical

setting, we must present the immediate sense of urgency,
the desperation, the despair that pervaded the American
people during our country's most tragic economic faltering.
We must also recreate the Bense of hope that was offered by
Roosevel~

and him alone.

A sense of hope began to uplift

and raise this nation's people during the first hundred
days of Roosevelt's Presidency when the New Deal was formulated
and hurriedly passed into law. 4

The inroads that the New

Deal legislation made toward solving the nation's pressing
problems are important in the evaluation of the Supreme Court's
invalidation of those laws.

The Supreme Court can be viewed

as impeding the successful solution of the nation's problems.
The Court Reorganization Plan was Roosevelt's reaction to what
he perceived as an obstruction to the nation's recovery in the

1930's.

4

By the year 1928, it was apparent that a sickness had
begun to pervade the United states' economic structure.

This

sickness grew with a terrifying speed, clutching first at
the throat of the American economy, then at the American spirit.
By the year

1930, the one word that would best describe both

the nation's economic outlook and the mood of the American
people was despair.

The depression had dropped upon the

nation quickly and suddenly giving no warning.

Not anticipat

ing what would soon make a mockery of his words, President
Hoover in the early hours of the depression stated that the
nation's economic outlook was "rosy."
same

d~y

On July 28, 1932, the

that_General KacArthur was forcibly eVicting from the

nation's capital thousands of veterans who were asking for

L~ 

mediate payment of their bonus allowance, the daily newspapers
were announcing that an expected increase in trade would occur
in ninety days.

This trade increase was to end the depression

and simultaneously put an

end to the nation's economic woes. 5

The arrival of such an increase in trade did not come in ninety
days nor in a hundred

nor in three hundred.

The belief that the depression would soon depart, was
caused by the

sp~ed

with which it struck.

Many people refused

to believe that the economic decline would last or that ita
effects would be harmful in the long run.

However, for the

fifteen million people who had lost their jobs by 1932, the de
pression was an awesome reality, its end nowhere in sight.
Only a few years before Franklin Roosevelt's inauguration

5
in 1932, the United States' economic system seemed to be
standing on firm ground.

During the 1920's, the United States

bad enjoyed one or its largest economic booms.

One indicator

of the prosperity of the times and the trust that the American
people had in the nation's financial institutions, was the amount
of money expended in the Stock Market.

We say expended rather

than invested because of the commonly held belief that, if one
weFe to

~pend

a little, the stock market would return, without

fail, a substantial increase in one's original outlay in cash.
The market was seen as a money tree.

Get-rich-quick schemes

abounded, shady practices and dealings facilitated windfall gains
for some and devastating losses for others.

The stock market

speculator believed that the market would always pay-off.

The

"house" could never run short, the gamble was Been as a sure
thing or so it seemed.
Whether or not the market was a sure bet, the fact remains
that during the late 19208 the trading activity on the stock ex
6
change increased a hundred-fold.
In th~ year 1920, there were
a mere 29,609 stock brokers in the New York exchange.

By 1930
the number of brokers increased to an impressive 70,950. 7
One reason for the tremendous advance in trading activity

was the practice of purchasing stocks on margin.

Buying stocks

on margin is similar to buying a house with a mortgage from a
bank.

The investor had to pay in cash a fraction of the stock's

real value.
a later date.

The rest of the value of the stock would be paid at
This practice can be sound, if the credit for such

6
purchases does not become over-extended.

What began to occur

was a situation in which the investor would purchase
stock then he had any possible means of paying
Making matters worse was the

~act

~or

~ar

more

in cash.

that investors would trade

unpaid-for stock for more unpaid-for stock, sell that stock for
cash, then use the accrued cash to buy more stock on credit.
Carrying this process on for a length of time, investors com
pletely over-extended their credit, and by doing so they ruined
the real value of the stocks they bought and traded.
Another indicator of the public's faith in the nation's
economic system was the esteem in which it held the nation's in
dustrial leaders.

Henry Ford and the men of Madison Avenue and

Wall Street were regarded as economic wizards.
was

Modern technology

developing, spreading its wonders throughout the country.

The economy was growl ng, everything di d i nde ed seem "ro sy • "
Blit this -eeonomt,c "ro_se"__was soon to wil b,
There were several factors which helped precipitate the de
pression.

The buying and selling of unpaid-for stock resulted

in a gross over-extension of credit.

The get-ricb-schemes helped

promote an aura of uncertainty in the economic sector.

The

temporary boom of the 20 's caused a tremendous rise in the pro
duction of durable goods.

Combined, the factors would increase

the severity of the pending economic decline.
The dramatic rise in the demand for durable goods created an
enormous productive

ef~ort

in this sector.

This effort created

employment for a considerable number of the work force in the

7

sector.

When lending institutions and businesses realized the

amount of credit over-extension that existed, they sUddenly made
a demand for cash.
average consumer.

This, in turn, caused a money pinch for the
The consumer's first austerity measure was

an immediate reduction in the purchase of durable goods purchases. 8
The result was a huge amount of unemployment in this area when
money got tight.
The pace of the depression quickened. Business after business
failed; stores and factories had their windows boarded up. Eighty
five thousand business failures occured between the years of 1930
and 1932. The nation's payrolls were reduced by an astounding forty
percent. 9

The economic sickness spread its cancerous growth until

it had critically weakened the country's financial institutions.
The nation's economic heartbeat continued to falter, economic ca1
amity bled rrom every institutional pore. The number of banking
institutions that shut their doors, between January 1, 1930, and
March 6, 1933, numbered well over five thousand. During this period
some $3,461,851,000.00 was lost to depositors as a result of bank
failures. 10

Millions of people lost their life 1s savings.

The

money that was deposited by trusting clients in the vaults of the
nation's banks had simply disappeared because of the over-extension
of credit. The money lent out could not be returned. the loan
recipients simply did not have the runds. The banks were forced to
close; the depositors were forced to suffer.
The political history of our nation's banking system shows
that the nation's banking system was built on a tenuous financial
foundation. Beginning in New York in the 1830's, an alliance
between entrepreneurial interests of the country and antibank

8

Democrats created our free banking system.

Free banking,

meaning a banking system founded on the principle of no govern
mental interference had become an American trademark.

Most

states had passed free banking laws by the late 1830's that per
mitted any group able to meet a simple list of financial require
ments to organize a bank.

The newly created free banking system

financially institutionalized the principles of laissez-faira;
the system also justified the creation of hundreds and hundreds
of banks.

The free banking system destroyed for years the

Hamiltonian belief in the need for a federally supervised banking
system. This led to an over extension of credit, credit which far
exceeded the nation's requirements and was to show conclusively,
when the free banking system collapsed, the need for the institu
tionalization of Hamiltonian doctrines. 11

It was not until the

Roosevelt administration that a reversal from "free banking" to
supervised banking took place.

Roosevelt ssw the need to act,

and did so, bringing the national government into what had been
previously considered the realm of the private individual.
The effect of the bank failure on the depositor was tragic.
For those who diligently set aside money for a rainy day, the day
was at hand but the money was not.

Confusion, panic and bewild

erment was a common reaction by those affected by the banking
crisis.

Worried depositors watched their home banks with a

cautious eye.

At the first sign or rumor of closing, depositors

would rush to the banks before the doors closed on their savings.

9
The bank clients were so edgy, so wary of the banks, that,
in some instances a panic by the depositors would cause such
sudden and large withdrawals that even banks on firm financial
foundations were forced to close.
The first governmental reaction to the banking crisis came
in the form of

banki~

holidays.

Through official proclamation,

state governors decreed that all banks in their respective
states would close their doors.

This action was initiated by

the state governors independent of the actions of other governors.
After the bank closures, state investigators would determine the
solvency of the bank.

If the bank was found to stand on firm

ground, then the doors of the bank were reopened.

Upon his in

auguration to the presidency, Roosevelt took the same steps as
the governors to meet the banking crisis.
national banking holiday.

Roosevelt declared a

Through executive decree he meant to

stop any further bank failures until new legislation could be
enacted to deal with the problem in a more permanent manner.
In this respect, the national banking holiday was only a stop
gap measure, an effort to deal quickly with a very pressing
crisis.
The traditional ideas and philosophies held towards bank
ing were concepts to be replaced by the ideas of Roosevelt's New
Deal.

The Banking Act of 1935 was a reaction to the banking

crisis that faced Roosevelt the day he assumed office.

The main

part. of the Banking Act consisted of the establishment of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

The F.D.I.C. was to be a

regulatory agency, empowered to create regulations and bank

10

policies that would prevent the future loss of monies to bank
depositors. 12 The Banking Act was to establish further banking
regulations,

which, through operation with the Federal Reserve

Board, would work to prevent future bank failures.
The Roosevelt administration sought to insure that the

3,461,852,000 dollars lost to depositors was to become a historical
ract, not a

present or future part of bank operations.

respect the Banking Act was a measure

des~:gned

confidence in the nation's banking system.

In one

to restore public

By assuring the

safety of deposita, and establishing a regulatory reorganization
of the banking system, Roosevelt hoped to re-establish the nation's
investment and banking system on a sound basis.
Roosevelt felt that, as trustees

of the public good, bankers

and other financial leaders must act in an honest - and_re
sponsible manner.
"public" money,
pUblic-at-large.

Public trustees were not to gamble with
or use the money entrusted to them to harm the
Roosevelt believed that the public trustees of

the day were

harming the pUblic, and took steps to put an end to

the "d.evd c e s

of financial chf.canev , 13

In his first
mediate

administration, Roosevelt began to take im

steps to propose measures that would in some way regulate

the nation's investment sector.

One of the investment measures

enacted was the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.

The legisla

tion was enacted in response to the deteriorating situation of
the

nation's investment system.

situation in the

Roosevelt regarded the existing

investment sector as a national concern.

The

11
effects of credit over-extension, and the manipulation of stock
prices, were

viewed by Roosevelt as placing a burden on inter

state commerce. and adversely affecting the general welfare of
the nation. 14 Roosevelt felt that because of the ramifications
of the investment crisis and the effect of the crisis on the
entire economy. that only federally-sponsored national solutions
would

solve the problem.
The Securities Act was designed to replace previous laws and

duties administered by the Federal Trade Commission. 1 5

The Sec

urities Act was an attempt to create one uniform law that would
deal with all

facets of securities exchange.

Before the enact

ment of the securities measure, regulation of security exchanges
was

done under the auspices of various individual state regula

tory laws.
They

These laws were referred to as "blue sky" laws.

required licenses and permits before a broker was allowed

to sellar buy

securities.

The state regulatory laws because of

differences in laws from state to state were ineffective in
stopping the sudden flooding of the security market with unwanted
stocks.

This and other forms of price manipulation were allowed

to continue under the fairly lax state laws.
Section seven(a) of

the Securities Act dealt with the

over-extension of credit by banks to investors and brokers.
order

In

to prevent the continued over-extension of credit for sec

urities procurement,

the Federal Reserve Board was empowered to

establish rules and regulations concerning amounts of credit that
could

be extended for purchases of _stock. 16

The Federal Reserve

Board was given, in effect, the power to determine the margin of

12

credit that could be given for securities procurement.
Borrowing money, either directly or indirectly, on secur
ities holdings was prohibited

~or

any member of the securities

exchange under section eight of the law.
to

~rther

This section BOUght

limit the amount of credit that could be introduced

into the stock market.

It prohibited the development of a two

staged credit extension.

Before the law's enactment, bankers

and investors could buy stock on margin and then borrow cash
using their stocks as collateral.
Sections seven and eight served to return the use
to a more sound, controllable financial level.

o~

credit

These sections

were regulatory advances by the federal government into an area
traditional local control.

o~

This type of regulatory legislation

was to become a model for future New Deal legislation which
sought to institute controls and regulations over the financial
working of the nation's economy.

Roosevelt's economic beliefs,

unlike the economic philosophy of Hoover, held that the crisis that
had evolved came from more than "a lack of confidence by the
people in the financial system.

Roosevelt believed that the

nation's financial structure, the traditional operating concepts
of the investment sector, needed to be changed.

The crisis at

hand was seen to mandate such a change.
An

example of a change in the traditional operating concepts

of the investment sector made by Roosevelt is the administration
of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation under Roosevelt's govern
ment.

Under Hoover, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was

13
designed to benefit those at the top of the economic order.
This means that rands

were meant to be allocated to large

corporations and lending institutions, rather than individuals.

By

helping the top of the economic hierarchy, the nation's large

financial institutions, it was believed that the benerits of
such relief would trickle down to the lower economic levels of
the economy.

The purpose of the R.F.C., during the Hoover Admin

istration, embodied the personal economic theories of President
Hoover. 17 Hoover's economic theories contrast sharply with
Roosevelt's belief that the little man, the individual, the man
at the bottom of the economic ladder, should be assisted first.
This, Roosevelt

argued, would prop up the entire economic order
from its foundations. 18 RoosBvelt put this theory in operation

when he reorganized the R.F.C.

Instead of lending money to

the large financial institutions, and increasing the debt of
those institutions, as did the R.F.C. under the Hoover administra
tion, the R.F.C. under Roosevelt enlarged the operating capital
of the banks by buying preferred bank stock.

This bolstered

capital structure, creating more available funds for the institu
tio~

thereby freeing more funds for loans and payments to

depositors.
Under the Hoover administration, a considerable number of
problems

became associated with the administration of the R.F.C.

The R.F.C. was enacted to lend money to banks and other financial
institutions.

The loans given to these institutions were supposed

to loosen up

the flow of currency .and allow banks to pay depositors

interest on their deposits.

Increased loan activity was the

I

14
expected result.
the economy.

This would then add impetuB to the recovery of

The R.F.C. did not achieve its expected results

primarily because the agency's Board of Governors set their in
terest rates far above the market level.

In effect, the

financial institutions had to pay more in interest to gain

~ds

from the R.F.C. than they would if they borrowed from private
lending institutions.

The case of the Reno Nation Bank loan

clearly illustrates the high cost associated with borrowing
from the R.F.C.

In order to secure a 1.1 million dollar loan

the Reno bank had to offer the R.F.C. some 3 million dollars as
collateral to cover interest payments.

The over-all effect of

the R.F.C. under the Hoover administration was a failure to
stimulate an increase in commercial credit, and a premature as
sertion that financial stability had been restored. 19
The administration of the R.F.C. under Hoover clearly shows
the failure of traditional economic theory.
from traditional notions.

Roosevelt diverged

His governmental policies were aimed

at helping the masses, in effect keeping his pledge to remember
the forgotten man.

It must be noted that even thought, lithe old

economic order (and the old economic practices) had been replaced
in 1933 in the Congress and in the White House ll 20 these same eco
nomic theories and beliefs were maintained and upheld by five of
the nine Justices on the Supreme Court.

The adherence by the

Supreme Court to an outdated economic theory would place it in
direct opposition to Roosevelt and the new progressive economic
theory of the New Deal.
In .another area of economic activity a Senate investigatory

15

committee found that in 1932, some thirteen holding companies
controlled over seventy-five percent of the privately owned
electric companies.

The committee further reported that of

the thirteen, three controlled forty percent of the privately
owned electric companies in the nation. 2 1 The Administrations
reaction to the situation, a situation confirmed by the Senate
report, was the proposal of the Public Utilities Holding Company
Act.

James Morley, a Presidential aide, expressed the admin

istration's view that the growth of the holding companies had
little relation to business or economic need.

The holding

companies, especially the public utilities holding companies,
existed and multiplied only because of a manifest desire for
exorb 1ot an t pro fOt
1 B. 22
The public utilities holding companies were virtually im
mune from existing laws in 1932.

Felix Frankfurter, a Roosevelt

advisor, suggested that the President enact a new law, one
specifically aimed at the holding companies.

Only in

this._~.man

ner could such companies be brOUght within the jurisdiction of
federal law.
The Public Utilities Holding Company Act had to meet
Roosevelt's personal requirements for the establishment of
stringent regulation of, and control over, the public utility
holding companies.

One section of the proposed act was so

stringent that it provoked a bitter fight within the Senate when
brought up for vote.
The act was divided into two main parts.

The first part

attacked the existence of the utility holding company as an

16
institution.

This

part of the act contained the controversial

section ten, which sought to eliminate all public utility holding
companies.

This section would prove to be so controversial

that only through its removal would the law pass.
over the death sentence clause

The fight

served to show that members of

Congress would only go so far in supporting New Deal doctrines. 23
On

August first, the House of Representatives voted

against provisions encompassed in the first part of the measure.
The controversial section ten, the

so~called

tldeath sentence

clausell, became the one major obstacle to passage of the bill
and because of this section, the Congress enacted the Wheeler
Rayburn bill.
containing a

This

bill was a compromise piece of legislation,

more subtle death sentence clause.

Under the

provisions of the Wheeler-Rayburn bill, holding companies that
were more than twice removed from the actual operations of the
utility were disbanded.

The Securities and Exchange Commission

was empowered to break up all holding companies which they de
termined to be
Other

against the best interests of the general public. 24

than the change of wording in section ten, the Public

Utilities Holding Company Act and the Wheeler-Rayburn Act were
almost identical in purpose.
The Public Utilities Holding Company Act which finally did
emerge from the legislature fit the model of New Deal legisla
tion by further opening the door to governmental intervention in
what had been previously considered as local concerns • . It
also sought to

help the common man.

With the utilities law,

17

the Roosevelt administration was to begin to hear the protests
of

the old order.

The final version of the Public Utilities

Holding Company Act was to be struck down by courts of law
across the nation.

The final spokesmen for the old order, the

spokesmen for the men of property who were opposed to and feared
New Deal ideologies, would be the courts.
would act

The Supreme Court

as the chief spokesman for both the old order and the

courts.
With the questioning of the Public Utilities Holding
Company Act, the gauntlet was thrown, and the fight between the
New Deal and the old order began to be clearly seen as an issue
of differing philosophies.
around those differences.

The battlelines would be drawn
The issue of the proper role of gov

ernmental operation in the nation's economy was to be reargued
and redefined through the court's decisions on the National Re
covery

Act, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the mortgage mor

atorium laws, and Railroad Retirement Acts.

18
CliAPTER TWO

Laws for Human Relief
The decay and virtual collapse of the nation's financial
institutions was perhaps a smaller, less important crisis than
the crisis of human need.

The soup lines in New York's bowery

were drawing over two thousand patrons for each meal in 1933.
This example serves only to begin to indicate the amount of human
poverty and suffering that occurred during the years of the
Depression.
With millions of unemployed, and hundreds dying across the
nation from lack of food, it became all too horribly apparent
that the nation's system of public relief was totally inadequate.

Our traditional notions of public relief come from Elizabethan
England.

These Elizabethan concepts held that public relief was

a concern of the local governments.
for being without a job.

The unemployed were blamed

They were given the means for a sub

sistence living, however, all aid given to the unemployed carried
the social stigma of a gift to freeloaders.

The desperate plight

of those caught in the economic collapse can be seen in the letter
to the editor published by The Nation on May 31, 1933:
I am a married man with two children. I
have worked steadily and saved some money so
that I could give my children a proper educa
tion and teach them to be honest, upright
citizens. A few years ago I purchased a horne
and was •••• happy.
I lost my home because I lost my position
and could not meet my mortgage payments. I
tried to borrow on my insurance and could not
secure cash.

. . . _--... .- - - - 
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What am I to do to keep my family
from sUffering? Am I to become a vagrant and
be sent to jail? Am I going to be driven
to steal or commit some other crime because
I have been an honest, law abiding, hard
working citizen? I am not signing this for
the reason that I may be termed a radical
and sent to jail.
This was the plight of many home owners, the people who held
jobs, bought insurance, owned a home, and had families - the
participants in the Great American Dream.

Now that dream had

been shattered.
Our traditional notions of public relief had effectively
precluded

the intervention by the national government into

pUblic relief compensation or planning.

As a reSUlt, when

unemployment rose to the dangerously high levels of 1932, the
federal government refused to act, feeling it was not within
its constitutional province to provide for the growing number
of unemployed.

It should be noted here that President Hoover,

when he opposed the allotment of federal

~ds

to state and

local governments for public relief, did not do so with malicious
intent.

It was

no~

at that time, part of the ':federal government's

operational philosophy to administer such funds.

President

Hoover did relent at the end of his term, and agreed to provide
loans to state and local governments for public-relief.

The

amount loaned was a substantial $2.222 billion, but even this
amount

of money did not begin to relieve the crisis.

Shortly

before

Hoover left the office of the presidency, he made the

loan a

grant. 1

Hoover's departure from office also marked the

departure from the traditional beliefs of governmental involve
ment in social welfare.
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Adolf Berle has

remarked that upon Roosevelt's inaug

uration as President, IIConditions decreed the extension of
federal power; President Franklin Roosevelt needed it to
carry out his plan for social-economic reconstruction of the
Country." 2 Roosevelt, during his first four months in office,
would embark upon what would later be described as "fifteen
weeks of whirlwind changes in the old order, of experimental
process, of legislative novelties, and of practically unchal
lenged executive domination of the colossal organism we call
the federal government. n3
accomplish much:

The first Roosevelt Congress would

pass banking and relief measures; prohibit

gold hoarding; pass the Economy Act; cut the budget by one
billion dollars; reduce Veteran's compensation by 320 million
dollars; legalize 3.2 beer; devalue the
More importantly,

the Congress would save the homes of millions

from bank foreclosure
create

nation's currency.4

by enacting the Home Owners Loan Act;

the Civilian Conservation Corps which would employ

275,000 young men;

allot five-hundred

million~dollars

for Un

employment Relief; and create the Public Works Administration
which would employ an additional 3.3 million men. 5

During

their 1934-36 terms, Congressmen would enact an all-encompassing
New Deal law, a synthesis of the New Deal--the National Recovery
Act.

The invalidation of this act, which was recognized by

Roosevelt as

an invalidation of the entire New Deal, precipitated

the Court Reorganization

Plan which projected Roosevelt and the
Supreme Court into a head-on clash. 6
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Banks were foreclosing on homes and private property
with what seemed to be a ruthless, relentless drive.
had

paid a

Those who

substantial part of their mortgage suddenly found

themselves in a far worse bargaining position than those who
owed the banks a higher percentage of their mortgages.
Economically, it was

in the banker's best interest to fore

close on property that was almost paid for.

The return or

profit made on selling property that was almost paid for when
foreclosed upon was much greater than on properties which still
had high outstanding

mortgages.

Foreclosures on homes soon became unrelated to the bank's
need to establish liquid assets.

Banks in need of funds for

the issuance of new loans could borrow from the R.F.C.

The real

reason behind property foreclosures wes that they became a means
of securing higher profits for the banks.?

When the plight of

the home and property owner came to the attention of President
Roosevelt, he requested the Congress to act, out of what he
termed a"morel obligation~8 on behalf of the homeowners.
The first act on the -homeowner s ' behalf was the Home Loan
and Bank Act.

This allowed homeowners to receive new mortgages

from specific lending institutions if the debt of the homeowner
was less than forty percent.

The chosen institutions were

usually found in larger cities, and many of the homeowners debt
was over 40%.

These-restrictions served to hamper or negate any

effective action that the law might have had.
act

~as

As a reSUlt, this

supplemented by the Home O.wner's Loan Act.

Through this

act. the Home Owner!s Corporation was created on June 13, 1933. 9
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The Loan Corporation was given some two hundred million
dollars in
prevent

cash and two billion dollars in bonds to help

~orecloBure

on individual residences and small, owner-

occupied boarding houses and apartment buildings valued at less
than $20,000. 10 Of this total, $923,416,733 were lent to save
306,887 homes from foreclosure.
lent went to

Over $100 million of the money

pay delinquent state and local taxes. 1 1

Payment

of these taxes allowed localities to meet payrolls for municipal
workers.

Some twenty million dollars of the money borrowed was

used for home repairs.

Together with the money paid in taxes,

money used for home repairs greatly benefitted the local commu
nity's financial and employment situation.
of the

money ' loaned wa.s

his private bank

mortgage.

The great majority

used by the house owner to payoff
Payments to private lending institu

tions allowed such institutions to reopen, and in many cases al
lowed banks to make substantial payments to their depositors.
President Roosevelt had taken steps to insure that home
owners would be able to keep their homes, and to insure that
banks would be established on a new

~irm

foundation.

At the same

time, Roosevelt was formulating measures that would begin to al
leviate

both the causes and effects of human poverty.

There

existed a number of crucial employment-related problems that had
to

be dealt with.

The trouble spots of unemployment, under

employment, and unfair hours and wages had to be given attention.
The primary victims of the economic turbulence were the
young and those workers who held seasonal or leas secure job
positions.

The aimless, drifting unemployed became -a serious
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threat to the peace and security or many local communities.
Traditional relief programs could not adequately deal with the
multitudes of unemployed.
caused

by the

lief programs.

The frustration, the desperation

depression could not be met by traditional re
This frustration and desperation constituted

the main threat to community security.

The nation's youth,

along with their parents, felt a strong sense of stagnation and
railure. 12

This feeling was dangerous to more than just the

community.

Because it came from the youth, the future of America,

it threatened the nation's future.
President Roosevelt took an active interest in the plight
of
his

the nation's youth.

The interest may have been caused by

sense of the urgency and potentially dangerous situation of

large numbers of able-bodied, unemployed young people.

On March

31, 1933, Roosevelt signed into law a measure that created the
Civilian Conservation Corps.1 3
provide

a

federally-~ded

The purpose of the corps was to

and supervised job to every young

man who did not wish to continue school after his sixteenth
birthday.

Over a quarter of a million young men were given jobs

working on various land-use projects.
had a dual function:

In this respect, the C.C.C.

to employ a segment of the nation's youth,

and to begin a national program of land use

conservati~n.

The C.C.C. fell under the administration of four executive
departments.
bility

The Department of-Labor was charged with the responsi

of enrolling and selecting G.G.C. recruits.

The Depart

ment of War ran the daily activities in the C.G.C. camps.
this respect, life in the C.C.C. took on a military flavor,

In
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complete with bugle, work and dress uniforms, and passes to
visit nearby towns.

The Department of Interior and the Depart

ment of AgriCUlture created and supervised the various land
use projects for the corps.
The
their

C.C.C. provided benefits to both the young men and

parents

and families.

The C.C.C. youth were given a

daily wage, half of which was sent home to their families, and
they received room, board and job training.
signed

The program was de

to remove the youth from their impoverished surroundings,

and to provide them with a new sense of self-confidence and a
desire

to succeed in the work place.

respect, an

anti-stagnation program.

The corps was, in this
It provided a very

crucial part of the nation with work experience, and most im
portantly, with something to do.

The C.C.C. also served to pro

vide a much needed boost in morale for at least this one segment
of the population.
While a form of relief had been instituted for some of the
nation's youth, other measures were being formulated to give re
lief

and employment to the other sections of the nation's unemployed.

The nation's first relief organization was embodied in the Federal
Emergency Relief Administration, which was established on May 12,

1933.

This program directed federal funds to states, who in

turn distributed the money among the needy as they saw fit.

Co

existing with the F.E.R.A. was the Civil Works Administration.
Established in November of 1933;4 this program Channeled federal
money directly to the nation's needy.
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Critics of the two measures complained that the federal
government was promoting a national dole.

They also argued that

this type of relief was degrading to recipients
provide
work.

and did not

any kind of impetus to the average recipient to find

As

a result of these major complaints the F.E.R.A. and

the C.W.A. were discontinued in 1935 after having spent three
billion dollars. I S
A pUblic works program was launched under the National In

dustrial Recovery Act, in the summer of 1934.

The Public Works

Administration was established under this program to replace pre
vious relief programs.

Under the administration of Harold L.

Ickes, then Secretary of the Interior, the P.W.A. allotted 3.3
billion dollars
projects.

to 13,266 federal projects and 2,407 non-federal

One of the more famous projects was the Tennessee Val

ley Authority.

Although all projects were not as large as the

T.V.A., 99% of all counties in the country had at least one public
. t • 16
wor k B proJec

The Roosevelt Administration sought, through the P.W.A., to
prime the nation's economic pump.

By establishing a nation-wide

building program, the Roosevelt administration hoped to add the
impetus

needed to bring about national economic recovery.

The

over-all effectiveness of the program was somewhat limited under
the administration of Ickes because of his insistence not to allow
the disbursal

of any funds for illegitimate purposes.

Ickes

was niclmamed "Honest Harold" by the newspapers of the day.
fear of scandal pervaded the
tent that allocations
out review of projects.

diBb~rsement

His

of funds to such an ex

were given only after careful and drawn-

26
Growing dissent began to be heard about the direction and
role of the executive branch in the nation's economic sectors.
One

Congressman from the State of Maine voiced his objections

that the measures would lead the "mas s aa" to believe that it was
the duty of the government to put everyone who is unemployed on
the federal payroll. 17 The role that the Roosevelt administra
tion intended to
of

assume was made clear at

the administration's term.

the very beginning

In his inaugural address, Roosevelt

made known his intentions when he said, "I shall ask Congress for
the

one remaining instrument to meet the crisis - broad execu

tive power to wage a war against

the emergency,

8S

great as the

power that should be given if we were in fact invaded by a foreign
foe. 1I 18

Roosevelt was given broad executive power, albeit with

growing reluctance on the part of the Congress.

The Congress gave

such power as a result of the intensity of the existing crisis
and of the immense pressure by the public for the enactment of
relief measures.
sent.

The JUdiciary would serve to intensify the dis

The Judicial branch of government would set aside the pres

sure of pUblic opinion and would question the propriety of the
assumption of new power by the executive branch of government.
With the exception of the Public Utilities Holding Company
Act,

the measures

courts of

discussed above remained unchallenged in the

the country.

stop-gap in nature,
Roosevelt would

These measures were, on the whole,

direct responses to specific pr-ob Lem s ,

eventually cause the intensification of dissent

from both the legislative and judicial branches or government.
when he went beyond reacting to immediate problema and formulated
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comprehensive national economic recovery plans.
Dire situations still faced the American business and labor
sectors. Traditional economic forces of supply and demand, of a
self-balancing market had failed. There existed much demand for
goods and necessities, there was also a surplus of goods in some
sectors, like fooatuffs, however, the market could not right it
self, the economic pump needed another way to be primed.

Wages

fell to levels where only the extremely desperate would take the
jobs at the offered pay. The low wages and long hours did not ef
feet the prices of most goods.

Any rise in prices in many cases

brought a decline in wages; the system could no longer
adjust itself to price and wage disparities. The market system needed
a strong and visible hand to forae price and
equitable relationship.

w~ge

levels into a more

In order to correlate wages and hours with

price levels, Roosevelt proposed the enactment of the National Re
covery Administration.

The N.R.A. was to establish "codes of fair

practice (which) would eliminate eye-gouging and knee-groining and
ear chewing in business. t1 19
The National Industrial Recovery Act was signed into law
by F.D.R. on June 16, 1933.

The act gave the executive branch of

government discretionary powers in approving industrial codes to
have effect for a period of two years.

By 1938, some four hundred

and twelve codes were signed into law.

It was estimated that the

codes had been responsible for the reduction in unemployment
figures from thirteen to ten million.

Unemployment was reduced

by limiting the mnnbers of hours many employees could work and in
creasing pay for those shorter houra. 20 The President described
the act as:

lithe most important and .far reaching legislation ever

enacted by the American Congress." 21

He believed the act to be
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the mainspring of the New Deal program.

The measure embodied

the hopes and aspirations of the New Deal.

The N.I.R.A., and

specifically the N.R.A., would become synonymous with the New
Deal.
The measure was new, and conservatives called the measure
radical while liberals criticized it for not being far reaching
enough.

Aware of the growing fervor about his over-all economic

policy,

Roosevelt had preferred to push through crisis-oriented

bills before

asking for

the

During the N.R.A.'s enactment, the debate on the

N.R.A.

floor

the broad reconstruction measures, like

of the two legislative chambers had been prolonged and

bitter.

The

final act was actually a compromise among many

different factions and theories.

It called for industrial repre

sentatives to write their own codes of fair practices.
codes had to be approved by the President.

These

All codes written under

the auspices .. of the act were exempt from anti-trust laws.
listic

Monopo

practices were still banned by law, although as a result

of code-making, enforcement of anti-monopoly laws would be impos
sible.

The

underlying theme of the act was to have businesses

of

all kinds join in a voluntary self-government program, lito be
come one happy family, 1I 22to act cohesively in order to ward off
the financial threat
the

N.R.A.

that faced the nation.

Section seven(a) of

offered labor a guarantee (although critics claimed

a vague one) of the right to bargain collectively, choosing their
own representatives to talk to employers.

The act established pro

visions or guidelines for wage and hour standards that would be
incorporated into all codes. 23

The" codes also sought to abolish
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sweat shops, child labor, and to make obligatory free access by
the government to the financial

~ecords

of busineases. In actual opera

tion the codes further provided for uniform prices, some codes
limiting production while others assigned industry-wide quotas. 24
Under the direction of General Johnson, the N.R.A. "burst on
the American people like a call to arms. II

Symbolized by the "blue

eagle," the N.R.A. had immediate public approval.

General Johnson

traveled from city to city, cajoling, pleading, and demanding in
dustry leaders to sign code agreements.
and industry rallied to the cause.

In the beginning the public

As long as a national emergency

was seen to exist, the codes would be formulated and followed.

The

song of the day was, IIHappy Days are Here Again".
Actually, what was really on the upswing was not the nation's
economy, but the numbers, strength and support of the critics of
the N.R.A. and of the Roosevelt administration.

Dissent was being

voiced because of the fact that Roosevelt's economic policies were
leading the government into, what had been previously been considered
as, the private sector with, what conservatives thOUght was, a
terrifying speed.
The National Recovery Administration was the backbone of
the New Deal.

To some it stood for help and rescue from troubled

economic times, yet to others the N.R.A.,

and the industry

codes which the administration compiled and enforced, was an
ominous symbol of government intervention into the affairs of
private citizens.

The N.R.A., because of its omnibus nature, ex

tended its influence in varied sectors of the economy.

This exten

sion was done bit by bit, code by code, industry by industry - and
the N.I.R.A. was invalidated in much the same manner.

Even
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though "symptoms of deep social unrest, following economic col
lapse, were insistent and could not be ignored,,,26 the jUdicial
branch of our government repeatedly invalidated New Deal legisla
tion for reasons of unconstitutional delegation of legislative
powers to the executive.
The Courts began to disassemble the National Recovery Ad
ministration, and invalidate the National Industrial Recovery
Act, with their ruling in the "Hot Oil ll case.

On Januay 7, 1935

in the case of Panama Refining Company v Ryan, the Supreme Court
of the United States of America declared section 9-C of the N.I.R.A.
unconstitutional.
invalidation

The January 1935 decision foretold the May 1935

of the entire N.I.R.A. that would mandate the ces

aation of the National Recovery Administration's activities.
The

history of

the invalidation of the N.I.R.A. is inter-

eating in that it clearly shows the divergent economic theories
held by the
really begins

Courts and ',the Execu ti v e.
in

th~

The hi B tory

0

f the N. I •R. A.

time span between 1933 and 1935.

During this

time, the overproduction of oil was seriously threatening a col
lapse of the

price structure in the oil market.

This in itself

is an example of the failure of traditional Smithian economic
notions of a self-righting, self-adjusting market.
as it 1s today, an

important national commodity.

Oil was then,
A collapse of

the oil price structure, and therefore a threat of cessation in
oil production, was viewed by the Roosevelt administration as a
national concern. 27 Under the National Industrial Recovery Act,
Congress had given to the President the power to prohibi-t .the
interstate transportation of petroleum produced in excess of the
amounts permitted by N.R.A. code.

Through this delegation of

31
power by the Legislative to the Executive branches or government,
the price structure of oil had been stabilized.

The so-called

lIhot 011" production code was a voluntary code written by the
oil industry at their own request.
of

enforcing agreed-upon codes.

lating their own

The N.R.A. was given the task
The idea of industries formu

codes or standards or fair trade and practices

was in keeping with the administration's philosophy that it was
not the purpose or the function of the N.R.A. to organize either
industry or labor.

Only as a result of the national economic

crisis was the Federal government given, and willing to assume,
powers to bring about solutions to the economic crisis.

The

United States Supreme Court disagreed with the administration's
philosophy, and invalidated the assumption of new powers.
On January 7, 1935 in Panama Refining Company vs Ryan,
the Court invalidated a part of the N.I.R.A.

The Court held as

unconstitutional the delegation of power given to the President
under section

9-C of the N.I.R.A.

Section 9-C had authorized

the President to prohibit the transportatbn in interstate and
foreign commerce of petroleum as he saw rit. 28 Brushing aside the
interstate commerce question, the Court stated that the confering
of power upon the President,

without the prescription or a

policy or standard to guide the decision, was an unconstitutional
delegation of power. 29 The immediate effect of the Supreme
Court's decision was a dramatic increase in the movement of thot
oil t • 30 Congress would pass a substitute measure, the Connally
Act,

in 1936.

This Bet sought, in a dirferent legislative

fashion, to regulate oil production. 31

Popular opinion ran
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strongly against the Court's decision.

Time magazine argued

that "when industries organize themselves on a national scale,
making their relation to interstate commerce the dominant factor
in

their activities, how can it be maintained that their in

dustrial relations constitute a forbidden field into which Congress
may

not enter when it is necessary to protect interstate com
merce from the paralyzing consequences of industrial war?"3 2
Roosevelt was taking steps to prevent any further economic par
alyais.

Roosevelt's election to the Presidency was seen as a

clear mandate to go forward with the programs which he believed
necessary to take care of the needy, to draw the country up from
the depths of the depression, and to correct the glaring evila
in the nation's economic and social syatem. 33

The President's

program required the assumption of new powers in order to meet
the nation's needs.

Meeting national needs became a "Roosevelt

ism ll for extending control over prices and wages.
The courts, with growing frequency, disagreed with the means
by

which Roosevelt hoped to accomplish national recovery.
Embodied in

the N.R.A. were perhaps the most extraordinary

measures found in the entire New Deal program.
operational

symbol of New

Deal philosophy.

The N.R.A. was an
On May 17, 1935

the Supreme Court invalidated this philosophy by declaring the
code making the authority of the N.R.A. unconstitutional.
case

which decided this was the Schechter Poultry Company v

United States 295
the

The

u.s 495 (1935).

Unlike the 'Hot Oil l decision,

Schechter decision was handed down by a unanimous Court.
.

The case poorly represented the N.I.R.A. Codes.

34

A somewhat

33
jovial Court heard the case.
ings Counsel

At one point during the proceed

for the Schechters explained that, "if a customer.

wants half a coop of chickens, he has to take it just like it
iall ••• to this Justice Sutherland queried, "What if the chickens
are all at one end?n35

General laughter followed.

In his decision Chief Justice Hughes stated, IlExtraordinary
conditions may call for extraordinary remedies.

But the argument

necessarily stops ahort of an attempt to justify action which lies
outside the sphere of constitutional authority.u36

The Chief

Justice continued, " ••• extraordinary conditions do not create or
enlarge constitutional power. 1I 37
President was infuriated.

No one was laughing now.

The

The President stated, "We have forty-

eight nations from now on under a strict interpretation of this
decision. 1I 38

Roosevelt further lamented, "Ia the United States

going to decide, are the people of this country going to decide
that their Federal government shall in the future have no right
under
a

any implied power or any court-approved power to enter into

solution

of a national economic problem or must they be de

cided only by

the states?,,39

Under an interpretation of the

Supreme Court's opinion, the Federal government had no such power.
The Court

held that transactions involved in selling chickens

wi thin a state

were not

It

in" intersta te commerce and only indirect

1'1 - a f f ec t ed such commerce.
was

It

The court held that the distinction

a fundamental one, essential to the maintenance of our con

stitutional system, otherwise, no limit would exist to Federal
power, and for all practical purposes we should have complete
centralized government.,,40

The Schechter decision made clear that

34
power to regulate

interstate comnerce, vested by the Constitu

tion in the Federal Government, will not support a planned
economy.41
of

all

The decision threw doubt upon the constitutionality

New Deal legislation.

The Court had ruled that, ltpro

duction or the manner in which it is conducted does not affect
interstate commerce with sufficient directness to warrant Federal
regulation unless it places an intentional, artificial barrier
in the way of

the free flow of connnerce. rr 4 2

The Court's position

was made clear; the Roosevelt administration could have only the
most limited usage of the power vested in the Congress through
the commerce clause.
The

celebrated "Chicken Case ll had effectively destroyed

the statutory base not merely for the poultry code, but for all
codes formed under the N.I.R.A.

In a letter to Henry L. Stimson,

President Roosevelt acknowledged defeat for the entire N.R.A.
program.
is

"It is the 'dictum' in the Schechter case opinion that

disturbing because, again, if the 'dictum' is followed in

the future the Court would probably find only ten percent of the
actual transactions to be directly related to interstate commerce. II 43
As

further acknowledgement of defeat, the President ordered the

Attorney General to dismiss 412 code violations that were slated
for prosecution.
The Schechter decision threatened the entire recovery pro
gram.

As

Roosevelt stated, "The whole line of decisions cast a

deep shadow of
time, to

doubt upon the ability of Congress ever, at any

protect the nation against catastrophe by squarely

meeting modern

social and economi~ maladjustments. tl 44

Secretary
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of Labor Perkins reported to the President that as of noon,
June 13, 1935, fifty-nine
and increased hours.

Blacks in the deep south were quickly

being paid ten cents an hour. 4 5

returned to
250

establishments had reduced wages

By June 25, some

pages of documentation were sent to the President listing

firms that had broken from code guidelines. 46
On June

3, 1935, Roosevelt wrote to Ambassador Bullitt,

serving in Moscow, tithe fact remains that the principles of
the N.R.A. must be carried on in some way.,,47

In his letter to

Henry stimson on June 10, Roosevelt alluded to how he might be
able

to carry on wi th his

trying to

plana: "I can assure you that I am

look at several angles and that I hope something

practical can

be worked out. n 48

That "something practical"

would be the Court Reorganization Plan of 1937.
would pass before the plan was unfolded.

Almost two years

During those two years

the Supreme Court would strike down more and more of the New Deal.
It

may

camel's back."

be said that the Schechter decision "broke the
Research shows that shortly after the May decision

Homer Cummings began work on the Court Reorganization Plan.
Schechter

decision also exemplifies the differences in govern

mental outlooks
members of
D.

The

and economic philosophies which were held by the

the Supreme Court and those that were held by Franklin

Roosevelt.

The Court believed that Congress could not dele

gate broad powers to the President.
stitution did not permit

The Court held that the Con

such delegation of powers, nor did the

Constitution permit the assumption of executive powers that were not
specifically given in the Constitution.

The N.I.R.A. went

36
beyond the Constitutional boundaries set forth by the Court.
The Constitution was what a majority of the Justices on the Court
said it was, and the N.I.R.A. was not constitutional in the eyes
of the majority of the members of the Court.
On the same day that the Schechter decision was handed down,
another decision, perhaps as equally important, was also made public.
The Supreme Court, by a 5-4 margin, in the case of Railroad Retire
ment Board v Alton Railroad Company, further limited the Federal
government's power to regulate interstate commerce. The Railroad
Retirement Act was an attempt to provide security for railroad em
ployees in interstate commerce, through required contributions by
the railroads' companies to a retirement fund. 49 The Court held
that all legislation of this nature was unconstitutional. This as
sertion brOUght a vigorous dissent from the Chief Justice:
The gravest aspect of the decision is that
it does not rest simply upon a condamnation of
particular features of the Railroad Retirement
Act, but denies to Congress the power to pass
any compulsory pensions act for railroad
employees. I think that the conclusions thus
reached is a departure from sound principles
and is an unwarranted limitation u~on the com
merce clause of the Constitution.5 0
Hughes made it clear, that in his opinion, Congress had the authority
to subject purely intrastate railroad traffic of the nation, to
its control. 51
On January 26, 1936, the Supreme Court, in the case of U.S.
v. Butler 297 u.S. 1(1936), held in a five to four majority, that the
overproduction of farm products was not directly related to the
countryls general welfare.

The Agricultural Adjustment Act was an

attempt by the Federal government to stabilize farm market prices.
With the economic collapse of the 1930's, farm produce prices
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had fallen to levels far below the farmers' cost of production.

In

fact, farming income had dropped from $5 billion to one-half billion
from 1929 to 1933. 5 2 The result was a virtual mass exodus of farm
ers from their farms.

The U.S. entered the dust bowl era.

Food be

came scarce, because of the low prices, and more and more farm land
lay barren.

The central part of the A.A.A. was the processing tax

levied on farm produce processors.

Through this tax, the Federal

Government sought to pay farmers not to grow certain crops, and
heavily taxed those crops produced in excess of government quotas.
The Court invalidated the use of taxing power to achieve reg
ulation in U.S. v Butler.

Associate Justice Roberts presented the

Court's opinion; "At best it (the A.A.A.) is a scheme for purchas
ing with Federal funds submission to Federal regulation of a subject
reserved to the sta.tes. tr 53

Roberts continued, lICongress has no

power to enforce its commands on the farmer to the ends sought by
the A.A.A.tt54

trIn the general understanding of the term, and as

used in the Constitution, tax signifies an exaction for the support
of the Government.

The tax here provided for was not a means of

raising revenue for the support of the Government, but was part of
a. plan to regulate and control agricultural production, a matter
beyond the power delegated to the Federal government. II 55
As a result of the Schechter decision, power given under
the commerce clause of the Constitution to the Congress was
severely curtailed.

Through the Butler decision, the taxing

power of Congress was also limited.

Clearly the Federal government

was being backed into a powerless situation.

The issue was made

clear by Associate Justice Stone in his vigorous dissent, liThe
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present levy is held invalid, not for any want of power in Congress
to lay such a tax to defray public expenditures, including those
for the general welfare, but because the use to which its pro
ceeds are put is disapproved. II 56

stone continued, making clear

his message that he believed the tax to be valid, and that the tax,
held to be invalid by a majority of the Court, was ruled invalid
only because the Justices on the Court were answering to different
economic doctrines. Stone stated in dissent that in his view;
liThe present stress of widely held and strongly
expressed differences of opinion of the wisdom of
the A.A.A. makes it important, ••• to emphasize at the 
onset certain propositions which should have control
ling inf'luence in determining the validity of the act.
(The Court should be guided by two principles in in
validating legislation) one is that courts are concerned
only with the power to enact statutes, not with their
wisdom (my emphasis). The other is that while uncon
stitutional exercise of power by the executive and
legislative branches is SUbject to judicial restraint,
the only check upon our own exercise of power is our
own sense of self-restraint.57
Stone ended with a powerful plea, "Courts are not the only agency
of government that must be assumed to have capacity to govern.,,58
Many now believed that the Courts were the only ones who would be
allowed to govern.

As one concerned voter wrote to the President,

"If nine or even five men, can nullify the will of 125,000,000
people, where is the difference between democracy so brilliantly
painted in your last world-famous speech and the Russian, German
and Italian .au t ocr a cy? 1l 59
difference lay.
mortally.

Roosevelt was also unsure where that

His recovery program had been weakened, almost

As he stated, "We were stopped short and thrown back

in our efforts to improve conditions of labor, to safeguard
business against unfair

competitio~,

to protect disorganized and

chaotic interstate industries, to provide old age pensions for

- - - - - _ ._--.- - .- -----  -

39
railroad employees, and in other ways to serve obvious national
needs. 1I 60 Roosevelt waited, he would wait until his re-election in

1936.

He had said little, but very soon he would declare warewith

the Court in a last ditch effort to regain lost power; power needed
to run his (the pronoun is accurate, in Roosevelt's eyes) country.
Two other Supreme Court decisions are important in understand
ing the severe limitation placed upon Gongress and Executive powers.
In Carter v Carter Coal Company, 298 u.S. 278(1936) the Supreme
Court invalidated the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935.
Under the act, also known as the Guffey Coal Act after its sponsor
Joe GUffey, a national bituminous coal commission was appointed by
the President.

The commission was authorized to enforce industry

codesj these codes allowed the coal miners to organize in unions,
and also regulated the price of coal.

A 15% tax of coal aold at the

mine was levied on coal producers if they did not follow industry
codes. 61 The Court ruled that this type of excise tax was an im
proper use of the taxing power.
is not seriously in dispute.

IIThat the 'tax' is in fact a penalty

The position of the Government is that

the validity of the exaction does not rest upon the taxing power
but upon the power of Congress to regulate interstate cormnerce. 1I 6 2
The Court held that the tax was an improper tax, and also held that
the production of coal was not an interstate activity and therefore
was beyond the power of Congress.

"That production, in this case

mining, which precedes commerce, is not itself commerce; and that
the power to regulate commerce among the several states is not a
power to regulate industry within a state. 1I 63
The Court moved on from its specific invalidation of the
Bituminous Coal Act.

The Court handed down a statement spelling out

what commerce was and what power Congress had in regulating camroerce.
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IIIn exercising the authority by this
(the commerce) clause of the Constitution,
Congress is powerless to regulate anything
which is not commerce, as it is powerless
to do anything about commerce which is not
regulation. What is commerce? •• As used in
the Constitution, the word 'commerce' is
the equivalent of the phrase 'intercourse for
the purposes of trade; ••• between the citizens of the
different states. (Vearie v Moor 14 How 568-573-574)
Nor can it be properly concluded, that, because
the products of domestic enterprise in agriculture
or manufactures, or in the arts, may ultimately
become the SUbjects of foreign commerce, that
the control of the means or the encouragements by
which enterprise is fostered and protected, is
legi timately wi thin the import of the phrase
foreign commerce, or fairly implied in any
64
investiture of the power to regulate such commerce."
In other words, the Court told the legislative and Executive
branches that they could regulate only items that were specifically
engaged in interstate trade, wbile these items were in trade.
Even then, as in the Railroad Retirement case, industry or items
that were in movement between two states were not always within
the jurisdictional authority of Congress.
tempt to

The Court, in its at

insure that Congress could not regulate lI e a ch and every

branch where the produce contemplated an interstate market, tr 65 had
ef f ec t i v el y stripped Congress and the Executive
r egul a t e any

commerce.

from _ ~a1l

power to

The decisions were based on such a nar

r ow interpretation of the Constitution that the Government was a1
lowed no latitude in dealing with the existing problems of the day.
The Coal Act that had sought to prevent further disorders
whi ch had

already resulted in bloodshed and martial law, the act

whi ch was established to maintain prices, control distribution,
ar br i t r a t e cut throat competition, wages, collective bargaining,
and BOUght to put an end to violence, strikes and strife in
mining communities,

~as

void.

The Court held that states could

- - - --- - - - - - - -.---- -.-.---- .-- .- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - 
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not give

up their rights to the Federal Government, even though seven

states had filed appeals urging the Supreme Court to validate the
act.

Conditions which had

were left to fester.

decreed the extension of Federal power

The Court held that such extension of Federal

power which would solve the problems unsolvable by states, was an
improper delegation of legislative power in its "most obnoxious
f orm. 1166
The Court was to act once again.

In what was considered the

final verdict on Governmental attempts to fix minimum wages and max
imum hours, the Court held, in Morehead v New York reI Tipeldo 298
U.S. 602 (1936), by a 5-4 decision that states do not have the power
to formulate minimum wage laws.
Childrens Hospital. the court
power by

Basing their decision on Adkins v

.:he~d

that the state "is without

any form of legislation to prohibit, change or nullify

contracts between

employers and adult women workers as to the

amount of' wages to be paid. 1I 67
The decision created "what the President and others charact
erized as a 'no mansland t which placed the regulation of wages,
even of the sweatshop variety, beyond the reach of any government,
federal or state.,,68

The President attacked the Court's decision

in his famed Court and buggy speech, and later wrote, "So, in the
year-and-a-half commencing with the that oil' case and ending with
the New York minimum wage

case, it became quite obvious that the

advance of recovery and reform begun by Congress and the Executive
in the year of crisis, which its opponents could not stop by the
elections of 1934, was being nullified by a barrier which read:
The Court Disapproves. n69
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The Nation magazine said that, IIIf someone is bold enough
to suggest that, with respect to minimum wage legislation, the
Constitution is rather what the jUdges who stay on the bench
longest say it i8 11 70 then the issue would be seen in its true
light.

The New York minimwn wage law was a local treatment of

a pressing problem.

In their decision the Court made a terrible

mistake, they told the country that they realized the seriousness
of the problem but that the Constitution did not allow the gov
ernment, state or federal, to solve it. 7 1 On November 3, 1936
Roosevelt was re-elected as President of the United states of
America.

He swept the country, winning 27,000,000 votes.

On

February 5, 1937 the President broke his silence and attacked
the Supreme Court.

Chapter Three
The Plan
On January 15, 1937, Roosevelt, in a letter to his close
copfidant Felix Frankfurter, gave an indication that he would
soon take drastic action against the Court.

Roosevelt, in what

may be an anticipation of the bad reaction to his Court Plan,
requested Frankfurter to I1suspend final judgement" until
Roosevelt was able to tell lithe story. II 1

During the Presidential

campaign of 1936, F.D.R. said nothing about the Court.
lieana associated themselves with the Court.

The Repub

Tension across the

country was growing, discontent among the people swelled.

On

January 6, 1937, in his inaugural message to Congress, Roosevelt
gave a slight indication of what he planned when he said, l1means
must be found to adapt our legal forms and our jUdicial interpret
ation to the actual present national needs. 11

liThe vital need is

not an alteration of our rundamental law but an increasingly en
lightened view in reference to it.,,2
Within the Roosevelt administration it was agreed that further
laws, or new words in new laws, or changes in the Constitution, would
all be interpreted by the Supreme Court in the same conservative man
ner.

The problem was made clear; it was not the Court as an institu

tion but rather the membership of the Court that had to be changed.
As Assistant Attorney General Robert H. Jackson stated:
JUdges who resort to a tortured construction of
the Constitution may torture an amendment. You can
not amend a state of mind, a mental attitude of
hostility to the exercise of governmental power and
of indifference to the demands which democrac~ at
tempting to survive industrialism, makes upon its
Government.3
The conflict between Roosevelt and the Court would not involve
questions of constitutional interpretation of the role of the
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various branches of government, nor would the conflict encompass
a national, nonemotional discourse on the proper limits of the
Federal Government's power.

Such a conflict could have been re

solved through a constitutional amendment, through the wellreasoned restatement of executive power and its boundaries in
the modern world.
tone.

The conflict was destined to take a different

One author has reasoned, lithe fight's course was decided by

the fact that the Court had wantonly offended every strongest
trait in the President.

Perhaps the most immediate of the Court's

offenses was its denial of satisfaction to the President's taste
of power. 1I 4

Roosevelt's letter to Claude G. Bowers on January 15,

1937 might be interpreted as supportive of the Presidential power
need

theory suscribed to above.

The letter stated in part:

I had a little fun in presenting the message
on the State of the Union text, of which by this
time you will have received a copy. None of the
nine highest members of our jUdicial branch was
present for the occasion, but I have received some
intimation that they at least read the remarks
which pertained to them. I hope soli 'S
Others believed that "the Court

Reorganization Plan of

President Roosevelt was the political manifestation of a longsmouldering intellectual revolt against the philosophy of many
of

the Supreme Court I s decisions on Cons ti tutional questions. II 6

This latter theory seems to be the more correct one.

Roosevelt

went over the political solutions to the Supreme Court question
one by one in a letter to Charles Burlingham.

In the letter,

Roosevelt termed a Constituional amendment as impossible.

It

would be hand to get 2/3 of Congress and then fight for state
ra.tification.

Roosevelt s t a ted,

It

You could make $5 million easy

45
as rolling off a log by undertaking a campaign to prevent
ratification by one house of the legislature, or even (prevent)
the summoning of a Constitutional convention in 13 states for the
next four years.

Easy money! II 7

Since no amendment would really

be feasible, Roosevelt pleaded, "You must join me in confining our
selves to the legislative method ••• "

The direction of the fight

was made clear. The conflict would be between President Franklin
Roosevelt and Chief Justice Hughes and the other Justices who sat
on the Supreme Court. There would be no well-reasoned attempts to
bridge the gap between the no mants land.

There would be no philo

sophical discussions on the role of the executive in the nation's
economic system that would lead to a rational understanding of the
executive's role. The President would act; his assault would be an
attempt to remove, definitively, the obstacle of conservative jUdge
ments which he believed blocked the path to the nation's recovery.
The controversy was initiated. The honor and reverence of
the Court would be questioned.
tion of the "real" court system.

The ae sauf t began with an explana
In the magazines of the day, writers

told the public that "the strength of political and economic motives
behind the deceptively impressive logic and rhetoric or judicial
decisions is usually greater than the uninitiated public realizes. 1I
Magazines of the day continued to show that Judges"are human and
are moved by the passions that great crises involve," while they
"may seem quiet in the-courtrooms, it is the quiet of a storm center,
rarely, however, can one learn the secret history of what occurs
behind the closed doors of the JUdicial chambers. u8

The Court

46
fight would challenge the majestic awe traditionally held toward the
Court by the people of the country.

The people were told that

the Constitution does not really provide for the Supreme Court to
veto or pass upon the validity of an act of Congress,

In fact,

proposals made in the Constitutional Congress that would have given
the Court this power were voted down.
upon itself a new-found power.

The Court had actually taken

It was this Bame Court that was re

buking the Roosevelt administration for assuming new power not ex
plicitly provided for in the Constitution.

Senator Norris told

the Senate that it was a commonly held perception that

II

the people

can change the Congress, but only God can change the Supreme Court. 1I
He then made the challenge that IICongress has the power (to change
the Court) if it has the courage. 1I
In February of 1937, President Roosevelt addressed the Congress,
and unveiled his plan to remove the obstacle that lay in the path
of recovery.

The Court Reorganization Plan would empower Roosevelt

to appoint one new Justice for each Justice over the age of seventy
years who did not retire.

Roosevelt would also be authorized to

appoint fifty new lower Court Justices, one for each Justice over
sevent~.

The Plan would halt injunction proceedings in lower Courts

on Federal legislation which was challenged on Constitutional grounds,
until the Justice Department had made arrangements for appeal to
the Supreme Court.

The Plan also called for the appointment of a

court proctor, who would keep cases from piling up in the lower
courts. 9
Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes recorded in
his diary, liThe President t s message is especially a joke on Justice
McReynol ds because, as Attorney General in the first Wilson
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administration, it was he who advocated the matching of every
Federal judge over seventy below the
man." 10

Supra~e

Court with a younger

The message may have been a joke on McReynolds, it cer

tainly was a surprise to the members of the Cabinet and to Congres
sional leaders.

On the morning before he read his message to

Congress, Roosevelt summoned the Vice-President,members of the
Cabinet, Senator Robinson, Speaker of the House Bankhead, Congress
man Rayburn (who was House Majority Leader), Senator Ashurst (who
was Senate Judiciary Chairman), and Congressman Summers, House
JUdiciary Committee Chairman. 11 To these people Roosevelt read
his reorganization message.
of the idea in this form.

It was the first time they had heard
Roosevelt had consulted with no one,

except for Homer Cummings and a few assistants in the Justice De
partment.

"At no point did he (Roosevel t) seem to doubt that the

tried and true leaders of

his party would supinely do his bidding. 1l 1 2

But as Ickes noted all were quiet, none, except himself, were out
wardly supportive of

the plan.

Soon, Roosevelt's secret formula-

tion of the plan would cause dissension, and rebellion in the House
and Senate.

liThe plan", in the words of Assistant Attorney General

Jackson, "did not capitalize more than a
the

f~action

of the force of

revolt (against) the Courtls philosophy.1l 1 3
The reaction to the Court Reorganization proposal consisted

of a mixture of delight, rage, praise and condemnation.

Common

opinion was "the plan is put forward with all the artistry of the
President's political mind.
that all

He ingeniously conveys the impression

he seeks is a routine and moderate effort to speed up

justice and improve the whole federal bench ••• the brutal fact is

- - ---,..--- - - - - -- - - - - - - -- -- 

- -- ..- - - - 

48
that President Roosevelt would pack the Supreme Court with six
new justices all his

own choosing.,,14

The Supreme Court had

been packed before, and columnists of the day thought it would
be a very simple matter to pack the court again. 15

Other com

mentators thought that "to limit the authority of the court would
be to change the form of the American Government. n 16

Others con

curred with statements such as, nalthough I do not believe the
Supreme Court is sacrosanct, I would regard the opinion of a picked,
packed court on

a position of law with the same lack of respect

that I would regard

the opinion of a kept woman on a question of

virtue. II 17
The Court Reorganization Plan was criticized most heavily
because

it was

clear that it was not the age of the Justices or

the workload of the Justices that Roosevelt sought to remedy. It
was the attitudes and the philosophies of the Justices that needed
changing.

In order to change the philosophical direction of the

Court, it was clear that the actual men sitting on the Court
needed to be replaced.

Roosevelt insisted, even in the face of

report after report prOVing that no relationship existed between
aged jUdges and congested dockets, that his intentions were not to
replace the men on the court but to help the system.

Roosevelt's

solution to the breach between the philosophical direction of the
Court

and the New Deal was to dilute the power of this conservative

element, to remove those conservative Justices from the Court.
This attempt failed; we must now ask why.

- - - - - --.-- --- -..-_._ - - - ,
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Chapter Four
The Nine Men
The Court Reorganization Plan was a corrective measure, it
was a result and recognition or the existence and collision of
two divergent socia-economic theories.

The Court Plan was formu

lated to resolve the conflict and contest between the two theories.
Through the enactment of the Court Plan, Roosevelt attempted to se
cure the supremacy of his new order while insuring the final oblit
eration of the other.

The New Deal marks

our society's evolution.

a transition period in

This paper has recounted the dramatio

events and the effects of the events which marked the beginning of
the end for the old order, and the realization of the need for the
creation of a new order.

The old order was ernbued with the doctrines

of nineteenth century liberalism.

This was the liberalism which

called for the institutionalization of laissez-faire, the liberalism
which advocated the continued infancy of Federal authority, struc
ture and activity.

The social and economic theories that pervaded

the old order had failed, the guarded economic system had collapsed,
the ruggedly individualistic social system was in chaos.
tragic fall of the old order emerged a new order.

From the

The new order

represented a demand for a new society through the formulation and
operation of new socia-economic theories.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

formulated a new set of theories, because of the New Deal, and
Roosevelt, a new definition of the proper role of government was
developed.

This role was diametrically opposite to the role of

government in classical nineteenth century liberalism.
Our system of government has .f o rmu l a t ed the means for the
gradual transformation and evolution of our society.

The President

is to create, the Congress to approve, the Supreme Court to insure
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that the transformation is gradual and in keeping with the
fundamental democratic precepts on which our Constitution rests.
During the late 1920's and throughout the 1930's, this system
of gradual change malfunctioned.

The Justices, who were products

of and advocates for the old order, by virtue of their life ten
ure on the Court, insisted upon the adherence to the old doctrines
of nineteenth century liberalism, now thOUght of as conservative
in comparison to the new twentieth century liberalism of the New
Deal.

Since his election in 1932, Roosevelt, because of the ten

acity of the Justices to continue to live or fail :t o retire, was
denied the habitual privilege of appointing new members to the
Supreme Court.

This denial prohibited Roosevelt from instilling

within this final legal tribunal the catalyst for change that
new appointees would be.

The Justices on the Court were out

living the socio-economic doctrines acquired in their youth.
The anomaly in the evolution of our society was to be
rectified by the Court Plan.

The Court Plan was designed to al

low Roosevelt to force a long-awaited change in the Court's
ideological outlook.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine

the judicial opinions and socio-economic beliefs of the nine men
Roosevelt labeled as lithe only obstacles in the path of social
progress. n1

Through our exposition and analysis of the Jus

tices' biographical data, as it relates to the development of
their socio-economic views, we will examine the validity of
Roosevelt's statement on January 24, 1936 that;
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•••• the objective of the Court's purpose
was to make reasonableness in passing leg
islation a matter to be settled not by the
views of the elected Senate and House of
Representatives, and not by the view of
an elected President but rather by the
private, social philosophy of a majority
of nine appoi~ted members of the Supreme
Court i t s eLf , ~
Roosevelt's attack on the Supreme Court was not the result
of an affront to any love of power held by Roosevelt, rather
the Plan was formulated in recognition

of a situation in

which a judicial tribunal insisted upon giving legal sanction
to the socio-economic theories of a small majority of its mem
bers.

The Court crisis must be regarded beyond the simple

tenets ·that. attribute the crisis as an expression of personal
animosities between Roosevelt and the Supreme Court Justices.
Our analysis will illustrate that the continued expression of
the personal theories of the Justices, developed into an in
atitutional conflict.

The -Court Plan was an action by the

current liberal spokesman to repudiate the doctrines of the
guardians of the old order.
We will offer evidence to support our contention that the
Justices transformed their personal beliefs into institutional
beliefs.

Our contention will be that "judicial decisions are

not brought about by Constitutional storks, but are from out
of the travail of economic circmnstance."

We will provide an

examination of the Justices travail of economic circumstance
to explain the opposition of the Justices to the New Deal.
The existence of divergent socio-economic theories will be seen,
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and the development of the Court Plan as an outcome of a
four year ideological battle between Roosevelt and the
Court will become evident.

Our task is to explore the

jUdicial beliefs and backgrounds of the Justices, who were
members of the Supreme Court in 1937, to .d emon s t r a t e both
the reality and intensity of the Justices ideological op
position to the New Deal.

Thi!s chapter will serve to explain

the development and existence of a theoretical debate which
Roosevelt attempted to win in 1937 with the proposal of the
Court Reorganization Plan.
Chief Justice Hughes
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes was once described, by his
biographer Samuel Hendel, as "a great liberal, concerned with the
preservation and extension of pUblic rights against special privi
lege. II S He has also been described, by Alpheus T. Mason as an archconservative "who proved himself a particularly fertile source of
restrictive interpretation, an imaginative adapter of old dogma
to serve as a sword against the rising popular demand for ef
fective government. rr 6

The descriptions rest at opposite poles,

yet each represents a valid assessment of Hughes' legal career.
It would seem that Hughes' legal opinions should be consistent
enough to support the validity of only one description.

Amid

the confusion and ambiguity, the answer can be perceived. A
close examination of Hughes' jUdicial decisions would indicate
that pre-New Deal and a majority of New Deal opinions support
the liberal designation.

The con.fusion

arises
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when Hughes participates in several opinions which invalidated
New Deal programs and were thus considered as conservative.

It

is our belief that Hughes' participation in these decisions
occurred mainly because of his attempt to forge an image of
Supreme Court solidarity, he therefore voted with the conservative
majority for majority sake.

Hughes voted with the majority for

majority sake only during the period of time when the Court
was under heavy criticism for its decisions.

It was the few con

servative "opinions, that Hughes entered into for political reasons,
that have earned Hughes the rather derogatory conservative title.
Hughes' childhood development was guided by the strict
religious zeal of his father and mother.

Hughes' father was a

Baptist preacher, his mother was also devoutly Baptist.

Together

they shaped, instructed, and directed their only child.

During

his childhood, his father moved the family from town to town,
from congregation to congregation.

Hughes' father was well liked

by all the parishoners, accepting offers to move to new congrega

tions only after he thOUght that he had served his usefulness to
his present flock.

The effects of a Baptist upbringing, steeped

in morality and emphasizing the importance of education, are
probably responsible for the creation of Charles Evans HUghes;
child prodigy.
Having stUdied Greek at the early age of eight, Hughes
decided to pursue a career in Law when he was sixteen, a junior
in college.

Hughes matriculated at the Columbia School of Law when

he was twenty, in 1882.

Upon graduation he taught for a brief
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period of time at Cornell's School of Law.
Hughes became involved with the New York State government's
investigations into gas and insurance monopolies and frauds during
the late 1890's.

In the course of the

investigations~

HUghes

proved himself both an able attorney and a zealous campaigner against
concerns which he felt violated the public good. 8 Hughes was elected
Governor of the State of New York in 1906, during his term of office,
he led the way for state workmen's compensation insurance.
worked for successful adoption of anti-child labor laws.

He also
The

HUghes' administration established regulatory agencies which controlled
public utility rates and activities.

It is important to note that

HUghes' actions as Governor began to move the function of government
beyond the nineteenth century concepts of laissez-faire economic
liberalism, into the twentieth century liberalism of governmental
action and protection for and over the governed.

The same ideo

logical foundations that the New Deal was built upon.

Hughes,

however, still retained some of his classical liberalism ideals.
His advocacy against the Federal income tax amendment to the Con
stitution, and his

of too much Federal and executive authority,
or examples of this retention. 10 Hughes would later support the
fea~

Supreme Court's assumption of power to settle all Constitutional
questions as a check on growing Federal authority.11
Hughes' effective leadership as Governor, and his political
prowess within the RepUblican party won him a seat on the Supreme
Court on October 10, 1910.

Between the years of 1910 and 1916,

Hughes wrote and participated in a number of opinions which set
forth his socio-economic be1iefs. 12 In 1916, HUghes resigned from the
Court to run as the Republican candidate for presidency of the

55
United states against Woodrow Wilson, although Hughes lost by a
significant margin, the event serves to exemplify his political
aspirations.
Hughes' early Supreme Court decisions show the formulation
of a rather liberal judicial mind.
Wilson, 235

u.s.

In the case of Miller v.

375(1915) Hughes supported a California law which

forbade employment of women in selected establishments for more
than eight hours a day.

Hughes cited the need to enforce the equal
protection of laws for women in this case. 13 Speaking further for
laws which upheld the public interest, Hughes found invalide a
state law which authorized intrastate rail carriers to provide
sleeping cars for whites only.

Hughes held, in McCabe v. Atkinson,

Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad, 235

u.s.

151(1914), that this type of
law was a denial of equal protection of 1aws. 14 These two cases
serve to exemplify HUghes' position and belief in the protection of
the public good.

In these cases that protection included limiting

hours of work for women and providing equal accommodations for both
races on railroad sleeping cars. The important consideration in both
of the opinions is that Hughes recognized, and supported, governmental
action to cure existing ills in society's economic structure. Hughes
furthered his belief in the use of governmental authority to solve
private business problems in, Baltimore and Pacific Railroad v. Inter
state Commerce Commission, 221 U.S. 612. 15 In this case, decided in
1911, Hughes voted with the Court to uphold Congressional power
to regulate the hours of railroad employees.

In the Minnesota

Rate case, 230 u.S. 352(1913) and in Houston East and West Texas
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Railway Company v U.S.) 234

u.s.

342(1914), Hughes voted to up

hold the validity of Congressional regulation of railway rates.
In this case the issue was raised of whether or not Federal
authority could be exercised in establishing interstate rail
rates, so that order could be brought about in a generally
chaotic field.
of the subjects

Hughes stated that, lithe full control by Congress
committed to its regulation is not to be denied

or thwarted by the comingling of interstate and intrastate op
erations. 1I 16 It was Hughes' contention that the power of Congress
to control interstate commerce was supreme.

Both the Baltimore

and

Pacific Railroad case and the Houston East and West case of

fer

a firm indication by Hughes of his belief in and support of

the use of
Both

Federal governmental power to cure Bocio/economic ills.

decisions

gave broad interpretation to the powers given

to Congress under the interstate commerce clause.

Both decisions

acknowledge the propriety of Federal action in this area, and
also acknowledge that Congress has the overriding and supreme power
to regulate and control interstate commerce.

The distinction be

tween intrastate and interstate commerce has been left undefined;
however, Hughes has held that where the two are closely inter
twined, interstate characteristics override intrastate character
istics of trade.
These opinions

represent fairly liberal interpretations of

the commerce clause in the Constitution, as well as a progressive
viewpoint regarding the use of Federal authority where conditions
deemed it necessary.

The

opinio~s

would seem to lay a firm

foundation for further liberal interpretation, and for the con

-

-
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tinued expression of what may be considered as liberal viewpoints
in a twentieth century sense.

Hughes, during the 1930's, became

susceptible to abandoning these modern liberal ideologies for
more restrictive ideologies, when he became concerned over in
creasing Federal power.

The opinions constitute a definite minor

ity of the total number of opinions that Hughes wrote.
In Panama Refining Company v Ryan, 293 u.s. 388(1935) Hughes
wrote the majority opinion for the Court which invalidated, on
the grounds of improper delegation of power to the executive,
Section 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act.

Section

9(c) had given President Franklin D. Roosevelt the power to pro
hibit the interstate transportation of oil produced in excess of
state-fixed quotas. 17
Supreme Court.

The decision came from a six to three divided

The decision exemplifies a narrow shift in Hughes"

pUblic juridical thOUght.

Hughes had previously given Congress

broad powers in dealing with interstate commerce concerns.

Now

Hughes stated that the delegation, to the President, of the power
to enforce agreed upon state quotas for the production and inter
state sale of oil, was unconstitutional.

It should be noted that

during his term of office as Governor of New York, Hughes was
highly supportive of public regUlatory commissions.

It could be

inferred that Hughes' governmental ideologies allowed for the
delegation of power, away from the executive by the legislative,
to commissions with partial autonomy from the executive.

This

theory is further substantiated by Hughes' concern with the in
creasing amount of Federal authority during the drive for an in
come tax amendment in the early 1900's.

The decision must be

questioned, however, in light of the fact that section 9(c) of
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the N.I.R.A. gave the President the power to enforce only state
fixed quotas of oil production in regard to inter-state commerce.
Control over such commerce had been referred to by Hughes as a
IIsupremett power in early decisions.
HUghes returned to his more liberal inclinations in Railroad
Retirement Board v.Alton Railroad Company, 295
¥arter v. Carter Coal Company 298 u.s. 238.

u.s.

330 and in

In both cases, Hughes

dissented with the five to four majority of the Court.

In the

Railroad Retirement Board case, he held that a statute which pro
vided pensions for railroad employees was valid, and in the Carter
case he held the wage and price provisions of the Guffey Coal Act
valid. 18

In both cases HUghes BOUght to maintain Congressional

power to regulate interstate commerce.

The five member majority

of the court sought to limit the Congressional interstate commerce
power.
Hughes expounded upon his limited construction of what con
stituted proper delegation of power to the executive branch of
government, and utilized a somewhat narrow interpretation of the
commerce clause, in holding the code-making provisions of the
N.I.R.A. invalid, in the case of United states v. Schechter Poultry
Corporation. 295 U.S.495(1935).

The Schechter decision, written

by Hughes, was handed down by a unamimous Court.

The unanimity

of the Court tends to infer that it was the nature of the N.I.R.A.
as

a whole, rather than a shift in the Chief Justices' stand
which brOUght about the decision. 19 The decision established
definite limits to governmental activity in the private business
sector.

HUghes, who was afraid of too much Federal control,

_
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expressed his opinion that the N.I.R.A., if validated, would be
the basis for a completely centralized Federally run economy.
It was in the A.A.A. decision (made during a -time of
public condemnation of the Court, and of accusations by F.D.R.
charging the five man conservative majority with violating the
expressed will of the American people) that inconsistencies in
Hughes' jUdicial stances can be seen.

In United states v. Butler

297 u.s. 1, the Court invalidated the Agricultural Adjustment
Act on the ground that it regulated matters reserved to the
states by the Tenth Amendment. 20 The Court's opinion was written
by Justice Roberts.
sented.

Justices stone, Cardozo, and Brandeis dis

Hughes' actions seem to substantiate the contention that

he acted to protect the Court - politically - by voting with
the conservative majority in order to create an illusion of Court
solidarity.

Another five to four decision, especially on such an

important issue, might have seriously undermined the Court's rep
utation and would possibly have alienated many of the few remain
ing Court supporters.

Hughes delegated the responsibility for

writing the opinion to Justice Roberts.

Roberts was the most

moderate of the conservatives, and it can be asserted that Hughes
chose the Justice in hope that an opinion written by him would be
less severe, and not as far reaching as an opinion from either
McReynolds, Butler, Van Devanter, or Sutherland.

Thus, Hughes

hoped for an illusion of solidarity while trying to insure mod
eration in the conservative majority's opinions.
Hughes voted, for solidarity sake, with

~he

five man conservative

majority in Jones v. Securities .and Exchange Commission, 298 U.S.I.

.

- - - ---- - - - - ,
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The decision, written

by Sutherland and dissented to by Cardozo,

Brandeis, and Stone, did little but scold the S.E.C. for not
allowing the plaintiff to withdraw an improper registration
in order to escape punitive actions by the S.E.c. 26

certificate

Since the validity of the Securities and

Exchange Act was not

questioned, the decision was of little intrinsic importance.
can be stated that Hughes voted
reasons.

It

with the majority for political

Our inference being that Hughes voted with the conserva

tives for solidarity sake.
The conclusion, that
for

Hughes joined the conservative forces

political expediency, is supported by the fact that the

A.A.A. ruling and the S.E.C. rUling are inconsistent with almost
all of the other rUlings Hughes wrote or voted for.

The broad

powers that Hughes had voted against giVing Congress in the A.A.A.
decision, were powers HUghes had expressed as valid in other
decisions.

In the case of Home Building and Loan Ass'n. v.

Blaisdell 290

u.s. 398(1934),

Hughes had stated "while emergency

does not create power, emergency may furnish the occasional use
of power. u 2 2

Hughes had voted in the A.A.A. case, that even in

the face of a severe crisis, the Federal government lacked the
power to take appropriate steps to deal with the crisis.
had

Hughes

expressed, throughout his legal career, the idea that the

government did have the power to intervene in private business
concerns in order to cure inequities in the economic system.
The conclusion is further substantiated in National Labor
Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S.l

(1937) where Hughes declared

valid the Wagner Act.

HUghes wrote
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the opinion for the five to four majority.

In the decision,

Hughes gave a liberal interpretation to what would affect inter
state commerce.

Hughes found that lithe fact remains that the

stoppage of those operations (production of steel) would have a
most serious effect upon interstate commerce. 1l 23

He further held

that in view of the corporation's diverse and wide spread activities,
a close relationship existed between manufacturing and interstate
commerce.

Hughes later agreed to the opinions in Steward Machine

Co. v. Davis 301

u.s.

548(1937) and Helvering V. Davis, 301

u.s.

619(1937), which upheld the Social Security Law.
In the final analysis, it can be said that Hughes was of
liberal judicial instincts, and the rule to his judicial thinking
was broad interpretation of legislative powers.

Re.·balked at the

delegation of broad powers by the legislature to the executive.
Throughout his life Hughes had been associated with the ideology
of the New Deal:

as Governor of New York, he created regulatory

agencies which began to protect the public good almost forty years
before Roosevelt directed the Federal government towards such pur
suits.

Hughes was a great liberal a majority of the time - Hughes

was also a politician.

He was a Presidential nominee, and Governor

of the then moat important state in the Union. When his Supreme Court
was under attack, he bent to political expediency.

The A.A.A. deci

sion must be viewed as part of the political defense Hughes formulated
to protect his domain from the vigorous attack of President Roosevelt.
We can conclude that in a judicial sense, Hughes was by nature a
liberal. however, in a political sanae and because of political
necessity, Hughes was by politics a conservative.
Unlike those of Chief Justice Hughes the opinions of the four
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conservative members of the Court remained consistent throughout
their tenure on the Court.

The opinions of the conservative

Justices are clearly expressions of the Justices' personal socio
economic beliefs. The conservative aocio/economic beliefs were
created through the travail and circumstance of the Justices'
childhood development.

All of the four conservative Justices,

McReynolds, Van Devanter, Butler and Sutherland were brought up in
socio/economic conditions which instilled within them the firm ideals
of rugged individualism. All four believed in a restrictive form of
Government, and in the notion that any person could, and should, be
able to provide and care for themselves. It was this concept that
would work to invalidate the New Deal program. It was these tradi
tional, individualistic notions which would collide head-on with
the progressive ideologies incompassed in the New Deal which pro
vided for the masses.
Justice Sutherland
Justice Sutherland is the one best example of how the adverse
circumstances of youth affected the development of personal socio
economic philosophies.

In 1864, when he was only two, Sutherland

was brought to the frontier utah territory from his Buckinghamshire,
England home.

His father was connected with the Church of Jesus

Christ Latter-Day Saints.

Soon after his arrival in Utah territory,

Sutherland's father moved the family to Montana where prospecting
for minerals was supposed to be better.

The Sutherlands quickly

moved back to Utah, where Sutherland's father drifted from job to
job, finally becoming imprOVident when Sutherland was twelve. 24
Sutherland worked at various jobs in order to support his family
and himself.

He managed to save enough money to finance an
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education at what is today, Brigham Young University.
At Brigham Young, Sutherland began to receive formal guidance
in the

development of his personal aocio/economic views.

Suther

land's studies were influenced heavily by the teachings and writ
ings of Herbert Spencer. 2 5

Through his admiration of Spencer's

writings, Sutherland formulated rigid ideas about individual
rights and the

rights of private property.

individualism was steeped in Sutherland.

The concept of rugged

By the end of his studies

at Brigham Young Sutherland had formed an outward contempt for
those who could not
American Frontier.

meet the challenge and survive in the austere
The beliefs that Sutherland developed during

this period would cause him to applaud the Mormon Church's refusal
to

allow its followers to

accept welfare payments.

Sutherland attended the University of Michigan's School of
Law in 1883.

Here Sutherland was further versed in ideologies of

individual rights and the supremacy of the rights of private pro
perty.

He had come to believe

in the Constitution as a divinely

inspired document, whose purpose was to limit the powers of Govern
ment.
year.

26

Sutherland stUdied at the University for less than one
He returned to his native Utah and became a financial suc

cess through his practice of law.

When the Utah territory became

a state, Sutherland was elected as a RepUblican representative to
the State's legislature.

In 1922, by virtue of his political

activities, Sutherland was nominated to the Supreme Court by
President Harding.

Sutherland had been Harding's chief campaign

strategistj it was Sutherland who convinced the Presidential hope
ful to conduct his front porch campaign.

Over bitter objection

- - -- -- - - - - - _. - . --~-- -------------_.
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from some Senators, Sutherland won confirmation and began what
would be sixteen years of conservative opinion writing on the
Supreme Bench of our land. 27
One of the most important decisions that Sutherland partic
ipated in was Adkins v. Children's Hospital 261 U.S. 525(1923).
This case struck out early governmental attempta at wage regula
tion.

The Court ruled that " ••• Freedom of contract is, never

theless, the general rule and restraint the exception: and the
exercise of legislative authority to abridge it can be justified
only on the existence of exceptional circumstances.,,28

Sutherland

would never see the existence of exceptional circumstances even
during the most severe years of our country's economic depression.
Sutherland's experiences as a child may well have precipitated
the formulation of this philosophy.

During what may be called

exceptionally unusual circumstances of his childhood, no one had
offered him and his family help, no one had thought it to be the
proper function of Government to provide such help.
The case of Home Building and Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell,
290

u.s.

398(1934), exemplifies Sutherland's lack of sympathy for

those caught in economic travail.

The Court ruled that, in time

of emergency, the State of Minnesota could postpone the due dates
of mortgage payments. 29 Sutherland protested in Vigorous dissent,
stating that emergency conditions did not abrogate the Constitu
tional principle of liberty of contract. 30 He noted that during the
formulation of the Constitution, conditions of financial distress
had necessitated the insertion of the liberty of contract clause. 3 1
Sutherland's dissent shows the effect of the teachings of Herbert
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Spencer, and the

e~fects

of his belief in the divine inspiration

which created the Constitution.

Sutherland paid little attention

to the severe social conditions of the times.

Perhaps the con

tempt that he harbored as a child, for those who could not meet
the -challenge of the American frontier, was being expressed again.
In any event, Sutherland voted - in the A.A.A., N.I.R.A., N.R.A.,
N.L.R.B., and the Social Securities cases - to outlaw any legisla
tion which sought to provide for the welfare of the American people.
Sutherland provoked the wrath of President Roosevelt when
he spoke for the defense of the separation of powers doctrine in
Humphrey's Executor v. U.S. 295 U.s. 602(1935).

In this case,

Roosevelt had attempted to fire an administrator

o~

agency.
power.

an independent

Sutherland viewed this as an unlawful abuse of executive
Sutherland was able to persuade the moderate Justice

Roberts in order to secure a five to four majority in favor of
his view. 3 2
Sutherland's opinions were consistent.

His socio/economic

views were firmly grounded in the doctrines taught to him and sup
ported through the experiences of his youth.

Sutherland's views

not only transcended into his judicial thinking, they dominated
his jUdicial opinions.

Sutherland was aptly called the spokemnan

for an old economic order of classical liberalism.

This was the

economic order that he was forced to confront, and successfUlly
mastered as a child in the rugged frontier of the Utah territory.
Sutherland would answer to and defend the socio-economic concepts
of strict laisseZ-faire, even in face of a national crisis that
demanded governmental intervention into the previously considered
private spheres of society.

--
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Justice Butler
Pierce Butler, one of the staunchest conservatives to sit on
the Supreme Court during the
tier state of Minnesota.

1930-~

s , was born in 1866 in the fron

Butler was one of eight children, and

grew up in a household dominated by a very stern and very religious
Irish Catholic father.

Butler, like Sutherland, was forced to earn

his own way in life at an early age.

When he was fifteen, Butler

taught school earning enough money to finance his college education. 33
Through the travail of economic circumstance, Butler was instilled
with the same sense of rugged individualism that Sutherland had
adopted, and both would use this concept in the formulation of their
legal decisions.

Butler's belief in the notions of rugged individual

ism came from his austere frontier life.

Butler had been forced to

"make-it" on his own, he believed that others should also provide
for themselves without the help or hindrance of governmental inter
vention.
life.

Butler formulated a very set, very conservative outlook on

This philosophy of life was given rurther solidification

through his educational process.
Butler attended Carleton College in 1883, working on a neigh
boring dairy farm to pay his college bills. 34

Between the early

morning, and the late afternoon milkings, Butler managed to become
an avid reader of Cooley.35

Cooley's work, Constitutional Limitations,

found an especially receptive audience in the mind of young Butler.
Cooley espoused the virtues of economic liberalism.

His works

gave support to the positive value of limited government.

Butler

was extremely receptive to Cooley's ideologies and quickly adapted
them as his own.

It can be said .that Butler's childhood

- --_._--- ~-------------------------,
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experiences on the frontier had shaped and molded his philosoph
ical perceptions to such an extent, that the ideologies espoused by
Cooley were adopted because of their similarity with his own.
Upon graduation from Carleton (incidentally, at Carleton
Butler failed a course in Constitutional Law) Butler packed his
bags and moved to St. Paul.

In St. Paul, Butler read law at a
local firm and was admitted to the Minnesota bar in 1888. 36 Upon
gaining admission into the bar, he established his own private

practice.

In five years, Butler's practice had become successful

and well established.

Butler found success in specializing in

railway mattera, and would soon become the West's foremost rail
road advocate.

Butler's main goal, while representing railway con

cerns, was to save his clients money, and in this pursuit Butler
is said to have excelled. 37

Butler's representation of the rail

roads during their expansionistic heyday serves to give an in
dication of what type of person he was.

During this period,

railroads were pushing their way west, claiming land, making
enormous profits, and Victimizing many innocent people in their
scramble for corporation supremacy.

Butler made his living repre

senting and defending these corporation interests.

Surely it can

be assumed that Butler approved of his Clients' activities, and
could do well in justifying them to others, and himself, as
necessary evils in a world of economic Darwinism.
Butler's success as a railroad advocate drew the attention of
Attorney General George Wickersham.

Wickersham was the Attorney

General for the Taft administration.

He was fond of recruiting

- - - - -_..._ - - - - _._
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conservative lawyers to carry out the prosecution of the Gov
ernment's anti-trust cases. 38 Butler's career as a trust buster
was relatively unspectacular.

In fact, as critics charged,

Butler acted with what could be termed half-heartedness in his
pursuit of busting-up the large corporate concerns that he had
previously advocated for in his private practice.
For various political reasons, including considerations of
religion and geography, Butler was nominated to the position of
Supreme Court Justice by President Harding in 1923. 39

Taft, who

was now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, actively campaigned
for Butler's nomination.

The nomination of Butler to the Supreme

Court caused a minor uproar in the Senate. Leading the bitter pro
test against the nomination were Senators Norris, Shipatead, and
LaFollette.

To these three influential leaders Butler was an lIim_

possible reactionary.,,40

Two main issues highlighted the debate of

whether or not to ratify the Butler nomination.

The issues were

Butler's ties with big business and his participation in the firing
of several University of Minnesota faCUlty members.
As a member of the University's Board of Regents, Butler
used all of his persuasive powers to have a number of faculty
members dismissed from their posts.

Butler's motivation for the

dismissals was well known, and serves to exemplify the incredibly
strong willed personality of Butler.

The crime that the faculty

members had committed was crossing the vengeful ego of Butler. The
faculty members had spoken out against various activities that
were being carried out by the corporate interests which backed
Butler.

Butler used his position as a regent to silence those
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who spoke against his clients.

The University later rehired

most of the raculty, however, the Senate leaders used the incident
to substantiate their claims that Butler was an unyielding con
servative reactionary,41 who would use the Court to further the
interests of large corporations.
The issue of Butlerls ties with big business, probably helped
rather than hurt his ratification.

Big business carried out an

extensive lobbying campaign for Butler.

When the 64 - 8 vote for

ratification of Butler was announced on January 2, 1923,42 big
business applauded.

Presumedly pressure exerted by the large

financial concerns had a beneficial effect on the outcome of the
vote.
As an Associate Justice, Butler continued to represent big
business interests.

Butler's belief in the principals of laissez

faire is clearly seen in his opinion in the case of Euclid v.
Ambler 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Butler argued, in dissent, against
all types of zoning laws.

He stated his belief that there should

exist no controls over the expansion of business in any field of
economic endeavor. 43

Butler wrote several emotional anti-tax

opinions where he further enunciated his belief in the concepts
of laissez-fairism (see, Metler v. standard Nut Margarine Company
284 U.S. 489, 1923).

Butler argued adamantly against State and

Federal taxes, using a varied number pretexts to vote against tax
laws.

His stand on the power of the government to lay and collect

taxes further exemplifies his belief that the Constitution sought
to insure the existence of a

reB~rained

central government.

On racial issues, Butler remained in the reactionary camp•

.,. ----- - - - - - - 
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Even in the relatively unenlightened civil rights days or the
30's, Butler's opinions are highly conservative, almost back
ward.

u.s.

In the famous Scottsburo case of Powell v. Alabama 287
45(1932) Butler refused" to recognize the existence of racial

prejudice in the trial of several blacks by a white jury.

Seven

of the Supreme Court Justices clearly saw the existence of racial
prejudice in the trial proceedings and ordered a new trial for
the accused.

Butler also voted to uphold a Texas "white only"

primary law.

Stating that political parties were merely private

clubs, Butler voted in dissent to the Court's invalidation of
such laws in Nixon v. Condon 286 U.S. 73(1932).44
Butler wrote few of the New Deal opinions; however, he did
participate in almost all of the Court's opinions written during
the New Deal era.

Butler consistently voted against Roosevelt

administration New Deal legislation.

His famous New Deal opinion

was given in Morehead v. New York ex reI Tipaldo 298 U.S. 887(1937).
This opinion invalidated New York's minimum wage laws and would be
the last piece of New Deal legislation to be declared entirely in
valid.by the Supreme Court.

The Morehead case rurthered previous

Court rulings which had found it improper for the federal govern
ment to establish minimum wages (see, Carter v. Carter Coal 298
u.S. 238). The Court would now, under Butler's leadership, declare
it improper, even in the face of severe economic turmoil, for a
state government to establish or maintain minimum wages.
In the Morehead opinion, Butler's laissez-faire ideologies
are made extremely clear.

Butler held that the due process clause

of the fourteenth amendment prohibited the regulation of wages
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for men and women.

Butler's reasoning, in this decision, was

greatly influenced by his personal upbringing and the values at
tained through his youth.

The concepts of rugged indivldualiBlTl,

impressed upon him during his youth, and the notions of a restrained
government, taught to him during his formal educational years, pro
hibited him from allowing either a state or federal government to
formulate financial safeguards for their citizens.

In this respect,

Butler is perhaps the best example of a New Deal Justice facilitat
ing his own socio-economic Viewpoints to control and limit the gov
erning power of the national government. Butler's conservative phil
osophies not only transcended into his judicial opinions, his reaction
ary philosophies dominated his jUdicial thOUght.
Butler's donkey-like nature, and his consistent attempts to in
validate all New Deal legislation. made him the backbone of the con
servative forces on the Court. His 'tortured' narrow interpretation of
the Constitution prompted one critic. David Burner, author of The
Politics of Provincialism, to comment, "Butler's words certainly
quickened their (the Roosevelt forces) efforts to adopt

Borne

expedient

that would prevent jUdicial nullification of Congressional legislation.,,45
Clearly, the Court Reorganization Plan was such an attempt to negate
the conservative effect of men like Butler.
Justice Van Devanter
Like Sutherland and Butler, Willis Van Devanter was born and
raised on the western frontier.

Like his conservative counterparts.

Van Devanter was also faced with economic hardship as a child. He
would become imbued with the same sense of rugged individualism
that would later place him among the Court's conservative faction.
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Van Devanter was born on April 17, 1859 in Marion, Indiana. 46
He attended the Marion pUblic school system and later attended
Asbury University {now De Pauw).47

Van Devanter was forced to

finance his own university education when his father became ser
iously ill and stopped being the familyts main provider.
Van Devanter successfully worked his way through college and in
1881, he attended the University of Cincinnati School of Law,
where he graduated second in his c1a88. 48 After 8 brief period
of time practicing law in his father's firm, Van Devanter moved,
with his fatherts old law partner John Lacey, to Cheyenne, Wyoming.
Lacey had been appointed to the position of Chief Justice of the
Wyoming territorial Supreme Court. 49

Van Devanterts move to

Cheyenne, and his reliance on Lacey, are examples of two of Van
Devanterts personality traits:

his preference for the IIraw,

boisterous" life of the frontier and the importance that he placed
upon the presence of a friend in power to help further his own
career interests.
Settling in Wyoming, Van Devanter started a partially suc
ceseful private law practice.

He is said to have represented an

assortment of clients charged with crimes of an equally varied
nature.

Van Devanter continued his private practice for almost

three years,5 1 when he joined the RepUblican law firm of Charles
Potter. 52 The firm's major client was the Burlington Railroad
Company, and

80,

like the two other conservative Justices of the

Supreme Court, Van Devanter was destined to join the ranks of
those who represented the interests of large corporations.
In 1885, Van Devanter became the right hand man for Francis
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Warren who successfully ran for the Wyoming territorial governor
ship.

During the campaign for Warren, Van Devanter proved himself

an imaginative, if not devious politician.

He was involved in

several rather underhanded political incidents.

Van Devanter is

credited as having been responsible for the creation of the events. 53
Van Devanter1s political history serves to show that he was a man
who was politically astute and, in what may be a foreshadowing of
actions while on the bench, he was not above reverting to political
underhandedness to save his cause.
Van Devanter used accumulated authority, acquired through bis
association with Warren, to further the interests of railroad clients.
In 1893, a number of striking Idaho railroad workers made use of a
company locomotive to carry themselves to Wyoming. Van Devanter uBed
his political and legal skills to have the strikers thrown in jail
when they crossed the Wyoming territorial lines. 54

Van Devantertg

unsympathetic attitude towards strikers (inclUding their causes and
methods) would be repeatedly expressed when Van Devanter became a
Justice on the United states Supreme Court.
Van Devanter's support for Warren paid off in the form of an
appointment in 1889 as Chief Justice of
Supreme Court. 55

Wyoming~s

territorial

The job of Chief Justice, as Van Devanter soon

found, was not as grand or glorious as the title had suggested.
Van Devanter was paid a relatively low salary, and was required to
ride all sections of the expansive territory to preside over local,
mostly petty, disputes.

As a reSUlt, in 1890 when Wyoming became a

state, Van Devanter returned to private practice.
turned

lucrative

when

he became the legal

for the Union Pacific Railroad.

His practice

representative

Van Devanter would represent
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this company in virtually all of its litigation, and would
also defend the company against the federal government, when
the government leveled serious charges of fraudulent land
claims against the Union Pacific. 56
Van Devanterts ties with the Republican Party brought him
further political rewards in 1897 when he was appointed Assistant
Attorney General for the Department of the Interior.

During his

tenure with the Department of the Interior, Van Devanter developed
what would become a life long specialty of handling land claim
disputes.

It may be ironic that after seven extremely profitable

years of representing the Union Pacific, with its fraudulent land
claims and aggressive land acquisition tactics, Van Devanter now
saw, and was forced to protect, those who were bring victimized
by large corporations like the Union Pacific.

Upon seeing the

effects of such activities on the victims, Van Devanter developed
a semblance of sympathy for Indians and other minority groups.
In the early 1900's, owing again to his political connections,
Van Devanter was appointed as JUdge of the 8th Circuit Court. 58
As a circuit court judge, Van Devanter's legal opinions were oon
servative and are said to have "rarely reflected the social con
sciousness" that had enveloped the rather progressive era. 59 In,
Portland Gold Mining Company v. Duke 164 Fed 180(8th Cir.,1908)
Van Devanter reversed established precedent on the issue of in
juries sustained by employees of a company through no fault of
the employee.

Van Devanter stated that in his opinion that he
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believed it to be
a settled rule, as between Maater and
Servant, the duty of so using a
reasonably safe place, of so operating
reasonably safe equipment, and of so con
forming to any established and reasonably
safe practice of work, that injury will not
be inflicted negligently, it is the duty of
those to whom the work is entrugted, and is
no positive duty of the master. 8
This opinion is representative of Van Devanter's socio-economic
thOUght.

His beliefs as to the proper relationship of employer

versus employee, and the rights that employees had against the
actions of their employers, were based upon the economic notions
of an earlier day. Van Devanter would continue to express such con
servative opinions throughout his legal career.

It would be the

nineteenth century ideologies, regarding the rights of the
employed, which would clash so bitterly with what the reactionary
Justices believed to be the radical ideologies of the New Deal.
In December of 1910, President Taft nominated Van Devanter
to a place on the United States Supreme Court.

Van Devanter had

two powerful supporters, ex-Senator Warren and the one-time legal
counselor for the Carnegie Steel Corporation, Senator Knox. Van
Devanter's nomination was opposed by several progressive Senators,
inclUding Senator William Jennings Bryan.

Bryan described the

nominee as:
the Judge that held that two railroads run
ning parallel to each other for two thousand
miles were not competing lines, ong of the
railroads being the Union Pacific. 1
Such objections created but ripples against the wave of Senatorial
acceptance of the nomination.

As one author wrote, lithe politi

cal, railroad, and judicial interests of the nominee stood him
in good stead, and he (Van Devanter) was quickly confirmed. II 62
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In his early years on the Court, Van Devanter delivered
several broad interpretations of the commerce clause.
the Second Employers Liability Case 223

u.s.

In

1(1912), Van

Devanter stated his belief that Congress could control almost
every phase of carrier-employee relationships.

This meant that

in 1912, Van Devanter permitted Congress to control all aspects
of employment (including

working conditions, length of hours,

minimum wages) for those -:employed by companies involved in inter
state transportation, Roosevelt was prohibited by Van Devanter
in 1935 to further use those powers.

Van Devanter wrote in this

opinion:
Commerce is an act. It is performed by men,
and with the help of things ••• Congress can
do anything ••• (with discretion) to save the
act of interstate commerce from prevention or
intervention or interruption, or to make that
6
act more secure, more reliable or more efficient. 3
Here Van Devanter set forth a broad interpretation of the powers
given to Congress through the commerce clause.

In Southern

Railroad Company v. U.S. 220 U.S. 20(1911) Van Devanter reaffirmed
this broad interpretation of commerce clause powers.

Van Devanter

stated in part, IIcommerce comprehends more than the mere exchange
of goods.

It embraces commercial intercourse in all its branches •• ,,64

It was therefore within the powers given to Congress by the Con
stitution, to control all commercial intercourse and all aspects
or parts involved in that commerce.

Van Devanter further stated

that commerce was, by its intrinsic nature, of national concern,
and therefore needed national control (see Mayor of Vidalia v.
McNeely 274

u.S.

676, 1931).

These decisions were reached at what could be termed the
height of Van Devanter's intellectual capabilities.

In 1935,
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during the Court's most controversial period, Van Devanter was
seventy-six years old, a point that many consider as past his
personal intellectual prime. Van Devanter would probably have re
signed in the early 1930's if not for Roosevelt's election in 1932.
Van Devanter considered the President as "rash" and became deter
mined to remain on the Court to counter F.D.R.'s actions. 65
Perhaps the ract that Van Devanter had passed his intellectual
prime, coupled with his belief that Roosevelt was a menace to the
traditional American economic order, led to the aged Justices pro
hibition of extending earlier progressive judicial opinions to
include the operation of New Deal Programs.
Van Devanter, while he did not write any of the Supreme
Court opinions

which decided New Deal cases, always voted against

legislation which was liberal in the twentieth century sense.
Van Devanter1s votes against the A.A.A., Gold Clauses, and
Frazie-Lenke are understandable considering his economic views
and past legal decisions.

His votes against the N.R.A. and the

Guffey Coal and Wagner Acts (which contained clauses which sought
to control aspects of industries involved in interstate commerce)
are reversals of previous judicial decisions.

In the last three

cases, Congress sought to accomplish ends that Van Devanter had to
some extent previously s.anctioned in the Southern Railroad case,
the Mayor of Vidalia case and the Second Employers Liability cases.
Van Devanter's invalidation of the New Deal must be at
tributed to old age and his intense personal dislike of Roose
velte

In his last years on the Court, Van Devanter became

known as the silent

reactionary~

He established himself as the
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obstacle on Roosevelt's path to social progress.

Roosevelt in

turn responded to Van Devanter's efforts to invalidate the New
Deal.

He did not attack the Court as an institution but attacked

Van Devanter's opinions.

The Court Reorganization Plan was

Roosevelt's attempt to remove the silent, conservative, reaction
ary from his path.
Justice McReynolds
One Justice, on the Supreme Court in 1937, was the best ex
ample of a conservative reactionary.

This one Justice would always

vote to invalidate New Deal legislation.

This Justice holds the

distinction of being the most abrasive, tenacious, hateful con
servative to sit on the Supreme Court during the New Deal era. This
Justice was James Clark McReynolds.
McReynolds' economic philosophy clearly dominated his juristic
opinions.

Our task is made easier in that we only have to identify

these opinions, and trace their development.

Representative opin

ions of the few New Deal decisions that he wrote substantiate the
assertion that he was a conservative, and relied solely on his
private economic and moral beliefs in formulating all of his opinions.
Born in 1862, in Elkton, Kentucky, where there remained lingering
traces of a frontier quickly expanded and where there also existed
lingering sympathy for the Confederate cause, McReynolds received
many gifts from his Southern upbringing. One gift was an intense
racial and religious hatred. He would never be sympathetic towards
minority rights (see Powell v. Alabama 287 U.S. 45,1932) and would
also practice bis religious intolerance of the JewiSh and Catholic
faiths as Justice of the Supreme Court.

In the latter respect,
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McReynolds refused to talk to Justices Brandeis and Cardozo
because of their religious beliefs.

McReynolds was a haughty,

opinionated man, who would rarely change or bend his beliefs
even in circumstances which necessitated a yielding of his
one ideology • . McReynolds' senge of self-righteousness was form
ulated during his early childhood.

His father nicknamed him

"Popel! because of his belief in his own infallibility.66
McReynolds enforced his belief of his own infallibility by
leading a very spartan life.
and rarely socialized.

He never drank, hated smoking,

His life was dominated by the study of

law, similar to the devotion to the study of the bible by a
minister.

McReynolds, in his own way, loved the law as he construed

McReynolds' viewpoints towards the nature of law and man
wwre influenced by the teachings of his college Professor John
B. Minor. 67 Minor taught that law was an unchanging, totally
coercive entity.

Minor also taught Sunday bible classes, and

seemed to be able to convey to McReynolds that his ideological
doctrines were morally right and far superior than the doctrines of
anyone else.

Minor once said that he taught the law, he probably
meant that he taught the one and only morally correct law. 68
McReynolds adopted Minor's viewpoints, creating a impenetrable
shield of moral righteousness over his arch-conservative juristic
philosophies.
McReynolds was never very successful in the practice of
private law.

He became a legal advisor for the Illinois railway,

and thereby continued the tradition of the conservative justices
represeBting large corporate interests.

McReynolds became a
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Professor of Law at Vanderbilt University in 1900. 69

He

preferred to teach law, imparting his conservative doctrines in
a highly dignified

m~er.

McReynolds' political career was not one founded upon
popular support.

His one attempt at gaining public office

through popular election failed.

McReynolds was then elevated

to public office by inside political connections.

His post of

Assistant Attorney General, which he assumed in 1903, was gained
through the help of Jacob Dickinson, a prominent Nashville
lawyer. 70 His friendship with Colonel Edward House, and his
support for Wilson in 1912 won him the post of Attorney General.
As Attorney General, his tenure as a cabinet member was brief.
Apparently, he was unable to get along with anyone else on the
cabinet and was quietly kicked upstairs to the Supreme Court in
1914. 71
During his twenty years on the Court, McReynolds wrote a
scant five-hundred and three opinions.

The opinions that he did

write almost qualify as manifestos of conservative ideology.
McReynolds believed in the absolute efficacy of the Sherman anti
trust laws.

The anti-trust laws represent the virtual codifica

tion of McReynolds' personal economic views.

The economic world,

according to McReynolds, should be free from government inter
vention and monopolistic domination.

McReynolds believed that

the government interfered with business mQre, and constituted a
bigger threat to the free enterprise system, than did monopolies.
In Colgate v. United states 250

u.s.

300,307(1919), McReynolds

stated his belief that companies should be given the freedom to
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sell to whomever, whenever, and
pleased.

~or

whatever price as they ·

He also believed that companies should be allowed to

pay, and treat, their workers as they pleased.

He was adamantly

opposed to unions and government regulations which protected
workers.

In the Arizona Employer's Liability Cases 250

u.s.

400

(1919) McReynolds wrote that injuries caused to employees were
no fault of the employer.
McReynolds' most famous, or infamous, opinions were made
during the New Deal era.

During this era he voted against every

New DeaL.measure, citing New Deal programs as infringements on
the various rights of private individuals.
291

u.s.

In Nebbia v. New York

502(1934) McReynolds dissented with the Court's opinion,

and wrote that the creation of price support systems

~or

milk

constituted an infringement upon the right of a grocer to charge
as he pleased for milk.

In the same opinion, McReynolds contended

that the Supreme Court had the power to go beyond deciding whether
or not legislation was constitutional.

McReynolds stated that

the Court had the power to jUdge the wisdom of laws, a view con
demned in a later opinion by Justice Cardozo.
McReynolds wrote:

In the Nebbia case

"Plainly, I think, this Court must have regard

to the wisdom of the enactment.

At least, we must inquire con

cerning its purpose and decide whether the means proposed have
reasonable relation to something within legislative power.,,72
McReynolds attacked Roosevelt's use of power in several cases.
In the Gold Clause cases, McReynolds stated that Roosevelt had
deprived men of due process and ?ad failed to give just compensa
tion.

Describing Rooaevel t as "Nero in his worst form ll J McReynolds,

- - - - - - - - _ ._---- -..- - - - -- - - - - - 
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in dissent, declared that as a result of the Court's decision,
in the Gold clause cases, (which upheld Congressional abrogation
of the Gold Standard) that the Constitution was gone.

McReynolds'

opinions on New Deal legislation remained forcefully conservative.
McReynolds was always unyielding, his views were solidified and
would never change.
This was the man who would become furious at friends who
asked him for money during the absolute depths of the depression, the
roan who believed in the coercive nature of law, who would enunciate,
openly, his hate for New Deal doctrines and for President Roosevelt.
It was the personality of the man, strong and abrasive, that won him
infamy. His hatred of Roosevelt was returned by the President. In a
letter to Felix Frankfurter, Roosevelt states:
At the annual reception to the Supreme Court,
I think the Chief Justice pulled a fast one on me.
After he had been talking with me himself for ten
minutes he got up, said he thought some other mem
bers of the Court could have a talk with me and went
across the room and brought McReynolds and plumped
him down. The Chief Justice has a sense of humor
though few people realize it. Thank God no photo
graphers were present.73
Again, the conflict that arose was between President R09sevelt and
a specific Supreme Court Justice.

McReynolds was an obstacle

to Rooseveltls recovery program.

Roosevelt sought to formulate

a plan that would remove the obstacle, and would do so in a manner
that would strike at the Justice's abrasive personality, and hope
fully serve to humiliate this foe.
The ideologies of the two men were extremely different.
Their personalities were perhaps as equally strong, and each sought
vengeance upon the other.

The result was the Court Reorganization
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Plan, proposed by Roosevelt to deal definitively with the con
servative opposition.
mind.

The plan was devised with McReynolds in

McReynolds formulated a plan, while Attorney General for

Wilson, to increase the number or Federal Judges, his Federal
Court Reorganization Plan was aimed at removing aged Justices.
The plan of McReynolds did not include provisions which would
affect the Supreme Court.

This plan never reached beyond the

planning stage and was all but forgotten until Cummings happened
across it during research for Roosevelt's Court Plan.

The purpose

of Roosevelt's plan was not only to remove McReynolds but to em
barass and discredit the conservative Justice.
For our purposes here we have given the label of reactionaries
to the

Il

c on s er va t i v e ll members of the New Deal Supreme Court. The

f1liberalll members of the Court have been Lab l.ed progressives.
lNhether or not these labels are by definition correct, the point re
mains that, in the eyes of the New Dealers, both conservatives and
liberals voted and acted in a manner which created a record con
sistent with the suggested meaning of their titles. As established
above, the conservatives voted in all but one case to invalidate New
Deal legislation.

The conservatives broke ranks in the Tennessee

Valley Authority case (Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority 297
U.S.288) when Sutherland, Van Devanter, and Butler voted to sustain
the legislation which created the T.V.A. The liberals voted to invalid
ate New Deal legislation in two major cases: the National Industrial
Recovery Act (United States v. Schechter POUltry Corp.295 U.S.495)and
in the Richert Mills case (which held on the authority of the Butler
case, which the liberals voted

~gainst,

to return taxes collected
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under the Agricultural Adjustment Act to the taxpayer).
Our purpose in discussing the liberal Justices is to show
the development of the socio-economic thought of the Justices, and
to explain how and why these philosophies differ from the socio
economic philosophies of the conservative Justices.

As with our

analysis of the conservatives, we must ascertain if the liberals
held true to their beliefs, and if they did, did they do
consistent manner.
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in a

We must also analyze the effect that the

liberals, and their opinions, had on the formulation of the Court
Reorganization Plan of 1937.

We have stated that the Court Plan was

formulated with the clear intention of removing, and humiliating,
those Justices who had invalidated the New Deal program.

The con

servatives held only a slim majority on the Court. This margin was
usually only one vote on most New Deal decisions.

A change of one

vote, or the replacement of one conservative Justice, would give a
majority to the liberals.

With such a slight margin, we must ponder

as to whether the liberal Justices had any influence on the formulation
of the Court Plan and whether the Court Plan was written in such a
way as to insure the continuation of the Court's liberal membership.
Justice Brandeis
The socio-economic views of Louis D. Brandeis are perhaps
more dissimilar to the philosophies of the conservative members of
the New Deal Court, than the views of any other liberal Justice.
~le

the conservative Justices rallied to the banner of law as a

fixed and coercive entity, Brandeis professed a theory of law as a
fluid or "living" entity.
1921)

In his Truax v. Corrigan (257

opinion, Brandeis enunciated his belief that the

u.s.

312,
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Constitution should be used for social experimentation. Brandeis
defined his philosophy of the proper nature of law, in the Truax
opinion, when he stated, "the rights of property and liberty of
the individual must be remoulded (my emphasis) from time to time
to meet the changing needs of society.,,74

For Brandeis, law was

an operationally useful tool for the shaping and reshaping, of
society, or the social order, to insure the protection of the
interests of the private individual:

the common man.

Contrasted to the conservative's and to much of the business
world's beliefs of the proper function of Lav , the ideology of
Brandeis was heretical.

As we have set forth, the conservatives

believed in a fixed, coercive law.

Their law was designed to pro

tect and promote the concepts of rugged individualism and economic
Darwinism.

Brandeis promoted a theory which professed that law was

the protector of the common man, law was the equalizing force among
men in society.
The differences in views between Brandeis and the conserva
tives were, as can be clearly seen, basic ideological ones.

The

differences of socio-economic thought were created as a result of
the circumstances of environment during the Justices' formative
years.

Brandeis became a man of and for

socie~.

Be became the

famed "People's AttorneyllJ who worked without fee for causes he
thought important to the public good.

Brandeis was both a

sociologist and economist who stUdied the ills of society and
proposed solutions to those ills, solutions which would be imple
mented largely through the judicial system.

It was Brandeis who

gave legal effect to the use of data gathered by social and
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economic experts in deciding the validity of laws and actions.
Brandeis stated in Truax v. Corrigan that IIconsideration of the
contemporary conditions, social, industrial, and political, of
the community to be affected thereby" must be made in order to
II

appreciate the evils sought to be remedied and the possible

effects of the remedy proposed.,,75

Brandeis did diverge from the

conservative thought which dominated the Supreme Court in the 1930's.
The question that now arises is, what led to the creation of such
thoughts, and, why were they so different from those held by his
conservative colleagues.
The differences between the conservative and liberal members
of the Supreme Court were many. The dissimilarities were the
results of different considerations of geography, youthful envir
onment, and the Justices' intellectual development.

These factors

affected the formulation of the Justices' socio-economic philo
sophies.

The conservative Justices all came from areas of the

nation that were considered, during their youth, as in the western
regions of the nation.

In these areas, the conservatives shared

similar circumstances, including austere living conditions and rel
atively unstable home lives.

The conservative Justices were

products of economic travail, they were engulfed with a sense of
frontierism that led to the creation of self-imbued doctrines of
rugged individualism.

The circumstances of their youth, and the

resulting socio-economic doctrines formulated by the future Jus
tices during this time, would dominate their juristic thought in
a conservative fashion for the remainder of their lives.
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From this conservative scenario steps Louis D. Brandeis.
His biographical background and the development of his mind
differ vastly from that of his

conservati~e

counterparts.

Brandeis was born in the same state as McReynolds, however, the
similarities between the two men stop there.

Parental heritage,

economic circumstance, and intellectual development of the two
Justices lay at opposite poles.

McReynolds was born in the small,

backwater town of Elkton, Kentucky.

The

to~

was still enamored

with frontier spirits and confederate sympathies.
born in Louisville, a cultural and economic center.

Brandeis was
Brandeis'

father was an immigrant from Bohemia, who came to the United
states with the revolutionary political group, the 48'ers.

Brandeis'

father was a political genius, a man of culture who harbored a
restless spirit, and a man whose heritage was well versed in the
struggle for freedom, and social justice for all mankind.

These

traits were passed along and instilled within Louis, the only
child of the Brandeis' family.

Throughout his youth the Brandeis

homestead would play host to a vast array of talented, young, in
tellectuals.

His father's success as a grain merchant brought

stability, comfort, and culture into Louis' world.
Brandeis was schooled in Germany, he returned to the United
states where he attended Harvard Law School from which he received
his law degree at the age of twenty.

Upon his establishment of a

practice in St. Louis, Missouri, it became quite clear that Brandeis
did not enter the field of law for desire of monetary gain.

Ris
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advocacy of issues which affected the pUblic good brought him
honor, he refused financial reward.

Brandeis opposed the

tactics and practices of the corporations that disregarded the
well-being, rights or existence of the common man in the corpora
tions mad-dash for financial wealth.

Brandeis litigated against

corporations like the railroads, which the conservative members
of the Court earned their living protecting and defending. Brandeis'
legal briefs and opinions became treatises on the proper function
ing of the economy and the proper role of the government to insure
the protection of the governed.
Ice Co. v. Liebman 285

u.s.

As Brandeis stated in New state

262, 311(1932) "there must be power

in the state and the nation to remould, through experimentation,
our economic practices and economic needs.,,76

Brandeis advocated

for power to protect and provide, powers considered unconstitu
tional by the conservative Justices.
Brandeis came from moderately wealthy economic circumstance
which helped provide him with a sense of culture and society.
His schooling gave him international background and experience,
he was, in some respects, cosmopolitan.

He received from his

parents a craving for social justice and liberty, a craving
that he transformed into practiced philosophical beliefs
founded upon a sense of economic and social justice for all man
kind.

His beliefs would fit within the governmental mould of

the New Deal, in all but one respect.

Brandeis could not sanction

the creation of an all powerful government which would combine,
and control, segments of the

so~iety.

Brandeis advocated for a

protectorate government, in the senae that government should
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protect the social and economic rights of its citizens, but not
a government that would form a protectorate by amassing the
industrial operations of the nation.
Brandeis refused to support one piece of New Deal legisla
tion:

the National Industrial Recovery Act.

His vote to

invalidate this legislation exemplifies another aspect of Brandeis'
socio-economic thought, his hatred of bigness.
in Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pa 277

Brandeis stated,

u.s. 389, 410-11(1928) " ... that

the evils incident to the accelerating absorption of business by
corporations outweigh the benefits thereby secured; and that the
process of absorption shou.!Ld be retarded. 1I 7 ?

Because of this

ideological stand, Brandeis refused to support a New Deal program
which sought to combine, protect, and strengthen the nation's
business and corporate sector, although Roosevelt saw this
combination as the only way to secure national economic security
for his country.
Arter the reading of the N.I.R.A. decision, Brandeis
motioned to an administration official to follow him into the
disrobing room.

Brandeis turned to the official and said that

this decision was to serve as a signal to the administration that
bigness would not be tolerated by the Court.
On the issue of bigness, Brandeis would momentarily leave
the New Deal camp.
of legislation.

To Roosevelt, the N.I.R.A... was a "must" piece

As was seen in the discussion of the Schechter

decision, Roosevelt felt it necessary to continue the program in
some fashion.

Clearly, it was the Schechter decision which put

in motion the wheels which formulated the Court Reorganization
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Plan.

Brandeis' vote to invalidate this piece of legislation

seems to have overshadowed, in Roosevelt's eyes, his support for
the New Deal.

Roosevelt decided to submit to Congress, in 1937, a

reorganization plan which rested solely on an "old-age-equals
incompetencettformula.

The conservative Justices were, on the

average, older than the liberal Justices.

Justice Van Devanter

was born in 1857, McReynolds and Sutherland were born in 1862.
Going by Roosevelt's plan of augmenting Justices with a junior
Justice when the Justices reached the age of seventy-five,
Roosevelt would have been able to replace Van Devanter imme
diately, and would have been able to replace Sutherland and
McReynolds in a year.

As the oldest member of the Court was

Brandeis, Roosevelt would have been able to immediately replace or
augment him, and, according to the old age equals incompetence the
ory of the Court bill, Brandeis would have been labeled as the most
incompetent, which was by far an -limproper and derogratory tribute
to the Justice's capabilities.

At the time of the Court Bill's

proposal, Justice stone was sixty-four and Justice Cardozo was
sixty-six.

The Court Bill, while trying to single out the con

servative Justices, singled out Justice Brandeis as one of the old
men who had to go.

Roosevelt seemed willing to allow such in£er

encee to be brought to bear against 't h e Courtls leading liberal,
in pursuit of removing the conservative reactionaries.

If the

Court bill had passed Congress, and been made into law, Justices
Brandeis and Van Devanter would have been immediately replaced or
augmented.

Roosevelt, in effect, would have been able to appoint

two new Suprame Court Justices.

The only way that the plan would
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have been approved by Congress (more on this subject in the
next chapter) would be through the continued efforts of the plan's
sole Senate promoter, Joe Robinson.

Robinson wanted a reward for

his tireless efforts; a seat on the Supreme Court.

Robinson was,

in the eyes of New Dealers and Roosevelt, a conservative.

Thus,

Roosevelt would have conceivably had a conservative court, Robin
son being a conservative.

The new liberal would have balanced

the Court at five to four (hoping that Roberts retained his con
servative stance) or six to five.

The point being that the age

formula had a drawback, Roosevelt could still end up with a con
servative Court after all his efforts.

Roosevelt, however, had

narrowed his attack on removing certain conservative Justices,
regard for Brandeis, the liberal spokesman, would not alter his
attack.

The liberal desertion of the New Deal in the Schechter

case, may have convinced Roosevelt to pursue his line of attack
and hope that political necessities would not bind him to the ap
pointment of a conservative.

Roosevelt definitely felt no obliga

tion to formulate a bill that would insure the continued membership
of Brandeis on the Supreme Court.
Our model, or theory, of the conservative Supreme Court
Justices (born on the western frontier, living under austere
living conditions as children and representing large corporate
interests during their legal careers) as obstacles to Roosevelt's
recovery program and, the theory of the liberal Justices (born
in more established eastern-orientated areas, their childhood

-
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spent in a stable and more comfortable environment, and repre
senting the "people ll during their legal careers) as a responsive
force to Roosevelt's New Deal program holds true for the six
Justices discussed so far.

The biographical data of the seventh

Justice, Harlan Fiske Stone, threatens to invalidate this model.
A review of Stonel.s biographical data, presents many sim
ilarities with those date of the conservatives.

Starting with

his childhood environment, stone grew up in a rural setting, as
did the conservatives.

The conservatives faced austere living

conditions, all had to work their way through college and law
school, all felt unfulfilled desires of want.

stone also grew

up in less than aristocratic circumstance; he also had to work
his way through college and law school.

Undoubtedly, there were

many occasions when stone saw his personal wants un£ulfilled be
cause of economic circumstance.

Herein ends the similarities,

even these similarities, upon close inspection, are tenuous and
exist only through a superficial s trudy and simple generalization.
In what becomes a question of degree, stone's biographical data
present a portrait of a man much different than either his con
servative or liberal counterparts.
Harlan Fiske stone was born in the year 1812 on a farm in
rural Vermont.

The farmlife of Stone l s childhood days is remem

bered by Stone in a storybook fashion. Long summer days spent fish
ing with the town. doctor, hard work doing the chores on the familyls
farm, and memories of close association with a loving extended family,
are all examples of this storybook youth.

Economically the

Stones were not rich, however, in spirit, respect and familial
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love, the stones both gave and gained a king's treasure.

What

spearates Harlan Fiske stone's childhook from his conservative
counterparts, and likens him to the Chief Justice, Charles Evans
Hughes, is this familial stability with its life filled with
tenderness, and emotional and physical stability.

stone's eco

nomic circumstance can also be likened to that of the Chief Justices,
austere but not destitute.

For both men, food was always on the

table, a roof was always above head and shoes were bOUght each
spring.

stone's formative years were not infringed upon by the

real and psychologically scarring call to set forth and earn
money to provide for a destitute family as was

Sutherlan~and

to

a lesser degree Butler.
The quietude and stability of the farm life also provided
stone with another asset, a rigorous early education.

In the

category of education, Stone can again best be likened to Hughes,
although similarities to Brandeis are clearly seen.
formally educated by his mother, Anne.

Stone was first

Like Hughes, Stone was given

what his mother called, "mental exercises ll before he reached the age
of attending regular school.

Stone's Grammar and High School years

were spent in rigorous stUdy memorizing dates, names and facts.
Throughout his education process, Stone became an avid reader, pur
suing both his studies and farm chores with equal vigor.
The differences between Stone and the conservatives are made
clear.

Although stone was born in a rural setting, it lacked the

sense of frontierism and the requisite ideology of rugged indivi
dualism that imbued his conservative counterparts. Stone's economic
conditions, while perhaps austere in one respect,of not providing
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enough funds to pay for higher education, were nevertheless far
from being those of destitution and other other attributes of his
farm life far outweighed the lack of funds for his college and
law school education.

While Stone worked to pay for college, some

of his conservative colleagues had to work to gain sustenance, a
difference of great magnitude.
Our model ·then continues to merit validity.

The man that

came from the Vermont farm, experienced a vastly different child
hood from his conservative counterparts.

Unlike the conservatives,

stone was not moulded into a firm ideological form.

Stone suf

fered from no economic hardships, and this would lead Stone to
develop a different outlook,as politically neutral

a.~hilosophy

as was the conservatives' philosophy reactionary and Brandeis'
progressive.
Stone's juridical philosophies have been said to rest on
many foundations.
restraint.

Stone promoted the concept of judicial self-

He believed that the correction of outmoded social

and/or economic processes ought to be left to the legislature to
solve. 78 His philosophy on the purpose of law was to administer
Justice and secure social order.

His philosophy concerning the

purpose of law is succinctly stated in his address to the Columbia
Law School faculty while he was Dean in 1910 ••••
Too long have we studied Law as though its problems
were like the problems involving mathematical form
ulae. (We must) humanize law, ••• to make the work of
our school progressive and enlightened without loss
of a due senae of proportion and at a time to pre
serve unimpaired our sense of the practical aim of
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Law as an agency for administering justice and
securing social order, must in this as 1n every
case be the guiding principal in determini~g
all questions of Law School policy.79
Throughout his legal career, stone sought to preserve his belief
in the purpose of Law.

The securement

o~

social order and the ad

ministration of justice became an operational guideline as well
as a philosophical goal.

In pursuit of this philosophical goal,

Stone came to be regarded as a man of judicial self-restraint.
Stone strove to regard solely the statutory provisions of the law.
He considered only the words of the laws. and not their wisdom
when he decided upon their constitutionality.

It is important to

understand that Stone, more than any other Justice of the New
Deal Court, allied himself neither to the conservatives nor the
liberals.

He sought to maintain a neutral jUdicial stance, a

stance which regarded and decided upon the Validity of law not
on the basis of the wisdom of the philosophical notions which
supported the law.
The 1930's must have posed a serious strain upon a man like
Stone who possessed such lofty and neutral legalistic philo
sophies.

Economic decay had brought into serious question the

future of the social order.

As Stone said, "the fortress of our

civilization developed unsuspected weakness and in consequence
we are now engaged in the altogether wholesome task of critical
re-examiniation of whatever our hands have reared. lI 8 0

That

re-examination was. in what stone considered as the proper
place, being undertaken in the legislative and the executive
branches of government.

The r.esul t.s , or remedies,
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of that re-examination were passed through the legislature,
made into law, and were now being questioned in Courts through
out the land.
The duty of the Court was to decide whether the law was
permitted by the United States Constitution.

As a Supreme Court

Justice, Stone believed that he should strive
to make plain that his opinions upholding the
Constitutionality of statutes cannot be taken
as an indication that he personally thinks
the legislation wise or desirable, they (his
decisions) are based Wholly on his conception
of the principles of government which are
81
sanctioned or permitted by the Constitution.
Stone would refuse to became an advocate for liberal legislation,
and would dissent vigorously with the conservatives who judged
New Deal laws as bad, but not necessarily unconstitutional.
Stone attacked conservative opinions which rested upon
their belief that law which rostered even the slightest judicial
distrust ought to be invalidated.

In his famous dissent to the

Agricultural Adjustment Act invalidation, Stone wrote:
We aee it frequently in the common untrained mind,
which is accustomed to think that legislation which it
regards as bad or unwise must necessarily be uncon
stitutional. Where there is a choice of interpreta
tions of a constitutional provision, such a habit of
thOUght is very likely to make a choice of the inter
pretation which would Le s aen the possibili ty of
enacting bad law. The diffiCUlty with this method
is that lessening the power to enact bad law likewise
lessens the power to enact good ones, and the judge
ment or what is bad or good, which is essentially a
legislative function, is likely to be affected by
the passions of the mament. 82
stone continued his condemnation of the conservatives' continued
invocation of personal economic philosophies in deciding the
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wisdom or propriety or law rather than deciding the constitu
tionality of the law.

In Morehead v. New York ex reI Tipaldo

298 u.s. 587, 636(1936) Stone wrote:
The fourteenth amendment has no more embedded in
the Constitution our preference for some particular
set of economic beliefs, than it has adopted, in
the name of liberty, the system of theology
which we may happen to approve. 8 3
Representative of his neutral philosophical stance, stone re
fused to support the broad ranging liberal economic treatises
of Justice Brandeis.

Concerning one opinion, stone wrote to

Br.andeis stating that the opinion of Brandeis was a;
very interesting and powerful document. But •••
it goes further than I am inclined to go, be
cause I do not think it is necessary to go that
far in order to deal with this case ••• I think you
are too much an advocate of this particular legisla
tion. I have little enthusiasm for it, although
I think it constitutional. 84
This correspondence with Brandeis presents the best portrait
of stone's legal thinking.

During the New Deal stone remarked

that while he did not personally approve of the New Deal program,
the legislation proposed by Roosevelt sought to insure societal
stability and order.

Since stone believed that it was not within

his province, or the jUdiciary's province, to decide upon the
wisdom of the statute, he steadfastly kept to his task of deter
mining the constitutionality of the statute.

If the law was

statutorally permissable under the articles of the Constitution,
then Stone sought to uphold the law.

It is important to note that

Stone, unlike the other Justices discussed above, struggled to
allow no personal economic philosophies to inrluence his judicial
decisions.

Stone's socia-economic beliefs are not enunciated in
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his judicial decisions.

His economic philosophies were care

fully and continually separated from his methodical, philo
sophically neutral, judicial opinions.
Justice Cardozo
The last of the so-called liberal Justices needs but little
discussion.

Our model has now been formulated and given clarity

through the personality portraits or the last seven Justices.
We can concern ourselves merely with .the identification of
several personality traits held by Justice Cardozo and show how
these traits are similar to his liberal colleagues and dissimilar
to his conservative counterparts.
Justice Benjamin Cardozo's strict adherence to a judicial,
not an economic or political philosophy, closely resembles the
ideological stance of his closest Supreme Court colleague,
Justice Harlan Stone.

Cardozo, like stone

in the eastern United states.
sembles that of Brandeis.

and HUghes, was born

His childhood life closely re

Specifically in an educational sense,

and to a lesser degree in an economic sense.

Born on May 24,

1870, Cardozo was a member of a distinguished household of
Sephardic Jews. 85 Like Hughes and Brandeis, Cardozo's childhood
was devoted to academic pursuits.

In the same fashion of educa

tion that Hughes and Brandeis experienced, Cardozo was a product
of home education.

Cardozo had the benefit of private instruction

from some of the most reknown liteFary figures and tutors.

Fol

lowing the tradition of Brandeis, the child prodigy matriculated
at Columbia College when he was fifteen.

He graduated at the top

of his class, and continued his studies at the Columbia School of
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Law.

He left that institution before completion of the formal

educational program.

Cardozo joined his older brother's law

practice, and quickly established a reputation of being a legal
genius.

Brandeis continued to substantiate this reputation
throughout his legal career. 86
There are a few important aspects of Cardozo's youth
that are important to our discussion of the liberal Justices.

Our model has emphasized two main analytical areas in evaluating

the Justices.
cumstance.

We have considered economic and environmental cir

Cardozo's youth lacked the economic consternation

that enveloped his conservative counterparts.

This lack of

8CO

nomic adversity opened up and to some degree allowed the pursuit
of Cardozo's academic program.

The effect of moderate economic

circumstance, and of an intense intellectual climate is really
immeasurable.

We can say that with the absence of stress in 1n

suring the sustenance and survival of his family, Cardozo was able
to participate in a rigorous academic program that helped create
a highly intellectual and trained mind.
is environmental circumstance.

Our other consideration

Cardozo was born and lived in New

York, far from the western frontier with its bawdy, rugged life
and the ensuing travails of frontier life.

His environment was

lacking in any quality of situation which would have necessitated
the formulation of a theory like rugged individualism.

This

doctrine was formulated by the conservatives as both a shield
and explanation of their youth.

Cardozo was not compelled to

shield or explain the circumstance of his youth.
between the conservatives' upbringing

The differences

and Cardozo's
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upbringing are vast and fundamental.
of a different time and circumstance.

Cardozo is a product
Our question is then,

what effect, or interpretative manifestation did this manu
facturing process have on Justice Cardozo.
Cardozo's legalistic philosophies are easily identifiable.
Cardozo, like stone, believed that it was solely within the
powers of the nation's legislature to make stutory recommenda
tions for the solution of the society's problems.

Following

closely to Stone's philosophy that law was designed to secure
social order and insure Justice, Cardozo believed that it was
beyond the constitutional sphere of the Courts to decide upon
the wisdom of the actions of the legislature.

Cardozo stated

on many occasions that the duty of the Court was to pass upon
the constitutional validity of legislative enactments, and to go
no further.

In Stewart Dry Goods v. Lewis, 294 u.s. 550, 566,

569(1935), Cardozo stated, "It is not the function of a court to
make itself the arbriter between the competing economic theories
professed by honest men on grounds not Wholly frivolous."
Cardozo's adherence to this stance, like Stone's adherence to the
same stance, separated Cardozo from Brandeis.

Cardozo and Brandeis

may have shared similar juristic theories, but

Cardo~o

lacked, or

refused to pUblically offer, a firm socio-economic doctrine which
could be reflected in his legal opinions as did Brandeis.
Cardozo's belief of the proper role of a Justice was succinctly
similar to that of Stone's.

As Cardozo stated, a Justice "is not

a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of
beauty or of goodness.

He is· to draw his inspirations from
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consecrated principles. 1I 87
were human.

He knew that

Cardozo realized that all Justices
II

the great tides and currents which

engulf the rest or men, do not turn aside in their course and
pass judges by.n 88
Cardozo and Stone can be regarded in the same judicial view.
Both men committed themselves to regard only the legal questions
or the New Deal.

Neither allowed a marriage to develop between

private socio-economic beliefs and their juristic opinions.
Cardozo himself stated, "What

~

As

I that in these great movements

onward, this rush and sweep of forces, that my petty personality
should defeat them by a hairbreadth? 1t 89 CardOZO'S belief that the
legislature should be given broad powers in solving the nation's
problems, made him, in the eyes of the conservatives, a broad
interpretor of the Constitution.

In fact Cardozo cautioned

the Court on several occasions from defining in too narrow a
light the powers given to the legislative branch under the Con
stitution.

In general, Cardozo is said to have sought a broadened

interpretation of the commerce clause, and a narrower inter
pretation of the due process clause.

Cardozo's opinions, during

the pre-1937 era, were reactions against conservative opinions.
He was never able to specify, or set-forth in a succinct manner
what the proper limits of congressional power were in these
areas.

Restricting himself to speaking on the validity of

specific legislative acts, Cardozo never looked ahead to theorize
what the proper role of the government should be in the disputed
areas.

Perhaps in this respect, the politically neutral stand

that stone and Cardozo assumed held one inherent flaw:

whereas

the conservatives delineated a restrained governmental role,

.

--

_._-_

... _--------- -----------------~
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stone and Cardozo never allowed themselves to use their
jUdicial opinions to describe the boundaries of governmental
actio~,

a job they vi.ewed as a political and judicially im

proper one.
Justice Roberta
The last of the nine "old" men to be discussed is Justice
Owen J. Roberts.

Roberts presents a formidably complex and

conrusing judicial record.

It is hard to fit Roberts into our

analytical model because of the difficulty in specifically
identifying his jUdicial stance.

Two questions, of intertwined

nature, need to be answered in considering Justice Roberts. Our
first question, regarding Roberts' true jUdicial stand on
questions of Congress' power to tax and to regulate commerce, nec
essitates a lengthy review of Roberts' representative opinions
and personal statements on these issues.

The second question,

which arises, asks if Roberts really committed what has histor
ically been referred to as the switch in time that saved nine,
also requires extensive review of jUdicial decisions and personal
observations of the main actors of the day.
Owen J. Roberts was born on May 2, 1875. in a suburb of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
clination to read.

Young Roberts showed an early in

Hia academic interest was given support by

his parents, who sent Roberts to a private academy to complete
his childhood education.
homelife.

Little has been sald about Roberts'

However, we can say that his family was of moderate

wealth, for Roberta never had to worry about his financial cir
cumstance.

In the year 1891, Roberts enrolled at the University
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of Pennsylvania, from which he graduated with distinction in
1895.

Immediately after the completion of his undergraduate

studies, Roberts matriculated at the Kniversity of Pennsylvania
School of Law.

Upon completion of his legal studies, Roberts

became a Law School Fellow.
time basis until 1907. 90

He continued teaching on a part

Roberts' legal career was highly successful and respected.
Although he served various corporations, it is said that he never
served on anyone corporation for a long enough duration to earn
the title of "corporate lawyer. 1I

Roberts' metOO'ric rise to

public notice and prominence began in 1924.

Roberts was ap

pointed to prosecute the "teapot dome" oil scandals in that year,
and earned himself the reputation as an avid, serious prosecutor
of those who transgressed the law. 91 A short time after, on June 2,
1930, Roberts was approved by the United states Senate to fill
a vacancy on the Supreme Court.

Critics claim that from this

day onward, Roberts' legal career was one marked with vacillation,
inconsistency, and conrusion.
New Deal legislation exercised two principle congressional
powersj regulation of commerce and the taxing power.

For the

purposes of our stUdy, we can focus upon the legal decisions that
Roberts wrote dealing with these areas.

Our first task is to

formulate the foundation, or portray the stance, which Roberta
took on each of the issues.

Our question is what was the ideo

logical belief of Roberts on congressional powers of taxation
and regulation of commerce.

Our answer is hard to formulate.
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Taxation
Roberts remarked, in a lecture to the faculty of Yale
University, that, "it was plain that SUbstantially the entire
field of taxation remains open to each of the governments,
national and state. 1I 9 2 The implication being that both govern
mental entities enjoyed the right to tax their citizenry.

The

boundaries of jurisdiction for taxing power gave to the Fed
eral government a

much~ro8der

realm and 8 supreme authority

over the boundaries and authority of the states.

In this same

lecture, Roberts spoke of the power and purpose of government in
using the power of taxation.

Roberts wrote that taxation "does

not necessarily and unavoidably destroy.

To carry it (the

power of taxation) to the excess of destruction would be to
banish that conf'idence which is essential to all government.,,93
Here, Roberts shows a necessary restriction upon the government's
power to tax.
manner.

That power must be used in a responsible and just

To this end, Roberts stated, "that it was the function

of the Court to preserve the federal system by striking down
such exercise of the taxing power by either sovereign as will
hamper, impede, or destroy the other. 1I 9 4 For Roberts, the Court
is the final arbriter, the guardian of the Federal system. It is
the dUty of the Court to remove those laws which pretend to
"hamper, impede, or destroy" the Federal system.

A considerable

judgement of the wisdom of the legislation, and its probable ef
fect on the Federal system, must be given to decide upon the
striking of such legislation.
It is seen from the statements of Roberts that a definite
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foundation of opinion concerning the propriety of legislative
tax acts has been formulated.

Roberts quotes from McCary v.

u.s. 195 u.s. 27(1904) and Veazie Bank v. Fenno 8 Wall 535.

545(186) in defense of his opinion in United states v. Butler
297 u.s. 1, which invalidated the agricultural processing tax
contained within the Agricultural Adjustment Act.

The opinion

handed down in the McCary case states in part that when and if
a tax is lawful, meaning that powers to implement such a tax
are pennisssble under the .Articles of the United states Consti tu
tion, a Court is incompetent to invalidate that tax or to limit
the effect of the tax, because the Court believes it to be unwise.
Specifically, the McCary opinion states that:
uno instance is ai'forded from the foundation of the
government where an act which was within a power
conferred, was declared to be repugnant to the
Constitution. because it appeared to the jUdicial
mind that the particular exertion of constitutional
power was either unwise or unjust. 1I 9 5
Even thought Roberts uses these opinions as the guidelines of
proper action for the Courts, his decision in the Butler csse,
which was concurred with by the four conservative Justices, en
voked the rage of Justice Stone. stone cond6mned Roberts for
invalidating the law solely because he thought it unwise.

In

the majority opinion for the Court, Roberta stated that
III! the act before us is a proper exercise of the
Federal taxing power, evidently the regulation of
all industry throughout the United States may be
accomplished by similar exercise of the same power.
This country would be converted into a central
96
government exercising uncontrolled police power ••• 11

Roberts, and the Conservatives, thOUght that this possibility of
the future growth of governmental power unwise, .and thus considered
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it an improper exercise of the Federal taxing power.

Thus,

as Roberts contended, the Agricultural Adjustment processing
tax was not really a tax, and therefore the statute was invalid.
This opinion is, however, inconsistent with
opinion in Nebbie v. New York 291

u.s.

502(1934).

Roberts' earlier
In that opinion

Roberts stated:
. The Constitution does not secure to anyone the
liberty to conduct his business in such a
fashion as to inflict injury upon the public
at large~ or upon any substantial group of
people. 9 (
The Agricultural Adjustment Act sought to raise the prices of a
range of farm goods in order to insure the continued flow and
production of food stuffs.
end through a tax.

The A.A.A. sought to achieve this

In the Nebbia case, a tax was placed upon

the price of milk. in order to achieve its continued flow and
production.

In one case the tax pre-ordained a completely cen

tralized government, in the other the Court acted to insure that
the people would not harm themselves.

The explanation is still

one of contention. However, we can hypothesize that the all
encompassing tone of the A.A.A. may have moved Roberts into the
conservative camp.

Where taxation was valid for a specific farm

commodity, it was not valid for a group of farm commodities.
These opinions emanating from the sarne man who disavowed that
the Court should become

II

a super-legislature."

Roberts was able to explain away his inconsistent behavior,
stating that

Il

n ew and difficult problams ll now sought answers.

He blamed it on the expanding

It

activi ties of state and national

government which were not envisaged when the Constitution was
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adopted or when early decisions of the Court in the field of •••
taxation were announced.,,98
Roberts set forth several inconsistent judicial beliefs.
He believed that the Federal taxing power was supreme over the
taxing power of the states.

He believed that the courts could

not invalidate tax legislation on the ground that it was unwise,
if the legislation was oonstitutional.

Yet, as a member of the

Supreme Court, he wrote opinions which struck down Federal taxing
power because it infringed upon state powers, or because the
legislation was unwise.

Opinions which received scathing con

demnations from the progressive Justices of the Court and from
legal scholars across the nation.

The inconsistencies are clear.

The explanation for their continued formulation is not clear.
The Commerce Power
The opinion of Roberts on the issue of the congressional
power to regulate commerce, follows closely the opinion Roberts
holds in respect to congressional powers of taxation.

Roberts

told an audience, IIIn short, both a state and the nation may ex
ercise the police power, the former without restriction, save as
the authority granted to the Federal govemnnent limits its actions. 1l 99
Roberts is just as specific in his definition of the term
IIcommerce ll as used in Article I Section 8, of the Constitution.
Roberts states that commerce was declared by the Court to be
equivalent to the phrase, lIintercourse for the purpose of trade."
Roberts defines commerce as the "transportation, purchase,
sale and exchange

of commodities between

the different atatea.,,100

the citizens of

Roberts derives this view from the
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1914 Shreveport ease, 234

u.s.

324.

About this case Roberts

wrote, "There can be no question of the correctlness of the
decision in the Shreveport case. The power (of the Federal
government) to regulate interstate rates was incontestable. 1I 102
Roberts warned that if "action required by state law, within
the state, were to be allowed to disrupt and destroy the ef
ficacy of the order regarding interstate rates, the power of
the national legislature under the commerce clause would be nUl
lified. 1l 10 3 This viewpoint would seem to indicate the formUlation
of a fairly broad, fairly firm, interpretation of the powers
given to Congress by the Constitution in the commerce clause.
Roberts further developed his viewpoint concerning the
powers of the commerce clause in Hill v. Wallace 259

u.s.

414(1922).

Roberts stated that in this case the court held "transactions
of a trader in commodities moving in interstate commerce, whose
activities necessarily affected the flow of Buch commerce ••• ,
might be controlled by a Federal system of Bta~utory regulation. 1I 104
Congress had the power to establish such a system, the question
in Roberts' mind was to what degree, how far an extent, could
Congress go in its regulation.
In Carter v. Carter Coal 298

u.s.

238 (1936) commonly known

as the bituminous coal case, Roberts voted with the conservative
majority to limit effectively this usage of power. The decision
specifically stated that the local production of coal, did not
directly affect interstate commerce, and therefore could not be
regulated as such.

Congress was limited, then, to assert control

over only those items which had a direct effect on interstate
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commerce.

The Supreme Court was, of course, the final determiner

of degree, under an interpretation of this decision. Roberts sup
ported an opinion which casted the Court in the role of a superlegislature, a role which Roberts condemned assuming but worked
to acquire.
In the second Agricultural Adjustment Act case, Mulford v.
Smith 307 u.S. 38(1939), Roberts ruled that it was constitutional
to regulate foreign and interstate commerce in certain goods to
provide an Itorderly, adequate and balance flow of such commodities. n105
This opinion, as pointed out by Assistant Attorney General Robert
H. Jackson and others, did not logically follow the first A.A.A.
decisions or other commerce decisions.

As Jackson stated, lithe

second opinion is a :.broader more tolerant approach, while Carter
v. Carter Coal and U.S. v. Butler follow extremely less tolerant
paths of judicial thought. n 10 6
Roberts later conceded that Carter

v.

Carter Coal was

"8.

high-water mark of the doctrine that Congress cannot regulate
local activities. II I O? Roberts'remark was of course true, after
the Carter case, specifically after the Morehead case, Roberts
turned to support almost any and all New Deal cases.

As noted

by David Burner, Roberts' biographer, from the time between
Morehead and the Parrish v. West Coast Hotel c8se(both minimum
wage cases) Roberts helped stem the tide of adverse New Deal
decisions.
The climax for congressional commerce power cases came with
N.L.R.B. v. Jones and LaUghlin Steel Corp.

In this case the

Court decided to accept the definition of lIaffecting commerce"
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that the legislation gave as a self-restraining guide. The leg
islatlon defined commerce as an article or event which was in com
merce or "burdening or obstructing commerce, or the free flow of
commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute
burdening or obstructing connnerce of the free flow of commerce." 108
Roberts, to the amazement of New Dealers, accepted this loose, per
haps evan all encompassing definition.

This was the same man who

invalidated previous attempts at regulation of commerce because
of the indirect effect that regulated items had on interstate
commerce.

Roberts later stated this decision "was in the teeth of

what the Carter opinion declared, that ia, that ,the magnitUde of
the ,l ocal operation was immaterial. u 109

Apparently Roberts held

no qualms about reversing his judicial opinion from the Carter
decision to the N.L.R.B. decision. Roberts has said in his defense,
it runs pretty hard to draw a line in respect of
this type of Federal prophylatic legislation. Its
operation must be permitted to extend to the rnnallest
units and to activities that once were thOUght so
remote from interstate commerce as to have no ap
preciable effect on it. In light of these decisions,
it is hard to think of any local business which Congress
may not regulate if it professes to believe that the
operation of that business may be detrimental, in how- 110
ever slight or remote a degree, to interstate commerce.
Roberts also explains his reversal as an evolutionary one.
He states that "looking back, it is difficult to see how the
Court could have resisted the popular urge for uniform standards
throughout the country, for what in effect was a uniried economy. 111
He states hia belief that lithe resort of Congress to the taxing
power, the general welfare power, and to the commerce power as
a means to reach a result never contemplated when the Constitution
was adopted, was a subterfuge. 1I 1 1 2

- - - - .'-- '.'.

- ,-

Roberts' legal philosophy
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probably never took a concrete or consistent form.

We see

from his statements and representative opinions a continual
state of ideological flux.
are hard to account for.

Roberts' changing judicial views
The reason for his sudden, and timely

reversal on several key issues is one still debated among
historians.

Several ,.theories and observations concerning this

question are given below.
A Switch in Time?
Historically, the bantered question of whether Justice Roberts
did in fact change his judicial views in order to save politically
the Court, is now upon us.

Historians have, as a general rule,

concluded that in fact "a switch in time saved nine" did occur.
Historical sentiment is perhaps best likened to a quote from
Fielding's Jonathan Wild,

1I • • •

he ••• would have ravished her, if

she had not, by a timely compliance, prevented him. 1I 1 13

Thus

the analogy is made that President Roosevelt, if the Supreme
Court had ruled adversely to any of the Wagner cases, Social
Security case, or Washington Minimum Wage case, would have been
able to "ravish ll the Supreme Court with his Court Reorganization
Plan, the Court by its timely reversal prevented him.
During a time of public debate and condamnation of the Court,
a time shortly preceding and during the Court Reorganization
Plan's public unveiling, the Court did change its ideological
stand.

As Roosevelt outlined in a memo to his files in late May

or June of 1937, a reversal in the Court's trend
New Deal legislation took place.

o~

invalidating

From October of 1935 to the

introduction of the Court Plan; Roosevelt states that five
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important New Deal programs were invalidated.
A.

The A.A.A. - the decision limited the Federal taxing
power.

B.

The GUffey Coal Act - limited the Federal commerce
power.

C.

New York Minimum Wage - in Morehead ex reI Tipaldo,
limited state action through the due process clause.

D.

N.L.R.B. case - crippled the administrative powers of
the executive.

E.

Washington Utility Case - limited utility regulation by
114
states under the due process clause.

Roosevelt then noted that (in his eyes) after the announcement
of the Court Reorganization Plan, the Court upheld three import
ant pieces of New Deal legislation.
A.

Washington Minimum Wage case - in West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish the Court overruled the New York minimum wage
decision, and reversed 1923 precedent of the Adkins
v. Children's Hospital. The Court gave a new inter
pretation of the due process clause to the states.

B.

Wagner Act cases - reversed their ruling on GUffey Coal
Act case and created a new boundary of Federal commerce
power.

C.

Social Security Act - the Court overruled the Agricultural
Adjustment Act decision in givin~ the Federal government
115
new spending and taxing powers.

Obviously delighted in the effect that his proposal had on the
Court, it still had not been considered by the Senate, Roosevelt
stated that, while he had lIattained the most difficult of his
objectives, i.e •• the liberalization of the

interpreta~on

Court," he still had to accomplish two goals:

of the
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(a) insurance

o~

the continuity

o~

liberalism and,

(b) a more perfect judicial mechanism for giving maximum
" in a m1n
. 1murn 0 f t"1me. 116
j ust1ce
These goals could only be achieved through the enactment of his
plan.

The President was, however, pleased with the path he had

forced the Court to take.

As he stated, "fortunately, after the

transmission by me of my message to the Congress for a rejuvena
tion of the jUdiciary on February 7, 1937, the Supreme Court re
versed itself, and declared the minimum wage law by the states
constitutional (in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish 300 u.S. 379

(1937)."117
March 29, 1937, was the day in which a shift in the Supreme
Court interpretation of the Constitution was first noticed, and can
be cited as the famous day of reversal.

Our analysis will tie to-

gather the Court's reversal and the downfall of the Court Reorganiza
tion Plan.

On H:arch 29, the Court upheld three strategic "New Deal"

pieces of legislation. All votes were a close five to four, the
liberal side of the Court prevailing because of newly found support
from Justice Roberts. The Railway Labor Act, the Frazier-Lenke Farm
Mortgage Moratorium Bill and the Washington Minimum Wage legisla
tion decisions were all handed down.

As historian Merlo Pusey

wrote in observing the decisions of March 29th, "The Court
achieved self-salvation through self-reversal, and the destruction
118
of the President by giving him what he wanted"
- a liberal Court.
Whether the latter part of the statement is true or false, will
be discussed in the next chapter.

Our purpose here is to decide

what caused this reversal.
In the month preeeding the March 29 th dec Ls Lon a , __ the Court
decided upon the validity of the Wagner Act, and the Social
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Security Act.

Merlo Pusey speculates that the Court, after

receiving copies of the Court Plan, began to ask themselves if
they were willing to continue their conservative invalidation
of the New Deal.

A continued invalidation would surely have

adverse political consequences.

The final verdict, the one

who would deoide if the Court was to remain sacrosanct, was
Justice Roberts.

The conservative reactionaries would not sway

their stance; the liberals beckoned; Roberts followed.
There is no historical doubt that Roberts did change his
voting pattern in the period after 1936.

He did change from

voting with the conservative faction of the Court to voting with
the liberal elements of the Court.
change in his voting behavior occur.

Our question is why did this
Is Roosevelt's explanation

valid that, "now, with the shift of Roberts, even a blind man
ought to see that the Court is in politics, and understand how
the Constitution is "judiciallyll construed."
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In order to

answer the question of why Roberts made his shift, we will examine
the cases of Morehead and Parrish.

From a comparison of the

Court opinions in each case we should be able to determine with
what ideology Roberts was aligning

himself with.

We can then

discuss the consistenoy of his aligpments, and speculate on
Why he changed alignments.
In the Morehead case, four Justices concurred with Justice
Butler in the five to four decision which invalidated New York
minimum wage laws.

The decision in Morehead denied to both the

state and the Federal government the power to deal with problems
of long hours and low wages.

Morehead is based heavily upon the
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1923 ruling of Adkins v. Childrens Hospital.

Justice Butler

shows the close relationship between the two cases when he
stated in Morehead, liThe state court rightly held that the Adkins
case controls this one ••• 11,120 The Court then offered questions it
deemed necessary to answer in the decision of the Morehead case.
The same questions, the Court notes, are answered in Adkins.
Justice Butler states, lithe question rises whether the state
may impose upon the employers state-made minimum wage rates for
all competent experienced women workers ••• ,,121 The Justice
poses the next question of ttwhether the state has power similarly
to subject to state-made wages all adult women involved in trade."
These questions, writes Butler, were decided upon in Adkins when
the Court ruled that, "the right to make contracts about one's
affairs is a part of the liberty protected by the due process
clause," in the fourteenth amendment.

The Court ruled that the

state possessed no power to enforce state-made minimum wages
upon employers or adult women.

The Court clung to nineteenth

century laissez-faire ideology when it stated, "Freedom of
cont rae t 1S
· th e genera1_rul e, restral' nt the exc ep t i. on. 1I 122 The
Court was not willing to give statutory effect to the exception
is either the Adkins or Morehead cases.
Roberts voted with the conservatives in Morehead, and by so
doing, he gave his support to the notions promoted in the Adkins
decision.

The strict 19th century laissez-faire ideology fits

well with the ideological tone Roberts presents in his Butler
opinion.

In this opinion, Roberts shows his concern with the

possibility of growing power in the central government.

The
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agricultural processing tax made it evident, for Roberts, that
tithe regulation of all industry throughout the United states
may be accomplished by similar exercises of the same power.

This

country would be converted into .a central government exercising
uncontrolled police power.tf123 Roberts supports nineteenth
century notions of a firm dichotomy between states and the Fed
eral government.

That, according,to the Butler decision, the

central government must be restrained in its use of taxing powers
in order to keep states and Federal government on an equal basis.
This is consistent with the views Roberts made known to the law
faculty at Yale University.

There he said, lIit is plain that

substantially the entire field of taxation remains open to.each
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of the governments, national and state," and again when he said
llit is the Court's function to preserve the federal system by
striking down such exercise of the taxing power by either sovereign
125
as will hamper, impede, or destroy the other. 1f
Roberts, however,
does not completely remain within the realm of nineteenth century
classical liberalism.

During the same lecture, Roberts stated,

tiThe Constitution does not secure to anyone the liberty to
conduct his business in such a fashion as to inflict injury upon
the pUblic at large, or upon any substantial group of people. lI
There exists an inconsistency in these views.
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Classical liberal

ism does not allow for the protection, by the government, of the
masses against the actions of individuals in private business in
all aspects.

The statement by Roberts opens the door to govern

mental regUlation of all units and aspects of business, the same
door Roberts sought to close in other opinions.
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This inconsistency is taken one step
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.

~ther

in West

In this opinion, written by Chief

Justice Hughes, a re-examination of Adkins was undertaken.
The question of due process in the fourteenth amendment was
considered, and a sense of restraint was cast upon the laissez
faire concept of freedom of contract.
new light, due process.

The Court defined, in a

"Libertyll,the Court said, !lunder the

Constitution is thus necessarily sUbject to the restraints of
due process, and regulation to its subject and is adopted in
1l 1 27
the interests of the community is due process.
In further
destruction of laissez-faire ideology, the Court stated that,
IC

freedom of contract is a qualified and not an absolute right. 11 128

As applied to minimum wage legislation this meant that an employeremployee relationship, was no longer considered as a private
contract between two individuals.

This contract of labor, or

employment, was conditioned, or under the jurisdiction of, the
state and its regulatory guidelines.

The Court struck down the

traditional concept of individual liberty when it stated that,
"Liberty implies the absence of arbritrary restraint, not im
munity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in
the interests of the community. II 129 Regardless of the nature of
business, be it of local or interstate nature, the Court ruled
that the "State still retains an interest in his (the employee's
or citizen's) welfare, however reckless he may be.

The Court

professed it as the state's duty to interfere when lithe indivi
dual health, safety, and welfare are sacrificed or neglected ••• 1I130
The concepts that had led to the formulation of Adkins were
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rejected.

In reference to Adkins, the Court stated that:
The validity of the distinction made by the Court
between a minimum wage and a maximum hours in
limiting liberty of contract was especially
challenged. That challefff persists and is with
out satisfactory answer.

The Court repudiated the Adkins decision and went on to
extinguish any doubt as to the case's correctness.

The Court

said, I1that the decision in Adkins was a departure from the
true application of principles governing the regulation of the
state and of the relation of the employer and employed. 1I

In a

concluding statement the Court announced;
IlTime without number we have said that the legislature
is primarily the jUdge of the necessity of such an
enactment, that every possible presumption is in
favor of its validity, and that though the Court may
hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law,
it may not be annuI~~ unless palpably in excess of
legislative power. 1I
In an especial slap at the conservative Justices the Court
closed its opinion wi th,

II

the communi ty may direct its law making

power to correct abuse which springs from their selfish dis
regard of the pUblic interest. 1I
Justice Roberts joined in this opinion, to the amazement
of Justice stone, to the delight of Hughes and the political
forces which joined to oppose the Court Reorganization Plan.
Could it be as Merlo Pusey said that Roberts made a timely switch
to save the Court and undermine Roosevelt, or was the vote for
the Parrish opinion a product of an evolutionary trend of Roberts'
jUdicial thinking.

As Roberts stated, IIlooking back, it is

difficult to see how the Court could have resisted the popular
urge for uniform standards throughout ••• what was in effect a
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unified economy."

We can only speculate that Roberts'

resistance waa lessened by both his political awareness of the
danger that continued conservative opinions would place
the Court.

Roberts may have also held a growing awareness, and,

or, a gradual change of ideological stance from nineteenth century
laissez-fairism to twentieth century liberalism.
The question as to whether Roberts purposely altered his
voting behavior to save the Court politically, can be given no
definite answer. The views espoused by Roberts, both in lectures
and in legal opinions, fail to provide a firm ideological founda
tion on which we can judge his actions.

He established a legal

career where only his vacillation was consistent.

Credence is

given to the contention that Roberts acted in a political fashion.
Credence is also given to the argument that Roberts' change of
view was a result of a gradual transformation of ideological be
liefs.
Roberts once claimed that he voted in Morehead only be
cause of existing precedent, and that without review of that
precedent he could not vote against it.
not follow this concern.

His other opinions do

We can conclude that the judicial voting

record of Roberts was changed at a convenient time, and that no
firm ideological foundation supports this alteration, and there
fore the credibility of the change in his judicial ideology
remains questioned.
Conclusion
The differences between Roosevelt and the Supreme Court
Justices were differences of' ideology.

The f'our "reactionary

conservatives" anslJered to the concepts of nineteenth century
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liberalism.

The concepts of this ideology called for a strict

adherence to a laissez-faire relationship between the government
and the governed.

The proper role for the Federal government,

in the eyes of the conservative Justices, was one of restraint.
The government was not to be a powerful regulatory agency, it
was not to be powerful at all, according to the

II

conservatives. II

As seen in Document One in the appendix, the "conservative ll
Justices were consistent in their invalidation of the New Deal.
The document also shows the consistency of the support that the
liberals gave the New Deal.

The

liberals, .~ho

answered to the

twentietp-century ideology of modern liberaligm, saw the need
for governmental action to correct a malfunctioning economic
system.

The deciding vote of Justice Roberts was sought after

by both ideological sights of the Court, and his alliance swayed
back and forth between the two like a willow in the wind. The in
consistency of Roberts is clearly noticeable. and is perhaps the
only consistent action of his legal career.
This analysis of the development of the Bocio-economic theories
of the Justices, serves only to prove the existence of differing
opinions over the proper role of the government. The conservative
Justices, through their development, were embued with the concepts
of nineteenth century liberaligm. Concepts which best explained and
best guided the worlds that they lived in.

The liberal Justices

carne from different circumstances and therefore sought new and
different doctrines to guide and form their world. The conservatives
were, however, of the majority opinion on the Court and insisted
upon invalidating governmental programs which did not conform to
their personal ideologies.
Roosevelt responded to the invalidation of his New Deal program
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by four principle representatives of an earlier economic order
and their one follower.

These four men refused to allow an

interpretation of the Constitution that would give to the Fed
eral government the power to correct the failures of the old
economic system.

In this respect, Van Devanter, McReynolds,

Butler and Sutherland, sought to arrest the forces of evolutionary
legal interpretation.

They sought to affix their ideological

interpretation of law upon all legislation and governmental
action for all future time.

The cries of desperation brought

forth by the failure of the old economic system, as described
in Chapter Two above, were answered by New Deal programs,
described in that same chapter, and were then invalidated by
the unmoving, unbending followers of classical economic dogma.
The 1930's marked the beginning of the creation of a new
American society.

The financial collapse of the thirties showed

the necessity of governmental action in and partial control over
aspects of the nation's economy.

Responsibility for the health,

welfare and safety of the nation's citizens was shifted from
the proven incompetent hands of private society to the domain
of Federal authority and public concern.

The New Deal was

formed as a corrective action, taken to reverse the nation's
devastating descent to economic ruin.

The corrective measures

were proposed through the executive and were judged as necessary
in the wisdom of the legislature which enacted the measures.
The Supreme Court, through the decisions of the four principle
conservatives, judged the wisdom of legislation again, seeking
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to evaluate the legislation against the concepts of their old
economic order.
Roosevelt responded to the situation by trying to remove
the specific Justices who obstructed his legislative path to
national recovery.

He formulated a plan which was designed to

remove, or negate the influence of the old order.

The President's

personality is seen within the plan in his attempt to vent his
frustrations through the htnniliation of the tlconservative ll
Justices.

The President launched his attack as a last resort,

after four years of continued invalidation of strategic pieces
of recovery legislation.

The Court was not an innocent victim

which suffered the attempted violation of its jUdicial sanctity
by Roosevelt.

The Court

real and political sense.

challenged the President in a very
The continued support of a

governing,

political ideology by the conservative Justices invoked the full
wrath of the President (wrath, which as we shall see, was less
potent than the Justices judicial decisions).

The battle was

between two separate and equal branches of government, first the
judiciary trying to limit, restrain, and suppress the power of
the executive, and then the executive trying to gain popular
support for an overt suppression of the judiciary.

The next

chapter will deal with the results of the contest, this chapter
haVing explained the reasons for the battle.
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Chapter Five
Congress and the Court Plan; reaction and rebellion
The creation of the New Deal was facilitated by the over
whelming support Roosevelt received from Congress.

The new

order had been born and implemented in less time than the old
order had taken to collapse.

When the continuation of the new

order was thwarted by the Supreme Court, Congress and Roosevelt
alike protested, and joined in denunciation of the Court.

With

the formulation of the Court Reorganization Plan, Roosevelt
foresaw the enlistment of Congress in the battle to force change
wi thin the membership of the Court.

From the day of the Plan 's

announcement, however, it became readily apparent that Congress,
spirited by adverse public reation to the Plan, and emboldened
by what they believed to be Roosevelt's last term in office,
would enlist the support of the Supreme Court to defeat the Plan
and to castigate Roosevelt.
In his bid for the enactment of the Court Plan, Roosevelt
asked the Congress to give virtually unquestioned support, in ef
fect creating a vote of personal confidence by the members of Con
gress for the President. This chapter will present and assess the
adverse reaction by the Congress to the Plan, in an attempt to
explain the reasons why Roosevelt lost Congressional and popular
support. The Court Plan proposal created some long-term negative
consequences for Roosevelt and his ability to govarn.

Through

our analysis and review of the events which followed the Court
Plan proposal, we hope to conclude with a portrayal of Roosevelt's
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political

positi~n

after the cessation of the Court battle.

We have as guides, two cammon interpretations of Roosevelt's
political circumstance after the defeat of the Court Plan.
New Deal historian Merlo Pusey has described Roosevelt as the
"tragic hero ll of the Court crisis.

Pusey contends that before

the announcement of the Court Plan, Roosevelt held more power
than any other President has held either before or after bis
time.

Pusey notes that Roosevelt's command over Congress, his

success in formulating a complete legislative program and the
enactment of the entire program, are unprecedented accomplishments
for any American President.

After the defeat of the Court Plan,

with the resulting loss of prestige and influence for Roosevelt,
Pusey describes Roosevelt as Ithumiliated and powerless to get his
.

way. II

1

Roosevelt's Assistant Attorney General, Robert H. Jackson, has
portrayed Roosevelt in a somewhat different light.

Jackson-surmises

the outcome of the Court issue as both a win and a loss for the
President.

Jackson stated, "in politics, the black-robed reaction

ary Justices had won over the master liberal politician of our
day,1I however, Jackson further states that Roosevelt scored

Ii

vic

tory in the field of law by "defeating the recalcitrant Justices
in their own Court. 1I 2

The notion of a combined defeat and victory

is shared and further expounded upon by Erwin C.

Hargrove~

Hargrove

states that, "although he failed with Congress, (Roosevelt)d.id in
directly convince the Court to support New Deal legislation, so
he achieved a victory of sorta.,,3
The areas for analytical concern in this chapter are clearly
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delineated.

Our goal is to ascertain wh1, and to what extent,

Roosevelt lost his Congressional, popular, and political sup
port.

We must conclude with a statement on the effects this loss

of Bupport had on Roosevelt's ability to govern.

Through our in

vestigation, we hope to show that Roosevelt's loss of Congressional
control and authorit1 was accelerated, but not solely brought about,
b1 the Court Plan.

The Court Plan served to rally the already

existing conservative forces in the Senate.

The Plan worked as an

adhesive, binding the here-to-fore warring factions of Republicans
and Democrats of Congress together.

We will find, after the Court

Plan, that Roosevelt was a President who lacked much, but no all,
of the political power needed to continue the legislative program
that the Supreme Court now found Constitutional.
A Brief History of Roosevelt's Relationship with Congress
When Roosevelt first acquired the reins of government,
Congress was emerging from a period of time where it was best
described as,

lIan

angry, turbulent, and ineffective body during

the evenly divided lame-duck session of 1932 through 1933. 11 4
Roosevelt's election signaled the transformation of this unpro
ductive body into an efficient legislative machine.

The election

returns signaled to many members of Congress that, as Senator
Burke from Nebraska stated, lIa clear mandate was given to the
President to go forward with the programs he conceives as nec
essary to take care of the needy, and to correct the glaring
evils in our social and economic system. 115

The members of Con

gress responded to this perceived mandate by enacting voluminous
amounts of social legislation, and did

-

-' . - .....-._...--

BO

willingly, losing

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - 
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their angry, turbulent personality and becoming lIpsychologically
encouraging, especially in contrast to what many had expected. u6
The cautioned forecasts of continued Congressional ineffective
ness, were never realized.

The warning of Senator Key Pittmen

that:
(F.D.R.'s) leadership (would) be exceedingly dif
ficult for awhile. Democrats have grown out of that
habit of being led, during the long Republican
regime they have grown individualistic, they have
lost the habit of cooperatiQn, they have grown
unaccustomed to discipline,·'
was proven invalid.

The Congress proved to be accomodative to

the New Deal and to Roosevelt.

The combination of Roosevelt's

political skills and the existence of grave social and economic
ills, resulted in the passage of an unprecedented number of key
pieces of social legislation.

Eleven of the New Deal's most

important social and economic reforms consumed only forty hours
of debate in the House, a feat still unrepeated by Congress. 8
Roosevelt's task of gaining the cooperation of, and authority
over, the Congress was facilitated by the paucity of, and deep
splits between, the remaining Republican lawmakers.

After the

overwhelming defeat in 1932, the remaining RepUblicans (thirty
five in the Senate and one-hundred and sixteen in the House) were
characterized by James T. Patterson as

11

unhappy, disorganized, and

acutely aware of Roosevelt I s tremendous populari ty. tl 9

Their very

distinct minority caused many RepUblicans to become quiet acqui
escers to the New Deal.

For the first years of his administration,

Roosevelt was unhindered by an opposition party. The lack of a
viable opposition enabled Roosevelt to consolidate and direct his
efforts at organizing and controlling the Democratic party.
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Roosevelt possessed some personality traits which helped in
the creation of a good relationship with Congress.
had a very keen sense about the use of power.

Roosevelt

He also had an

instinctive knowledge of when to compromise, and, how to use
patronage with cautioned dexterity.

At least this is what can be

inferred from a study of Roosevelt's handling of early legislation,
and remarks made by Senators like Senator Key Pittmen who stated
at the beginning of Roosevelt's term, lithe President will not in
terfere with any of the Departments until after his program has
been put into effect.,,10

Pittmen's remark shows Roosevelt's

astuteness at keeping bis relationship with Congress "tinged with
a shade of expectancyl1 until he received what he wanted. Roosevelt's
possession and use of these political skills resulted, to a large
degree, in the control and seeming domination over the Congress.
Roosevelt's political finesse, along with other factors, did work
to create an atmosphere which facilitated the enactment of an entire
social program in an extremely short period of time.
The combination of the crisis of the day, the overwhelming
Democratic electoral victory, and the inherent political astuteness
of Roosevelt, worked to secure a legislature which became effi
cient, and seemingly devoted to the principles on which the New
Deal was based.

For the first four years of his administration,

Roosevelt experienced little Congressional dissent.

He became the

master of a tightly run ship, heading the nation out of the troubled
waters of depression, into the calm waters of recovery. Once in
calm waters, Roosevelt found that the crew became restless and his
navigatory skills weakened.
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Underneath the triumphant electoral and legislative suc
cess could be found the beginning of a faction that would
penetrate and infect the New Deal coalition.
increasingly evident as the economic

cris~8

The faction became
subsided.

As

Patterson, author of Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal,
wrote that;
From the very beginning of the Hew Deal, however, a
cluster of Congressmen regarded the New Deal, in the
words of Virginia's peppery Senator Glass as "an ut
terly dangerous effort of the Federal government t0
transplant Hitlerism to every corner of the nation. 11
\~ile

this belief, and variations of the belief, was held by

other legislators, the conservative elements of Congress could
not consolidate to form a viable opposition to the New Deal. The
reasons for the non-consolidation of the conservatives have been
described above.

The conservative elements could "seldom manage

more than thirty-five votes in the Senate or one-hundred in the
House, and more often than not they were wary of denouncing the
New Deal in pUblic.,,12
The conservatives in the Congress represented members of
both Democratic and RepUblican parties.

The conservative coalition

formed in Congress was, out of necessity, a bi-partisan coalition,
only then could it become a viable political force.

The conaerva

tive members of Congress remained relatively quiet throughout the
first three yeans of the New Deal.

Their quietude resulted more

from political necessity than from lack of dissent.

An approp

riate time would come when the conservatives would rally to
their own convictions, and would become an acknowledged voice of
opposition.

The issue that rallied the conservatives
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was the Court Plan proposal, -and ,strangely enough,

f~r

the Republican conservatives - quietUde would remain a strength
and a key factor in the formation of an operational conserva
tive coalition.
From the onset of the New Deal, several legislators did
speak out openly against the Roosevelt administration.

Senator

Glass became opposed to the New Deal early-on in the first year
of Roosevelt's administration.

Senator Gore of Oklahoma shared

the fundamental conservative beliefs of Glass, and revolted
against the New Deal in an enunciation of a personal demand for
the return to the concepts embodied in nineteenth century liber
alism.

These early opponents of the New Deal, along with a

handful of others, were of the same ideological era, and were
ambued with the same beliefs as the Justices of the Supreme
Court who invalidated the New Deal.

These Congressional op

ponents worked to invoke a similar invalidation of the New Deal,
on the legislative level, as their ideological brethren obtained
from the Supreme Court.

The Congressional conservatives failed

in their quest for legislative veto of the New Deal.

The con

servatives would beccrne successful only through the advance of
time, when events and circumstance worked to facilitate the re
ception of their call.
As Roosevelt's years in office progressed, two key tools
which helped enable him to secure the
gradually diminished.

support of the Congress

New Deal programs which were enacted to

remedy specific flaws in the nation's economic system, did have
a dramatic effect in lessening the severity of the nation's
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economic crisis.

The programs which were invalidated by the

Supreme Court did have noticeable

bene~icial

effects for the

economy while they were operational, which usually 'was for a
period of two years before the legislation reached the Supreme
Court for final judgement.

The effects of the New Deal programs

were two-fold; the main effect was, of course, the progress
towards recovery, the other effect was the loss of influence
Roosevelt had with Congress.

It seemed that with each Buccess

ful step towards recovery, with the corresponding diminishment
of the national crisis, Roosevelt lost the edge of authority he
held over Congress during the crisis.

The diminishment of the

crisis lessened the sense of urgency which had helped form
congressional unity, which in turn produced congressional exped
iency.

In this sense, with each success Roosevelt lost, instead

of gained, power and authority.
Through the passage of time, Roosevelt lost much of another
managerial tool: the power of patronage, as Patterson states, "it
(was) no longer easy for Roosevelt to entice wavering Democrats
with a handful of plums. 1I 13 By the time that the Court Reorganiza
tion Plan was proposed, in 1937, many of the public works projects,
political appointments, and other "plums" had been handed out.
Roosevelt lacked sufficient tangible reserves needed to influence
those who might not support him. The lack of the availability of pat
ronage, lessened the political price that a Congressman or Senator
would have to pay if he opposed the New Deal.

withou~

thelltools ll of

urgency and patronage, Roosevelt found it increasingly harder
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to coerce the congressional flock to follow the shepherd.
Congressional dissent also mounted against Roosevelt with the
continued creation and proliferation of agencies and their bureau
cratic operators.

The implementation of the New Deal resulted

in the advent of recovery by agency.

The Federal government be

came inflated with alphabet agencies which SUbsequently increased
the amount of people and paper which Congress found itself faced
with.

Legislators increasingly felt boxed in, their "riatural

desire ••• for independence, was frustrated by Roosevelt's strong
leadership ••• 11 14 They were now further frustrated by the many
score of new agencies and their operatives.

This frustration be

came a subject on -which to base general disoontent as the New Deal
moved on.
The combination of the loss of political managerial tools, and
the growing awareness of Congress to the creation of a huge
Federal government, resulted in growing resistance and dissent
in the second and third New Deal Congresses.

The first New

Deal Congress, 1932-1934, had given to the President all that
he had asked for.

The second New Deal Congress began to balk

at some of the far reaching pieces of New Deal legislation.
The 1935 fight over the passage of the Utility Holding Company
Bill is an example of what can be termed as the beginning of
Congressional dissent to the New Deal.

Roosevelt·s version of

the legislation, which included the famed "death sentence" clause
(prOViding for the abolishment of almost every utility holding
company) was voted down
handling

258 - 147

by the House. 15 Roosevelt's

of the Works ,Pr o j e c t s ' Ac t and the poor formulation
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of the 1935 Tax Bill, provided conservative and Borne moderate
Congressmen and Senators with substantiation for their growing
belief that the New Deal had gone too far in Federal regulation
and involvement in the private sector. 16
The Democratic party, and the administration, increased
its representative strength in both houses of Congress in 1934.
The increase of majority party representation in a non-presidential
election year, remains as a feat seldom accomplished in the history
of American politics.

The RepUblican party, now decimated even

further, returned with little political power or support in

1935.

In increased numbers, the Republicans that were able to

retain or win their elective offices supported the New Deal and
its ideological tenets.

Out of the twenty-five Republicans who

returned to the Senate, ten were western progressives lIwho for
all intents and purposes had left the ranks of their affiliated
party. 11 17

The second New Deal Congress was comprised of an

almost embarassing overabundance of Democrats.

The traditional

separation of Democratics and RepUblicans by the center aisle in
the House of Representatives, had to be disregarded as the Demo
crats were forced to flow over this political barrier in pursuit
of seats, cramping and confining the remaining Republicans to a
few forward rows of seats.

The existence of the overwhelming

Democratic majority, would actually become a disadvantage rather
than a further facilitation for Roosevelt's control over the
Congress.
The legislative session which directly preceded the 1936
national elections, effectively glossed over the few disputes.
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and dissensions that had surfaced in the second New Deal
Congress.

The congressional session held on the eve of elec

tiona "was generally free of serious controversy mainly be
cause Roosevelt and Congress alike were anxious to avoid
altercations in an election year. 1I 18

The results

of the 1936

election clearly constituted another tremendous electoral
triumph for Roosevelt and the Democratic party.

The number of

known conservatives or anti-New Dealers had been reduced in
both houses of Congress, with the Senate boasting a mere eighteen
conservative members. 19

With the electoral triumph behind them

and the subsequent sense of security that at least two years
of office gave, the members of Congress were now willing to
focus upon the glossed-over controversies that were left un
resolved before the election.

The third New Deal Congress

marked a sudden upsurge in the expr-e s ad onco f suspicion and dis
trust of Roosevelt.

Said one Senator, IIRoosevelt is in an

audacious mood and is even thinking of propoging to pack the
Supreme Court by enlarging it ••• Roosevelt is determined to
curb the Court and put it in its place, and will go ahead even
if many people think it is unwise. II 20

Congress was emboldened

by the electoral triumph, interpreting the results as a state

ment of support for them as individuals, much the same as the
symbol of public support that Roosevelt viewed the elections
as providing him with.

Both Congress and Roosevelt felt en

titled to new initiatives of power.

Congress became much more

willing to voice opposition to the New Deal and Roosevelt.
The President became convinced that his popularity would "carry
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the country with him with his Court proposal. 1I 2 1

Roosevelt

would become cognizant of the increased congressional assertive
ness in the days which followed the January 5, 1937 Court Plan
announcement.

Roosevelt's t1most,energetio and courageous sup

porters were the first to halk ll 22 in supporting the Court Plan.
Even the IIpeople ll , whom Roosevelt believed had given him a
mandate to press forward and clear the obstructed path of re
covery, were to desert him. ,
Congressional reaction to the Court Plan can best be de
scribed as a gradual quickening of opposition.

Burton K.

Wheeler, whose opposition Roosevelt termed as IIbelow the belt
because by using only a very small excerpt from the (Court Plan
message), he deliberately gave a false impression, 1I 2 3 stated
that the Court Plan issue must be used to "teach that man 1n
the White House a lesson.

We must show him that the United

States Senate has to be consulted and is going to have something
to say on how the Government is run. 1I 24 (I have underlined
that man merely to illustrate that those who became opponents
to Roosevelt during this time referred to F.D.R. as that man
and not by name , )
Wheeler's defection

W~B

the

fi ~st- Q f~an

inereasing

number of Senators and Representatives who revealed their true
ideological colors and would disassociate themselves from the
New Deal.

Progressive Senators, like Norris and Borah, were

deeply troubled by the Court Plan proposal.

Torn between their

moral instincts to object to .the Plan. and their deep desire
not to defy Roosevelt, the Senators would lobby in an effort to
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convince the President to alter his plan of attack.

Borah went

so far as to offer a ready-made constitutional amendment which
would redefine the due process clause.

Borah's amendment would

limit the Court's jurisdiction over certain types of Federal
legislation. 25 Roosevelt refused to consider such suggestions,
deciding to adhere to a no compromise stance, believing that the
legislature would soon quiet and enact what he wanted.
After only one month, of what would become a seven month bat
t.Le, Harold Ickes confided Ln his diary t.hs t. Roo aeveI t "has a first
class fight on his hands. t1 26

Ickes continued writing with a pro

gnosis of the Plan's support in Congress.

According to Ickes the

end could be seen from the beginning, as he noted with the passage
of each day the "progressives in Congress are lining up with the
reactionaries. 1I 27 While Ickes and other Cabinet members correctly
sensed the mood of Congress, the President responded to the warnings
with and "insistence that the "people" were with him. ,t 28

Roosevelt

was convinced that his Plan was the only way in which jUdicial cor
rection could be carried out. Roosevelt substantiated his view that
an gmendment to the Constitution restructuring or redefining the
Court's powers could not be secured, by referring to reports like
that from Senator Meely who informed Roosevelt that a mere $25,000
would prevent the passage of an amendment or similar type of jUdicial
reform measure from being considered in Meely's state of West
Virginia.

The loss of support from his own Vice-President, and from

key Senators like Connally, Clark, Borah, Wheeler and Byrd, was met
with a Hcalm carelessness tl of acceptance by Roosevelt. In what Pusey
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describes as "alarming symptoms", Roosevelt constantly made
"references to the election and (used it) as a text for a sermon
on optimish," he also firmly refused to listen to (or, as in
the case of Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee Summers
on December 8, 1937. to see 28) his leaders in congress. 29
Roosevelt's aides did begin to take notice of the growing op
position.

While Roosevelt stated that the letters and telegrams

from people were

IIS0

sincere that you feel the country is be

ginning to realize that something in the long run must be
done. 1l 30

Roosevelt aides were aware of' the nine-to-one ration

of mail coming into the White House which was opposed to the
Court Reorganization Plan. 31 For every letter of support, like
the letter from Allison Waugh on January 8, 1935 which stated;
The need for your program is BO great and
criticism regarding the permitting of "nine
old men" to wreck the wishes of the majority
of Americans is so striking, that Constitu
tional changes or even a wholly new Constitu
tion might win support. Surely a Constitutional
convention would be favored by many,3 2
Roosevelt received nine which repeated the same message as
H.C.T. Hough, when he wrote;
Thank God - for the Supreme Court - which has
again shown it may be possible to have the
American form of government prevail over the
Communist ideas of Tugwell, Ickes - Hopkins
et ale (see document eight in Appendix for
full letter)
Roosevelt's treatment by the press was as lopsided as his mail.
Raymond Clapper of the Scripps-Harold Chain provides a representative
statement of those who supported the Plan.
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Clapper stated that;
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The hysterical attack upon President
Roosevelt's Supreme Court proposal obscures
ita essential mildness. We are being
treated to a bedlam of frantic shrieks not
unlike those which split our ears in the
Presidential campaign. What has Mr.
Roosevelt proposed? Changing the Con
stitution? No. Requiring it to reach its
decisions by a two-thirds or unanimous
vote? No. Stripping it of appellate
jurisdiction? No. Tampering in any way
with the power of the Court? No.33
The New York Tribune's Walter Lippman saw the issue as a
question of great moral significance, writing;
No issue so great or deep has been raised
in America since recession. No blow has
been struck which, if successful, would
so deeply injure the moral foundations
of the Republic. There is no dubt that a
great question has been raised in America.
It is the question of whether the people
shall be deprived of their sovereign
right to give and to withhold the power
their servants exercise, of whether a man,
who has evaded the judgement of the people
on this very question, shall by indirection
become the master of all three branohes of 34
Government and the fundamental law as well.
All this public and private debate created an issue in which,
in the opinion of Ickes, Roosevelt now had to win or should
resign because, if he lost, he would not be able to carry-out
his objectives.

Ickes lamented that the stakes involved in the

Supreme Court gamble were too high for What was such an unpop
ular notion. 35
With the mounting opposition, the inner group of Roosevelt's
closest advo80rs, Cohen, Corcoran, and Assistant Attorney
General Jackson, began to have success in convinoing the Presi
dent to change the direction . of his attack.

Roosevelt had oc

cupied himself with a search for substantiation of the arguments
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contained within the Court Plan proposal.

In the year before

the Court Plan announcement_ Roosevelt sought

~o

prove to Congress

that it was well within their jurisdiction to take action against
the Court.

As in the January 14_ 1936 memo to his Attorney Gen

eral Homer Cunnnings_ Roosevelt asked, ItWhat was the McArdle Case
(7 WeI 506 - year 1869)?

I am told that the Congress withdrew

some act from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.,,36

Roose

velt later focused his efforts on compiling remarks made by Sup
rame Court Justices and others_ which could be used to enhance
his arguments.

Roosevelt wrote to Homer Cummings on May 26, 1936,

asking for a meeting to discuss a letter from United States Cir
cuit Court of Appeals Judge William Denman, the letter (see docu
ment ten in Appendix) reportedly quoted HUghes on the need for
more Justices to end trial delays.37

As late as February 6, 1937,

Roosevelt still sought to convince legislators of the tenability
of his Court Plan argument.

As document nine illustrates (see

Appendix) Roosevelt desired to place in the hands of legislators
Full copies of a part of ••• Hughes and Taft
quotations, Legislative History Act of 1869,
including mention of the bill which passed
the House - framed on lines similar to the
McReynolds and Gregory suggestions_ excerpts
from Was the Supreme Court Packed by President
Grant and material marked Itpolicyl1 which ••• 38
(explains) why the present plan is the best.
On February 19, 1937, James Roosevelt sent his father a
memo which suggested personal pressure be used on Rye and
Frazier.

Young Rooseveltts report went on to indicate that at

best the Senate was evenly divided over the Court Plan issue.
The report prompted the inner group to ask Roosevelt to

-
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disregard what Ickes ca.lled, the "untena.ble premises" of the
jUdicial reform bill, and to state in truth why he wanted to
change the membership of the Court. 40

On March 4, 1937, at

the Democratic victory dinner, Roosevelt first pursued a new
direct attack.
tl

The President delivered, what Ickes called,

a fighting speech,,,41

where he lambasted opposition leader

Senator Tydings and stated that lithe prosperity of the country
counted on the legislation that the Court had invalidated. 42
Roosevelt in effect "laid-it-on-the-line,1I abandoning the
false"argmnents cnea t ed by Cummings and pushing for his true
belief in the political necessity of being allowed to · c a r r y- ou t
his programs.

The pursuit of the "new direction" created

further faction and dissent.

Among Roosevelt's

o~

staff,

personal disputes between advisors erupted over which strategy
should be followed.

One group argued for oompromise, another

for the adherence to the charges levied in the original Court
Plan proposal.

Other aides, like Raymond Moley, still regarded

the entire Plan as an attempt to Ilprovide in advance for Supreme
Court approval of whatever legislative reforms Roosevelt hap
pened to espouse, a plan to enable Roosevelt to control the
Court.,,42
Roosevelt's sudden switch in the d2rection of his attack
created even more dissension within the Congress.

His change

in argumentation added further substantiation to the growing
belief that the tenets on which the Court Plan was based, were
fabricated, political lies •. Supporters of the Court had
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maintained from the first announcement of the Court Plan that;
Once an understanding of the Supreme Court's
function and procedure is established, the
deceptive nature of the President's message
becomes obvioua. 43
Public opinion reacted negatively to the President's direct ap
proach towards the Court issue.

In what is a representative

editorial, the Literary Digest commentedj
Instead of going directly to the people with a
request for the amendment he seeks, he first
resorts to questionable methods to build up
support for his plan. Thi~ is unworthy for
the high office he holds. 44
The Nation enounciated a similar theme nine days after the
President's victory dinner speech. The magazine stated that now;
The underlying issue is clear. It is not age
or pressure of business. It is the attitude of
justices toward allowing the government to at
tempt desperately needed social and economic
readjustment~ partly known, in greater part
unforeseen. 4?
Roosevelt's switch in direction damaged his reputation with
Congress and the people because it not only indicated his at
tempt to cover-up his original arguments but it also came too
late.

A study done by the Washington Post in mid-February of

1937, ltmade clear that there wa.s no relationship between the
age of Justices and congestion in the Courts. 1I 46

The survey

did much to damage Roosevelt's reputation and cast further doubt
upon his sincerity and honesty in trying to improve the Court, as
his Court message had stated.

The Literary Digest commented;

Although the President in his recent message to
Congress justified his plan for naming additional
judges for those beyond seventy years by the
congestion existing in the Federal Courts, the
survey showed no apparent relationship between
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aged judges and congested dockets. The
heaviest congestion being in court districts
comprising the largest areas of population. 47
The lie was uncovered, Roosevelt's actions were to cost him
politically.

Roosevelt's actions gave impetus to the spawning

of the conservative coalition.

As Robert J. steamer, the

author of The Supreme Court in Crisis, observed;
Ironically, the President's intransigence and
lack of complete honesty may have been instru
mental in saving the Court fram an act of
Congress which would have curtailed its
power in aome way.48
The Growth of Opposition and of the Conservative Coalition
The opposition to the Court Plan in Congress headed by a
nucleus of conservative Senators, grew so that by March 3, 1937,
Thomas Corcoran was forced to report that over twenty-two Sen
ators had stated their definite opposition to the Court Plan.
The revolt in the House of Representatives became
and threatening as the revolt in the Senate.

as widespread

The Court Plan's

legislative history was decided when House leaders moved to
block the initiation of Court Plan debate and consideration
in their chamber, forcing Roosevelt to introduce the Plan in
the Senate.

Our study of opposition to the Court Plan

~ll

focus

on the Senate deliberations.
The conservative coalition that began to form in the
Senate, chiefly as a result of the Court Plan, consisted of a
nucleus of seven Senators.

The coalescence of this group according

to the author of Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal, James
T. Patterson, would later serve as the foundation for the bi

partisan conservative coalition "i n Congress, which became
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operational during the Court issue and would continue as a
viable political force up to our present day. The leader of
this group waa Millard Tydings of Maryland, who at age forty
three had earned himself the title as lithe outstanding spokes
man for corporate wealth in Congress. 1I

Tydings and Roosevelt

developed a relationship of mutual hate. Harold Ickes has re
corded a rather remarkable statement made by Roosevelt about
Tydings.

Ickes remembers Roosevelt as stating that he wanted

to peel-off Tyding' s -'hi d e and then rub salt into the wounds.
In any event, the two men had few kind words for each other,
their opinions residing at opposite poles. 50 North Carolina's
Senator Josiah Bailey held the distinction of being able to op
pose the New Deal without fear of electoral repercussions.
Bailey was firmly entrenched in the Senate, and was able to ex
press his true feelings, along with Tydings, early in the New
Deal. 51 Bailey held a genuine dislike for Federal programs which
called for the expenditure of large sums of money. Bailey also
loved to speak about issues in terms of great moral questions.
He quickly turned the Court Plan issue into a moral debate, ad
vocating with all his available moral indignation for the Plan's
defeat. 52 Virginia's Senator, Harry Flood Byrd, became disenchant
ed with the New Deal during the enactment of the National Recovery
Act and the Agricultural Recovery Act. Senator Carter Glass, Byrd's
Virginian colleague, supported Byrd in his opposition to New Deal
programs.

The opposition of Glass to the National Recovery Act

was characterized by Secretary of Agriculture as the result of

- -- - - --_.-.-
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a fear that the legislation would force Glass "to pay more
than ten cents an hour for his apple pickers. 1I 53
opposition to the New

Glass'

like the opposition of Tydings and

_ D ~ al

Byrd, came far before the formulation of the Court Plan.
The other Senators who

formed the nucleus of the con

servative coalition, also became opposed to the New Deal shortly
after its inception.

Royal S. Copeland of New York became op

posed to Roosevelt, and thus the New Deal, because of the manner
in which he was treated by Roosevelt.

Throughout the administra

tionts recovery program, little of the Roosevelt patronage was
given to Copeland. His revenge for Roosevelt's indiscretion was
to join with the conservatives. 54

Senator Burke of Nebraska

rescinded the laudatory remarks which he made at the beginning
of the Roosevelt administration, because of Rooseveltts in
clination to direct Nebraskan patronage to Senator Norris, an
avid Roosevelt supporter.

Burke had been torn between the New

Deal and his support of business, the patronage issue helped
decide Burke's stand.

Burke created a long record of negative

votes for labor laws, which, combined with his business interests,
set him apart fram New Deal ideology.55
renomination to the Senate in 1940.

Burke lost his bid for

Angered and disillusioned,

Burke campaigned for Wilkie, Roosevelt's opponent in the

19~O

Presidential election.
In addition to the seven men who comprised the foundation
for the conservative coalition, we can add Senator Buckley from
Ohio, Senator McCarren of
Missouri.

Nev~da

and Senator Ben Clark of

These men joined the conservative ranks after the
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Utility Holding Company bill debates.

As we have mentioned,

the bill aroused sizeable dissent in the Senate.

We must note,

however, that even though the Senators listed above as conaerva
tives became opposed to the New Deal, they could seldom join
to work together.

Before the Court Plan's announcement, the

conservative Senators did not form a coalition, even though
they and others saw the "New Deal as not only new, but revolu
tionary.u56

The Court Plan became the adhesive which worked to

bind together the conservative elements in the Senate to form
a solid block of opposition.
8

The process of transformation was

gradual one, dissent and union happened slowly.

From January

5, 1937 to July 14, 1937, the forces of dissent enlarged
with the passage of each day drawing other Senators, mainly
middle-of-the-road Democrats, away from the New Deal coalition.
There are a few key elements which guided the course of
the Court Plan battle in the Senate.

In 1936, the Senate was

comprised of seventy-five Democrats, sixteen RepUblicans, one
Progressive, one Independent, two Farmer-Laborites and one vacant
seat. 57 When the Court bill was introduced in the Senate,
spirited by a feeling that someone else would head the next
national ticket, all past hatreds and slights that any Senator
had incurred by the White House were now exposed and intensified. 58
The Senators I mood and reaction to the Court Plan was best deBcribed by the Literary Digest on April 17, 1937 when the
observation was made that;
The tipsheets whispered that Representatives
and Senators were becoming increasingly hot
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tempered about the great issue, that bitter
personal rows over the subject would Boon
bubble to the surface and flare into black
haad-lines, that the Democratic Party was
already split and had only an even chance
of regrouping, even if the President ac
cepted a compr6mise judiciary reform bill. 59
The mood was set, Congress grew restless during what they per
celved to be the last Roosevelt administration.

The Roosevelt

myth was being shattered, the urgency and sense of despair
which accented the Roosevelt administration of 1932, had dis
solved and dissapated during the years which aged the New Deal
and its purpose.

Rooseveltts towering authority was crumbling,

his power to persuade balking legislators had grown weak.
The Court Plan's Congressional History
The Court Plan was referred to the Senate Judiciary Com
mittee where, under the leadership of Senator Ashurst, the Plan
was debated for three months and thirteen days until it was
finally brought out of committee, by a vote not recommending en
actment, on May 18, 1937. 60 The manner in which Roosevelt acted,
his inability to convince Ashurst to speed up the committee's
deliberations, his .assumption that Committee members would come
through in the end for him, resulted in the loss of Bupport for
Roosevelt and the Plan.
The Committee's final vote was also influenced by the ef
forts of the influential Burton K. Wheeler to enlist the Supreme
Court in his battle against the Plan.

Wheeler constructed an

opposition force which runctioned with devastating political
precision.

Wheeler was able to convince Chief Justice Hughes

to write a letter to the Judiciary Committee defending the
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Supreme Court.

Hughes responded to each of the charges

which Roosevelt levied against the Court.

He wrote that;

an increase in the number of Justices of the
Supreme Court, apart from any questions of
policy, which I do not discuss, would not
promote the efficiency of the Court. It is
believed ,t h a t it would impair that ef~iciency
so long as the Court acts as a unit. There
would be more JUdges to hear, more Judges to
confer. more Judges to discuss, more Judges to
be convinced and decide. 61
The letter oontinued.:to destroy, point by point, the original
argument of the Administration, an argument already repUdiated
by Roosevelt himself.
The letter proved to be disastrous

for the Administration.

Ickes wrote in his diary that the;
episode proves again the mistake in going to
Court with a weak case. I refer of coure, to
the fact that the President's special message
on the question of judicial reform was almost
entirely based on the propoeition that we
needed more Federal judgea. b2
The Hughes letter further demonstrated the political slickness
of Roosevelt's Court Plan.

His arguments were now

by the Supreme Court Chief Justice.

refuted

The Court, in one respect.

again invalidated a Roosevelt attempt at reform.

Rooseveltts

power over Congress diminished, his reputation tarnished,
Roosevelt still refused to concede defeat believing that the
"people" were still with him, and that Congress would soon turn
and fulfill his desire.

Roosevelt would learn the lesson

offered by Bernard DeVoto author of F.DeR. and the Supreme Court
Crisis.

DeVoto stated. Ilup to a point the bleachers will applaud

political slickness, but the moment that point is passed they
always start throwing pop bottles. u63

The Senate in its continued

147
debate over the issue was nearing that point.

The only factor

which obstructed the Senate from carrying out a full fledged
rebellion was the continued defense mounted for the Plan by
Senator Joe Robinson.
Robinson was perhaps the only supporter of the Court Plan,
and his reasons for support rested upon political considerations.
Tom Corcoran, Roosevelt's Presidential aide, reported to Harold
Ickes on February 10, 1937 that Robinson would be demanding a
lot of patronage as a price for Court bill support. 64 In addi
tion to any direct patronage requests, Robinson requested that
in return for his loyalty he would be appointed to the Supreme
Court at first opportunity.
gain a seat on the Court.

Robinson's life long goal was to
Throughout the four and one-half

years of the Roosevelt administration, Robinson was devoted to
Roosevelt and the New Deal.

When the President slighted the

Senator, Robinson still tendered support, when Roosevelt failed
to make an attempt at forming a warm acquaintanceship with
Robinson, the Senator continued to steadfastly side with the
President.

Robinson provided his loyalty in exchange for a

promise of a Supreme Court seat.

To Robinson, the Supreme Court

was a goal that was worth the sacrifices made during the New Deal. 65
On May 18, 1937, Justice Van Devanter announced his inten
tion to retire after the close of the spring session.

Van

Devanter's announcement came at a politically inopportune time
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for Roosevelt.

The announcement offered Roosevelt a chance

to appoint a new Justice, a liberal Justice, and withdraw the
unpopular Court Plan before a final vote was taken. Roosevelt
decided not to take advantage of the development for one main
reason; Roosevelt had all but publically pledged the next
Supreme Court appointment to Robinson, and Robinson was feared
by the administration as being a moderate-conservative.

As

discussed in the Memorandum on Features of Proposed Plan (docu
ment eleven, see Appendix) the administration needed to insure
the creation of a liberal Court that was liberal by clear and
wide majorities.

With the appointment of one new Justice, the

Court would still only be balanced, the deciding vote would still
be cast by Roberts.

Fearing that appointment of Robinson would

result in a conservative Court, one beyond the criticism of
Roosevelt by virtue of his appointment of a new Justice, Roose
velt decided to continue with his attempt at Court Reorganization
in order to guarantee a liberal Court by 1938.
Roosevelt made no public move to Robinson.

Ickes reports

in his diary on June 17, 1937, that Tom Corcoran informed him
that Roosevelt had called Robinson to the White House. Roosevelt
made clear to Robinson of his desires for a liberal Court, the
President is reported as saying,"that if there was to be a bride
there must also be bridesmaids, at least four of them. rr 66
Roosevelt would continue to hold the carrot at the end of the
stick for Robinson until a Court Plan victory had been secured.
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Roosevelt's intentions about appointing Robinson to
the Court have always been in question.

As documents two

and three (see Appendix) indicate, Roosevelt clearly used
Robinson for his own advantage.

Roosevelt went so far as to

refuse to publically support Robinson in his 1936 re-election.
Roosevel t

rS

II

agr-eem en t," to appoint Robinson to the Supreme

Court after the delivery of the Court Reorganization Plan,
must also be placed on tenuous grounds.

Tom Corcoran, in dis

cussing the agreement with Raymond Moley, has given substantia
tion to the belief that Roosevelt never intended to appoint
Robinson to the Court.

Corcoran is reported to have said;

I've learned a lot about politics from
being down here, when a politician makes
a promise he knows that he is not binding
himself, and the man to whom he makes
the promise knowa it too. 67
Further support to the contention that Roosevelt never
really intended to appoint Robinson to the Court is offered
by Ickes.

He reported that when he made known his belief that

Roosevelt could not afford to appoint a relatively conservative
man like Robinson to the Court, Roosevelt is said to have
II emphatically"
agreed. 68
After June 17, 1937 the opposition to the Court Plan and
to Roosevelt grew at a steadily quickening pace. Democratic Sena
tors became upset with the treatment of Robinson.
June, Roosevelt

In late

authorized Robinson to attempt a compromise.

On July 2, 1937, Robinson offered a substitute Court Bill (see
document five in Appendix).

The substitute bill varies slightly
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from Roosevelt's original proposal.

Under the compromise bill,

Roosevelt would still be able to appoint an additional Justice
for each Justice age

seventy-five or older.

Robinson's bill

would have allowed for the appointment of only one additional
Justice in each calendar year.

The substitute Court Bill would

not have allowed Roosevelt to attain his final goal, the crea
tion of a solidly liberal Court by 1938.

In this respect, the

substitute bill was a very real compromise for Roosevelt.
The compromise bill received little support in the Senate.
In an earlier day the substitute bill would probably have been
accepted by the Senate.

Through the prolonged Court Plan bat

tIe, however, Roosevelt lost the support needed for the enact
ment of any reorganization bill, no matter how mild.

As author

Merlo Pusey stated, IIhe fOUght too long, divided too many.1I 69
The Senate was in rebellion against the bill and against
Roosevel t ,
The rebellion in the Senate was carried on by members of
the Democratic party.

The Republican party's contribution to

the Court battle was silence.

While the Court Plan divided the

Democrats, it did "what no Republican stratagem could have done;
it united Senate Republicans for the first time in same three
decades.,,7 0 Republican leader McNary, while supportive of
most New Deal programs, found himself and all of his Republican
colleagues in opposition to the Plan.

It was McNary who brOUght

up the tactic that facili tated bo tbioppo s I t.Lon to the plan and
the growth of the conservative coalition.

As J.T. Patterson

observed, lIuntil the Court Plan was defeated in July, roost
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prominent Republican Senators maintained a discreet, and to
Democrats, infuriating silence.,,71

The Republicans realized,

that with their minority position, they would have no bene
ficial effect on the formulation of the opposition if they
tried to lead it.

The Republicans instead decided to quietly

urge on opposition, attending bipartisan conservative meetings
and working closely with conservative Democrats in the f'orrnula
tion of opposition to the Plan.
The Republican strategy of discreet silence worked.

It a1

lowed powerful Democrats, like Wheeler, to lead the way for an
exodus from party folds.

Thus it became a Democratic rebellion,

a rebellion of and by the majority party.

The Democrat, while

desiring to maintain some control over the Court's jurisdiction,
strongly condemned

what M.A. Kaigle in a letter to the Presi

dent on July 2, 1937, called "the dubious expedient of' packing. 1I 7 2
Roosevelt was failing with his party, and also failed in gain
ing the support of labor and the farmers,two

o~

the New Deal's

primary supporters.
Labor leader Lewis decided on behalf of the C.I.C. not to
support the bill.

Merlo Pusey contends

that~Lewis

acted in

this manner "because of the callous way in which the government
treated him. 1I 73

The A.F.L. officially supported the bill, how

ever, because of his refusal to take in labor as a decision
maker, the A.F.L. kept its lobbyists at home.

One labor leader

did attempt to conduct a campaign of mass rallies in support of
the bill.

A.F.L. and C.I.C. headquarters quickly passed out

152

the word that such meetings in support of the bill were
Hpoison,1I the result was no mass rallies of' support for
Roosevelt. 74

As with labor, the farmers, through the Farm

Bureau, failed the President.

The Farm Bureau officially came

out against the bill, signifying the desertion of one of the
President's most secure blocs of support.
and the fanners was non-existant.

Support from labor

Both labor and the farmers

might have supported a Court Bill if the President had consulted
with or in some way made them part of the decision process.
Merlo Pusey surmised,

n •••

As

the President was paying for the ex

tram e a ecr ecy of hi s prep ar-a tions • 1175
In its 'own fashion, the Supreme Court also failed the Presi
dent.

Beginning with the May 24, 1937 decision upholding the

Social Security bill, the Court began to reverse previous
conservative New Deal opinions.

The effect of the Court's re

fusal was to remove the Court from further public condemnation,
and thus remove the Court from the critical public eye.

Without

the continuation of conservative jUdgements, the public, and
Congress, began to forget the opinions which spawned the Court
Plan and began to focus upon the Plan as separate from the in
validation of' recovery programs.

In this light, the Court Plan

struck against the popular view of reverance for the Supreme
Court as an institution.

Instead of rallying to teach the Court

a lesson, as Roosevelt hoped the Congress would, defense of the
Court and fear of the effects of an attack uponv the Court be
came the rallying point. Henry L. Menchan expressed the point
of increasing consternation when he stated, "if the plan succeeds,
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the Court will become as ductile as a gob of chewing gum,
changing shape from day to day and even hour from hour as this
or that wizard edges his way to the President's ear.,,7 6
The battle in the Senate became heated and embittered.
Joe Robinson fought frantically for the substitute bill which,
upon enactment, would supposedly tender him a seat on the Su
preme Court.
to win.

The fight was Robinson's to carry, Roosevelt's

As we have stated above, Robinson was almost the sole

impediment to adverse action by the Senate early on in the
fight.

If the bill had been Robinson's to win, without the

Roosevelt stigma which was evoking much of the opposition, the
outcome might have been much different.

As it was, Robinson

fought gallantly and arduously for an unpopular bill destined
for defeat.

The stress of the battle, and the strain and de

sire for a positive outcome, took its toll on Robinson who died
of a heart attack on July 14, 1937. 77
After Robinson's death, Roosevelt managed to further in
flame Senatorial opposition by refusing to attend Robinson's
final burial in Arkansas.

The result of this action was to

quickly seal the fate of the Court Bill.

After Robinson's

death, Vice-President Garner returned from his self-imposed
exile in Texas to lobby for and insure the defeat of the plan. 78
Garner worked for an immediate vote on the bill, and was able
to declare to Roosevelt on July 20, that no hope existed for
a Court Bill victory.

The seventy to twenty vote, which re

turned to committee a jUdicial reform proposal not inclUding
the Supreme Court,

--- - - - _._ - . .

sUbatanti~ted Garner's

declaration. 80
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Roosevelt's Court Reorganization attempt was dead.
Opposition to the Plan, and to Roosevelt, was the majority
view.

The reasons for Roosevelt's defeat must be affixed to

Roosevelt's own actions.

Roosevelt's manner of introducing

the plan was offensive, he failed to consult with others over
the Plan's formulation, he failed to show moderation in pursuit
of his ends.

At the time of the Plan's announcement there was

much public support for a measure that would in some way force
the Court to become more responsive to the changing needs of
the American society.
mood.

Roosevelt failed to capitalize on this

As Patterson concludes, Ilpractically every appraisal

of the Court controversy agrees that the most important reason
for Roosevelt's defeat was the plan itself and Roosevelt's
handling of it. 1I 8 1
The loss of Court reorganization must be squarely placed
upon Roosevelt's shoulders.

The Court Reorganization Plan

was his plan, he had decided upon the direction, formulation,
announcement, and strategy for enactment of the Plan.

Roosevelt

took a highly unpopular method of Court correction and trans
formed it into a test of his personal power and prestige, a
test which he failed miserably.

By charging the entire Court

with inefficiency and inadequacy in the performance of its
functions, Roosevelt succeeded in alienating the Court, the
Congress and the American people. B2
The travesty of court reorganization had some long term
consequences for the Roosevelt administration.

Walter F.

Murphy, author of Congress and the Court, states that after the
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demise of the Court Plan, "the mighty New Deal coalition that
had triumphantly swept forty-six states in November 1936, had
been splattered like Humpty-Dumpty the next spring. 1I 8 3
Murphy points to the fact that only one piece of major social
legislation passed the Congress after the Court Plan defeat.
This last measure was the Fair Labor Standards Act.

The legi

slation, introduced in early 1937, had a horrible time in pas
sage and when it was finally enacted in June of 1938 it was,
lithe product of the kind of political bartering in the back
rooms of Congress that Roosevelt had not before engaged in.,,84
The first of the long term consequences was Roosevelt's 10s8
of Congressional control.

After the defeat of the Court Bill,

the control that Roosevelt had over the Congress from 1932
through 1936 was to become a historical fact, not an operational
reality.
The loss of Congressional control is but one aspect of the
decline in Roosevelt's power and authority to govern.

Paul

K. Conkin, author of The New Deal, provides an insight into
the extent of the repercussions of the Court battle.

Conkin

writes that;
the Court fight ••• helped destroy the Roosevelt
myth of invincibility, disillusioned many of his
former disciples, divided the Democratic party,
gave the Republican party a new lease on life,
showed his worst militant characteristics, and
left Roosevelt bitter and hurt. 8 S
Roosevelt's loss of party control pervaded beyond the
lOBS

of Congressional authority.

As a result of the Court re

organization attempt, writes .Leonard Baker, Roosevelt lost the
leadership of the entire Democratic party, and by so doing lost
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the chance to "determine in which direction the party would
move in the future. 1I 86

During the Court Plan battle in Congress,

Democrats began to rebel against Roosevelt throughout the
country.

On February 8, 1937, Stephen Early informed Roosevelt

of the introduction of a resolution in the Texas State Senate
which denounced the Court Plan (see document twelve in appendix).
On May 9, 1937, it was reported that "certain prominent leaders
of the Democratic party in Wyoming, and some of our Democratic
newspapers, have recently voiced their opposition to (the
proposed) reorganization of the Supreme Court.,,8?

These spec

ific examples serve to exemplify a national loss of New Deal
coalition and Roosevelt support.

The occurrence was caused by

the creation of the Court Plan and Roosevelt's handling of the
Plan.

As a party leader Roosevelt's authority had been ir

reparably undermined.
Roosevelt's unsuccessful attempt to regain his party
authority in 1938, by trying to "purge" or campaign against
disloyal party members, resulted in a further loss of Roosevelt's
control over the Democratic party.

The purge strengthened the

conservative coalition by increasing the size of the coalition's
membership, and by extending the duration of the coalition's
operations in Congress.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have examined the reactions by members
of Congress to the Court Plan, in an attempt to ascertain a
description of the effects the Court Plan had on Roosevelt's
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ability to govern.

We have noted that the Court Plan was

Rooeeveltts first real Congressional defeat, and that this
defeat served to destroy the myth of Roosevelt invincibility.
The Court Plan proposal intensified faction
viously unified Democratic party.

within the pre

The conservative coalition

is perhaps the most important result of the faction caused by
the Court Plan.

The Court Plan did not create conservatives,

it served to unify conservatives to create a coalition of
conservatives.

The opposition to the Court Plan signaled to

Senators and Representatives, that it was alright to voice
opposition to '· the New Deal.

Members of Congress were increas

ingly unafraid to answer to their personal convictions.

The

result was a breakdown in the Democratic unity which had ex
pidited the creation of the New Deal, party unity that was
seldom seen before the New Deal and has not been seen since.
The Plan created opposition, durable opposition which
would hamper his efforts to receive the enactment of domestic
legislation in 1937.

Leonard Baker evaluates Roosevelt's

achievements after the defeat of the Court Plan and finds that
Roosevelt did not fulfill the purpose of the New Deal, he did
not bind his party together again, and he did not insure the
continuance of liberalism. 88 Paul Conkin continues stating
that the fight wasted an entire Congressional session, dis
illusioned New Dealers, destroyed Roosevelt's reputation,
factionalized the Democratic party, and provided for the recov
ery of the Republican party.8 9

Thus, the immediate results of

the Court Plan for Roosevelt were disasterous, one can only
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speculate on how Roosevelt would have faired in 1938 and 1939
if not for the increased anxiety caused by the rumbles and
rumors of World War II.
Our evaluation is focused at the long term effects of
the Court Plan on Roosevelt's ability to govern.

We must

agree with William Leuchtenburg and his analysis that;
by the end of the Roosevelt years, few
questioned the right of the government to
pay the farmer millions in subsidies not
to grow crops, to enter plants, to conduct
union elections, to regulate business
enterprises from utility companies to air
lines, or even to compete directly with
business by generating and distributing
hydroelectric power. All these powers 90
had been ratified by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court would later ratify new broader powers of
governmental authority.

Roosevelt was ab1t to appoint members

to the Court who would vote to overrule thirty-two precedents. 9 1
AS Roosevelt wrote, lithe result has been that the Federal gov

ernment now has the undisputed power which had always been in
tended for it by the framers of the Constitution. u9 2
Roosevelt's success must be measured through time, as Baker
states;
In the sixties the American people proceeded
with the philosophy of the New Deal then, that
they did not turn their backs on the reforms
fought for and instituted by F.D.R. - this
signifies the real victory of F.D.R.93
Roosevelt lost a great deal of his powers and ability to govern
because of the adverse reactions to the Court Plan.

His lOBS

must be jUdged against what he had acquired, the complete con
trol over Congress, solid and continued popular support for
himself and his New Deal, and the success of his programs on
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restoring and rebuilding the American society and economy.
No other President had such complete authority over Congress,
we must remember that eleven key, major pieces of new social
legislation passed through Congress with only forty hours of
debate.

Roosevelt achieved and acquired what modern day

Presidents have found impossible to achieve or acquire.

Any

detraction from this powerful and revered position would seem
to be a dramatic loss.

Roosevelt was removed from his pedestal

and placed momentarily upon an equal footing with other
Presidents in our nation's history.

Roosevelt's omnipotent

powers were reduced to a pedestrian level until 1940.
We can conclude then by_saying that the Court Reorganiza
tion Plan caused Roosevelt to lose some power and authority,
some ability to govern in 1937 and 1938.

Hia victory, however,

has been realized through the passage of time.

His powers,

his programs and his influence on American society still remain
today.

The Court defeat was a momentary defeat, an anomaly in

his governing career, a lapse in his ability to govern.

The

immediate effects of the Court Plan were serious to Roosevelt
and his record of unopposed, undefeated leadership.

We use

the argument of time not to gloss over the adverse effects but
to place them in their proper context.

CHAPTER SIX
Conclusion
The Supreme Court Crisis of 1937 was a product of the expres
sion of will by two branches of our national government. During
the 1930's, a change in the definition of the proper role of
government in American society occurred.

The new role definition

was promoted by Roosevelt, through the social legislation labeled
as the New Deal. The judiciary, through the legal opinions of the
conservative Justices who comprised a majority on the Supreme
Court, expressed its will by invalidating the social legislation
of the New Deal, and thereby moved to prohibit the change of the
Federal government's role in American society.
For a period of four years the ideological battle ensued.
On February 5, 1937, President Roosevelt moved to enlist the leg
islative branch of government to end the stalemate, to force
change within--the membership of the legal triburmal and to bring
about new legal opinions which would promote and pass favorably
upon the new role of government.

The argumentation pursuant to

the Court Reorganization Plan proposal, presents 80me fundamental
questions regarding the powers and relationship of each branch of
government to the others.
The issue of the proper relationship and the boundaries of
power of the three branches of government is a fundamental issue,
and one that as of yet has not been given a steadfast answer.
The framers of the United states Constitution debated at length
over which branch of government should represent the supreme will,
and how the expression of will

~ould

the other branches of government.

be limited and checked by

The Founding Fathers struck
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upon an agreement of government in which, as Madison states in
Federalist number fifty-seven, IIAmbition must be made to counter
act Ambition,1I 1 While at the same time the independence of each
branch of government must be insured.

Madison went to great

lengths in Federalist number fifty-one to set-forth how important
is the independence of each department of government from the other
departments.
The extensive quote from the Federalist fifty-one is important
in that it shows the fear that the Founding Fathers had of one
branch being able to subjugate another branch, partiCUlarly the
judicial branch.

In Federalist number fifty-one, Madison states,

in part, that;
in order to lay a due foundation for that separate
and distinct exercise of the different powers of
government, which to a certain extent is admitted
on all hands to be essential to the preservation
of liberty, it is evident that each department
should have its own will; and consequently
should be 80 constituted that the members of each
should have as little agency as possible in the
appointment of the members of the others •••• Some
deviations, therefore, from the principle must be
admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary
department in particular, "it might be inexpedient
to insist rigorously on the principle; first,
because peculiar qualifications being essential in
the members, the primary consideration o~t to be
to select that mode of choice which best secures
these qUalificationsj secondly, because the perm
anent tenure by which the appointments are held
in that department must soon ~"destroy all sense of
dependence on the authority conferring them.
It is equally evident, that the members of
each department should be as little dependent as
possible on those of the others •••• 2
The departments of government, according to Madison, are to be
independent and counteract the ambitions of the other branches,
and yet the departments of government are to form a Union which
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will be strong enough to inhibit the development of factions.
The Court Crisis of 1937 saw the development of factions among
the three branches of government itself.

How is such faction

to be resolved while atill insuring the independence of each
branch of government, and insuring that the ambition--o f' , or the
expression will by, anyone branch will not SUbjugate the other
branches of government?

The

re~olution

of such faction, as be

tween the President and the Supreme Court, has never been accomplished
through direct or overt measures taken by the President.

Two Pres

idents before Roosevelt, took steps to force a change in the
Court's ideological stance.

The two Presidents, Thomas Jefferson

and Abraham Lincoln, faced Supreme Courts which answered to the
ideology of an earlier order.
Jefferson tried many different tactics to force change within
the judiciary.

His most novel tactic was the use of impeachment

of lower court justices.

As a Jefferson aid

explained to an

opposition leader, "we want your offices for the purpose of
giving than to men who will fill them better. 1I 3

Jefferson did

succeed in having one Judge impeached, his next attempt at impeach
ment failed, and Jefferson ended his attack.
Jefferson held very strong opinions about the Supreme Court,
which was the object of his wrath and the primary target for
forced change, although, as the author of The Supreme Court and
the President stated, hBut for all his schemes and fulminations,
Jefferson never succeeded in limiting the independence of the
Supreme Court. 1I 4

Jefferson believed it to be l1a very dangerous

doctrine to consider the Judges as the ultimate arbriters of all
Constitutional questions.

It is one which would place us under

- --- -

- -------~- -------
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the despotism of oligarchy. 1I 5

Jefferson was deeply worried

about and fearful of the Supreme Court which he found opposed
to his governmental ideology.

Jefferson's correspondence is

punctuated with statements which express his fear of the Court.
In one letter, Jefferson writes; "there is no danger ••• so much
as the consolidation of our government by the noiseless, and
therefore unalarming, instrumentality of the Supreme Court.,,6
Jeff'erson was repulsed by "the very idea of cooking up opinions
in conclave, II believing that the manner in which the Supreme
Court arrived at decisions "begets suspicions that something
passes which fears the public ear. 1I 7
The issue of the proper role of the Federal government in
our society, and the issue of which branch of government has the
authority and function to formulate and express this role, arose
between Jefferson and Chief Justice Marshall of the Supreme
Court.

Jefferson, like his executive counterpart in 1937, con

demned the Supreme

Court's ability to frustrate what seemed to

be the will of the people as expressed by the President.

Jefferson

stated that the Ilpractice of Judge Marshall, of traveling out of
his case to prescribe what the law would be in a moot case not
before the Court, is very irregular and very sensurable. 1I 8
Roosevelt repeated these sentiments when the Hughes Court invalid
ated New Deal legislation because of the conservative majority's
opinion that the legislation was unwise.
Marshall, and the Supreme Court which opposed Jefferson,
saw the need for a strong central government, and the enlargement
of the powers of Congress.

In the Sedition Acts case, the Supreme
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Court expressed its belief, or will, that these tenets should
guide the operation of the Government.

Marshall, and his Court,

validated the Acts as an expression of will.

The Court's opinion

was clearly seen as such an expression, as one detracter stated,
lithe uncertain future of the Federalist party was more important
than the upholding of the Constitution. 1I 9

The issue between

Jefferson and Marshall is analogous to the Supreme Court Crisis
of 1937.

The executive and judiciary held opposing views as to

the proper function and role of the government.

The judiciary was

able to thwart the expression of will by the executive.
When the Constitution was conceived of, the framers believed
that the judiciary would be the weakest, and most vulnerable
branch of government. In the Federalist number seventy-eight,
Alexander Hamilton wrote that;
the jUdiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of
the three departments of power; that it can never
attack with success either of the other two; and
that all possible care is requisite to rBable it
to defent itself against their attacks.
History has proJen Hamilton wrong.

The jUdiciary has both deterred

and denied the expression of will by the executive and legislative
departments.

The denial of the expression of will is an attack

upon the powers of the other branches of government. The decisions
of the Court have been far-reaching and have had rundamental ef
fect upon the destiny .'of this nation.

The Court has acquired and

developed a degree of power so great that its decisions have had
important efreet upon the unity of the nation, and upon the ability
of the

othe~

two branches of government to resolve national crisis

according to their own ideology.
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The Supreme Court's decision in the Dred Scott case served
to limi t the abili ty of President Lf.nco Lrr...t o deal effectively
with a serious national issue.

The Court, through the opinion,

gave legal sanction to a particular ideology which SUbsequently
prohibited resolution of the issue through compromise.

Our Am

erican system of government operates on the principle of compromise,
and the Court, through the sanction of a particular viewpoint
or philosophy, removed the ability formulate compromise, and the
issue involved in the Dred Scott case was left to be resolved
outside of our normal system of government.
President Lincoln deplored the role of the Supreme Court as
the arbriter of national issues, when he stated that;
the candid citizen must confess that if the policy
of government upon vital questions affecting the
whole people '.i s to be irrevocably fixed by deci
sions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are
made in ordinary litigation between parties in
personal actions, the people will have ceased to
be their own rulers, moving to that extent
practically resigned their Gove~ent into the
hands of that emminent tribunal.
President Roosevelt echoed this warning in 1937.

To Roosevelt,

the Supreme Court should not be allowed to become a tribunnal of
men who decide upon the vital questions facing the nation.

When

the Court became involved in issues which adversely effected national
recovery in the 1930's, Roosevelt stated, "we have, therefore,
reached the point as a Nation where we must take action to save
the Constitution from the Court and the Court from itself. In our
Courts we want a government of laws and not of rnen.,,12
The development of the

Supr~e

Court's power to assert itself

into the decision and formulation of national policy began with
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the Judiciary Act of 1789.

This act listed the type of cases

that the Supreme Court could hear on appeal.

Wesley McCune,

author of The Nine Young Men, states that, "in the course of
that listing a national legislature, by its own voluntary act,
deliberately made itself subordinate to and reversible by a
national judiciary.1I 13 From this act has sprung the nation 01'
the Supreme Court's power of jUdicial review.
The Constitution has no provision whereby the Supreme Court
may veto or pass upon the validity of an act of Congress. Pro
posals made during the Constitutional Convention to include such
provisions were voted down.

The Court has assumed this power,

and has used this assumed power to prevent the expression 01' a
particular governmental ideology by the Congress or President.
The assumption of the power of judicial review has been seldom
questioned by either executive of Congress.

Roosevelt did not

question the Court's assumption of the power during the Supreme
Court Crisis of 1937.
What has been questioned is the Court's use of the power
of judicial review.

The power of judicial review has given·'the

Court ominous authority, which can only be tempered or controlled
through the Court's own self-restraint.

Mr. Justice Waahington

wrote in Ogden v. Sanders (1827) 12 Wheat 213,270) that it "is
but a decent respect due to the wisdom, integrity, and patriotism
of the legislative body, by which any law is passed, to presume
in favor of its validity until its violation of the Constitution
is proven beyond all doubt.,,14

However, not all Courts have

followed this doctrine, and have, as in 1937, precipitated conflict

....-- - - - - - - - - - - -

-
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between the several branches of government.
Judicial review, says Charles E. Hughes, "gives assurance
of a more just and reasonable balance between public and private
interests in the enactment and administration of our laws. n15
The power of review is supposed to give a stabilizing effect to
our governmental institutions.

The Supreme Court is elevated

to the position of guardian for the interests of the state against
the legislatures abuse of the great powers given them.

As Chief

Justice Balck of Pennsylvania stated, "there is nothing more easy
to imagine than a thousand tyrannical things which the legisla
ture may do, if its members forget their duties. n 16 The Supreme
Court, however, is maintained and restrained only through·-the
counsels of self-restraint urged by its own membership.

Our

paper has reviewed a period of time where the Court did not heed
such counsels of self-restraint, and proceeded to_insist, in an
almost tyrannical fashion, upon economic doctrines that a majority
of the members of the Court came to believe in.
The Supreme Court Crisis of 1937 was an event where in a time
of "crisis and change, a reluctant and backward-looking Supreme
Court, dominated by ••• a group of men who (owed) their power to
a repudiated President and partyll17 created friction and chaos
in the running of this nation.

The Court Reorganization Plan was

a response to the Crisis of 1937.

This paper has reviewed the

time of crisis and has portrayed the severity of the economic
decay, in an attempt to show the failure of the old economic order.
In 1932, the people of this Nation chose Franklin D. Roosevelt
to formulate a new economic order and to initiate change which
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would revitalize and rebuild the fallen economic system.

We

have provided examples, i.e. the R.F.C., which have shown the
differences in governmental operations of the New Deal compared
to the workings of government under the auspices of the old
order.

We noted in exactly what direction the New Deal attempted

to take the country, and how this varied from the guidance of
government under nineteenth century liberal notions.
Our focus then turned to the invalidation of the New Deal.
In that section we attempted to show that the Supreme Court struck
at the very heart of the reoovery effort.

The Court refused to

allow programs which provided further steps to "the operationaliza
tion of modern twentieth century social and economic thought.
We also sought to provide a feeling and an understanding of the
effects that the invalidation of New Deal legislation had on the
people of our country, and upon the recovery program.

In this

we wanted to make clear that, without the continued operation of
the New Deal with its new governmental operations and activities,
the nation would falter even more.

The void left by the invalida

tion of New Deal programs was not filled by a return to the
proper functioning of nineteenth century liber.al notions.
The analysis of the backgrounds of the Justices, and the
evaluation of their economic beliefs, should give substantiation
to our primary contention that the decisions of the Supreme Court
during the 1930's, were not based upon clear juristic principles.
The decisions were founded upon the socio-economic beliefs of a
small majority of the members of the Court.

In this respect, the

Constitution was what the five conservative members of the Court
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said it was.

The conservative members' interpretation of the

Constitution was based solely upon their economic beliefs, and
their tenacity of adhering to those beliefs, despite the power
ful arguments proclaiming the legislations necessity and validity,
is what fixed the Court and President on a head-on collision
course of ideological dispute.
We have spent much time analyzing the backgrounds and ideo
logical thoughts of the members of the Court.

Our reason for the

length and breadth of this section is multi-fold.

We had to make

clear the influence of the Justices' aocio-economic environments
upon their ideological development.

We alao had to make known

that the juristic opinions of the Justices were greatly influenced
by, and served to restate, their socio-economic beliefs.

Our pri

mary consideration was to deflate the elevated vision commonly
held by most Americans towards the Supreme Court as an institu
tion.

The Supreme Court is comprised of nine individual men,

and in this respect we must emphasize that, in 1937, the Court was
comprised of very politically motivated men.

The conservative mem

bera of the Court gained their offices through the promotion and
struggle for the success of their political party and political
ideals.

Their elevation did not neutralize their political be

liefs or their desire for the continued success of those beliefs.
The first sections of the work, are designed to show the
emergence of two totally divergent ideologies.

The competition

between those who held these beliefs would promote faction within
the branches of government, and would lead to the expression or
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two ideological opposite wills, and result in government in
stalemate.

The Supreme Court, which was never intended to pass

upon national policy only to settle disputes between the various
States and review such questions as Congress provided, acted in
a legislative fashion.

The Court vetoed the actions of the

President and Congress by invalidating legislation which it
viewed with displeasure.
The last point, of the Justices acting in a legislative
fashion, is our primary object of review.

In order to adequately

substantiate this claim, and in order to fully portray the situa
tion as we view it, great length and explanation was needed.
The crisis of 1937 was intensified by the chance denial to
Roosevelt of the pleasure to appoint new Justices to the Supreme
Court.

Because of the Justices ability not to die, and their

determination to remain on the bench, Roosevelt's only recourse to
force change within the tribunnal was by formulation of some court
reorganization plan.

Our last chapter reviews the formulation and

failure of the Court Reorganization Plan of 1937.

The plan

failed to gain support, and severely damaged Roosevelt's reputa
tion and to Borne extent limited his ability to effectively govern.
The failure in Congress of the Court Plan provides an excel
lent example of what Madison called
act ambition."

II

Arnbi tion ••• made to counter

The Court battle also provides an illustration of

how wrong Hamilton was in his contention that the Court would be
the weakest of the three branches of government.

We have &hown

that it was the bill and the manner of its presentation which
brought about its defeat.

We have also shown that the Court bill

- -.- -.-_. _----- - - ---- - --~
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was an attempt by Roosevelt to repudiate and ernbaraas his
opponents on the bench.

The Congress would not allow such

action, especially when such action would give so great a vic
tory for one branch of government as to threaten the gubjugation
or the other.
The real importance of the
this last statement.

Supr~e

Court Crisis lies in

Roosevelt was denied a direct victory

over the Court, yet he did not suffer total defeat.

His attempt

failed, the Court's interpretations changed, government then con
tinued along its normal course.

The study of the Suppeme Court

Crisis of 1937 is a study of the resiliency and of the true and
proper functioning of our American system of government.
system of government provides for a
tion of change.

gradual·~cycle

Our

and transforma

The 1930's were an abnormal time calling for

vast amounts of change in an extremely short amount of time.
The system balked, demanding lesa change in more time,· the nec
essity of the day was more change now.

As is usual in our system

of government, compromise was reached.

After four years of balk

ing, after four yeara of pressure for quick change, change occurred.
In what could have brOUght the downfall of government in another
nation, resulted in strengthening of our fundamental system of
three separate but equal branches of government expressing will
and independence, serving to promote unity while counteracting
Ambition with Ambition.

APPENDIX

(All documents from the Roosevelt Presidential Library in
Hyde Park J New York except for Document One which is from
Herman C. Pritchett J The Roosevelt Court (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1937) p. 32.)
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DOCUMENT ONE
1'1110 ROOSI::VELT COVIIT

Dissent is u';lI;l1Jy not a ;;a mc pbycd in ~(ll i tai re; the great nl.1;orit,y
of all Sllp rcnlC Co nrt disscnb ;JTe concurred in by two, t hree, or (our
jll!-tices. The :l~rCell1e ll t ~ :lIl d cli \agrcclIlents thus recorded (';111 be ex
arninc.] 10 determine whether :In)" regular patte rn of alignmcn t is
evident in these votes. The cxi\tence of such a pattern would be cvi
deuce til;]! dis;lgrcemellt ill decisions is not a random p rocess but is,
as Thom as Reed Powell put it. illd ieati\'e of "some underlyillg dii
Icrcnccs of go-pel." \0 One Il\dlll mcthorl of p rc~ell t i llg d ;l !; l 0 11 judi
cia] alignments is in the fOllll of :J table s!lowing the rda ljoll\hip
hct ween t he di \~Clllillg votes uf c . cry pair of jll.\! iccs, Such :111 ;1I1 ;l J~'S J 'i
is set (orth ill Table II, CO\'Cling the five terms [rrun lC)3 1 thr ollgh
TAlllE II

SI O ll C:

(4)

5'

51

n

C."dOl0

,I I

(I)

40

12

Hr:tn<1cis

,\ )

4::>

(,)

10

HUl:h~s

J 2

J:

'0

(2)

Rohc:r1s

6

2

8

II

8

-'

(I)

V"nDc:v:lnler

j

7

(I)

'3

J

( I)

'0

7

1 ,1

IQ

«)

J

I(

13

J7

~lIthC'rl':lnd
j

J

Butler

McReynolds

1

J

J

"
I ,t

"
( J,' )

H»)5,lI It indicatcs the number of di.'sCIlls (';; ~t b~ ' each iusticc dur ing
t!JJt period and the Illllllher o( times 11.:.11 the other jmlin;\ Oil t he
Court were ;1:, 0 ill dj ~~<':llt ill the S;JlnC C;)\ CS, D issents ill wh ich only a
single jl1sli~'c p:lTlil'ipatec1 <Ire gi\'CII ill \..lJrc llt l.c5C!', T he [usticcs :uc
arranged in tile I:Jh1c ill such a man ner lhul , so I.r r ;1,\ i ll lc rr d ,tf il ':
ships permit. ( ',it h justice is placed c10~ c,1 lo those \\ itl. \\'1.0111 Ill' til'
scntcr] most O(ICII, and f.Hthe ~t (rum [ll(I~c \I itlI \\ hum he dissented

lC.Jst often.
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~

.,

TH E ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON

I
I

January 12, 1937.

'

-,

(

My dear Mr. President:
So~etime ago I wrote Senator Wagner with
reference to the approaching arguments in the Supreme
Court involving the National Labor- Relations Act.
I suggested that he participated in the argument and
in the preparation of the brief.
For your information,
r enclose here~ith a copy of the letter r have just
received fraQ him.

l'[fl...ile I t.'-J.ought it quite likely that be
might not rrant, to take such an active pert in the
aatter I, nevertheless, felt it was desirable to
submit the suggestion to him.

The President,

The Vfhite House.

"
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UNITSD STATES SENATE

;

Washington, D. C.

Ho~. Homer Cummings
Attorney General
Washington, D. C.

My dear Attorney General:
Tbsnk you for your kind letter of December 31st,
with respect to the approaching arguments :before the Supreme Court
upon the cases involving the National Labor Relations Act.

While i deeply appreciate your offer to have me
participate in the argument, I feel that as a general matter of
governmental policy it is best that the cases should be hancUed by
the law,yers of the Department of JUstice and the National Labor
Relations Board, acting in cooperation.
My general views are
reinforced in this respect by my great confidence in the Depar~ment
of Just ..ce under your wise and discriminating leadership.
And of
course UIY confidence in you extends to the preparation as well as
the presentation of the cases.
With the very best wishes for unqualified success

in the approaching cases involving the ~ational Labor rlelations Act,

cases which I believe fraught with the gravest importance for the
of our democratic institutions, I remein,

pr.~servation

.'

Ver,y

sincerely yours,

<

ROBERT F. ,WAGNER
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DOCUMENT THREE

,

-~ 

"

s:

.1c1¥

-,

6. 1937

"

Dear Joe:

.,
\

~t

was a mpgn'f1cenf. sp68Ch of yours

toda3 on the Court Bi11.

- I eDcl.oBe for your eyBS .onlY. a letter
. to. me f'T'OI!! Harry Hopk:1..ns nth a memorandIrJ .
att.aehed. Would :,ou be good enough to read
.J.t snd .peak nth me about. it at your convenience?

Incldental1¥. this tnvalves. to a certain extent,
the problan of· t.ha ~lQypnmt C8J1.8U8 and I
.au~ to talk wUh iOU about ~~&1eo.

3-,(3 ~

.

'.

s:

-

Let. £rom

l!ARRY

HOP~S.

7

7/1/37,

nth ';"'0. re W;empl~t'll

4'-~¥--C
-.

.
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DOCUMENT FOUR

-

;

/J
-.-,=~-'- /....;

,," ,

...

_.

;.

....

'

"

·So · ~

has b6en Jl]ftdo
.

'.o~ : i: ~b' 'tIhe~ 8J1Y' - sbo-tad. .

-.

.

·

• z;

- ' _

Ilhow 1 t

'

to this and I

.

':lfbe ~deut.. however., .mted. ~
1;0 you ' tmd "t8.lJc: 1;0 you. I!lboa:t.1}; •

to

.
'rne on.ly d188dvan~ about just
. ignoring it  end tha't's wh!l"t it rai;es - is the
. .•. ~&C~ th.e.t he meY later on !!Seke 1 t puhJ.i.e BnC 6f!:Y
tha{ 't:h6 Prest-dent ref'nsed 'to CCIJI,1& out f cr:: ROb tn

BOn.
'.

".

:

\;~:~ '~:~.~'~ '. :-.

)tv

own :.~ :~., about 1 t ie :to find an

. }/..1nM~et repli by··the .Pres1 dent , 88'S1Jig .eame~Dg .

, .:
.:

:':' · .~: publ1 cJ.:y 'thet ·.woald .cOln'8y ;~e .SD.II'W8r. ' .

.

:_• ..., ,:..~ '.', .

~~.~~-' ;::-i~~I{~~~~ ?-:\f: ~~~~9t:{~~;~~ :.; ·i£:~ ~·.'; :t:; (: ~: -:;~~ ;'i:~~:;: ~~;~~ 6~-:- : ::-': . :-~~~ij ~:~ '~
: :; :~ , _ ~: , . -:~_:~::- -: , '
I;.~ ~

.:' .;

;. I -,'IOtl1d l1ke ·'tO .ta1k

::~: ::: . ~ lIhea ·~ . d1scu8S

nth

~ about,lt ', '

the, ..ut=anees :t'ri.p . ' -.

X 2,0 a

~ ~ , ;::-:~ .: : ..

--r
<.

.....

~

-

. ".

"...!.

. .. :-.
.. ..
.~

....

~- ,

,.. '
,

,

•

~ - v

e-

--..

.. . ...
" . .o , '

..

~

,_

:

0

~,

' ;:-. , " , "

~ :::i!-:\:~~~

;

',. "-,:.'~'~»

' -. ' . "

."

•

~' ~:~~: ~ ~::::'. ~'~~ '

' 'to 1ihe "Pres1dettt

_.;:-.' . ...:.. .

"'.: _ ·· : · :'~~~b~' ~~~ ~.' BO~~ ,~
Un! 'ted -sta'teB senau,
· .~~h1ngton t D. C. 

.~

.:

')<...

IllWd

:E:ne.1osu.re
. ...
" Lettc:" of S-S-35...to the Pr-e s , fro~ J. Rosser \Tenable. Ll t t Le
:' . . ~ockJ l.~k~ ·, as1:inG ' t~ e Presiden.t J ~o YOu i a't end t.o e;oc1:)rse
~
.
r -~~" ....
s'>," and st~ t
. .r-.
?obi!l.son
· in _your.'sp ee ch 1:1. your' ·ns. l't
. to c....L~=.u~_
.

i
·o j .

.

.

•

•

'"
: .' . :, ~
..
.'
'
.
. .. .
:: .0 .Lbet
" .. : thl.s
, Q ~ e s t i o n -m-J.s "t t-e

- TIP-:

' .

'

C'''"

0

.
'
-<:o.... ally.
"'-e"'ec b '''' "':l:r e: "". ... e .. - 'M

.- ~ ~ s, " ... :

__

. -

-
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DOCUMENT SIX

- -- ~
I

.

'

?--;J
'; , .. '

-t -.; '/
.:,

'"I "..( " "\('\1\
I

/\

! ."

\

.

KARL L. GAUCK

124a GREENWOOD AVENUE

'4

~~

uf

~ A"<..

.

~ - .e. . .-: -

nov

tv

0,'

TRENTON, N. J.

~J (J ~
.---U.........

.

,

0
:} . -r-,
U. ~ v.

June 8, 1935

President Franklin D.
'Nashington," D. C.

R~oseveltJ

d9a.r President:.

.. You may be ' interested in the follo'.'fing t·a.bu1ati~n,:= ~ .
which is· based on a ·.personal surv'ey ' c onduc t ed : by ." . .
my research or-garu.z a t t.onsdur i.ng the past ten days. '::" ' ,
..

' . J I ..,

~

•

t.' : ; ..

..

. '

•,. _ -

. _.

4

••

~

(males, f'ema Le s , :rar~ers ', ~' ' .
-,business' men, industrialists, e tc , ) were aaked . ~_" '{. ,
(by p e r s on a l int,erview) " the- :f' o l l ow1n6 ques t Lon e. " ":" .: ' "
,
15,479 New Jersey ,v o t e r s

I

180

,

~-~~

- /' ' (" /\
l / 0 ('" 0
C)
My

-

-~ I-~ - ).k....,.......!. ~ :~,.

.£, ~

/V ,

- ----

.

Ar~
~lon

0

in favor of changing the Constitu
he Unlte Sva es in order t.at

President Roosevelt's
effective?

pol~cies

may be

- "

~~de

Should you des ire a f urther breakdovm tabul~tion
(based on vari c~s cl~ssification of voters) I
s c ~ll be glad to ~re f ~re it for you.
S Ln c er-e Ly -yours,

-:
.:

t.
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DOCUMENT SEVEN
REDFEARN & FERRELL
AnORNE YS AND COUNSELORS
9 0 " - 91 1 .....

o

A A ...."' ''"'

au

AT L AW

I LO I .....O

MIAMI, FLORIDA

J( \

February 10; 1937.

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
White Bouse,
Washington, D. C.
My dear Mr. President: ·

1
'.

I have read with delight and profound .
satisfaction your communicat.ion to the
Congress concerning the courts and the
judiciary of the United states.. Wi th charac
teristic courage it grapples with a problem
of Long standing. In a masterly way the plan
and the procedure for remedy:1ng the ill are
presented.. I sincerely hope that the pro
gressive .thought of the country ~ll act
speedily and effec±1vely so that· you may be
assured of the overwhelming support of the
Congress. lI t is my conviction that orderly
constitutional government can not ~ve
:
unless the courts and the judiciary keep abr~t
of economic changes , ) The measure of our da.i.ly
bread depends upon ebonomics. .Men will not
,.
forever be patient with judiciaJ. machinery that _
denies·to ·them the fruits of our 'economic
development • . Democracy in America can be per- 
. petuated OIllY by recognizing tbatDnew. occasions
teach new duties; time makes ancient good. .un
couth; they must upward still~ and onward, who
would keep abreast of truthn. ~aur message
contains no revolutionary suggestion but it does
point out the way for preserving real consti
tutional democracy.

....

,

-2

My father was a Confederate soldier at .
sixteen years or age. I was born and reared
in the South, educated in North Carolina and
at Harvard University; yet these are my con
victlons from twenty-five years of active
practice at· the bar.

Please accept 'my commendations and ad
miration for this last manifestation of your
greatness as a leader.

Very sincerely yours,

R. B. Ferrell .

BBF:O
Copies:

Senator Claude Pepper
Senator Charles O. Andrews
Congressman Mark Wilcox
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DOCUMENT NI NE
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I

COPT

'e'braar7

6, 1931.

c

eme11eD\~ _~ _be p11t

--

.1Jlt .

. the b8~.ot:- tU appropriate
- .

.

~

'm the

-

coaUJ& d.ebate, together

with all tbe other thillgs' ".

suggested t or their use? .

BaDd.wrltten (1nlc) note frca the JD. 2/4/JT
to the Preeiden'\. encl.siug copies of
some ma'\erial prS'rioualy handed to Preslden'
for possible use at Press Conference (a).
full coples of a pa1"\ of tbe foregoing JDatel'ial- _
part1calar1.7 the R-aghe. and Taft quotations (b&b).
Legl.latiTe Hlsto17 ot Act of 1869, iDCludiD«
mention of tbe Bill that paased the Roue. - b'sme4 
on lines simn ar t. tbe WaRe,-nold8 and Grego!7
suggestions, (0) lb::cerpt. from ""&8 the Supreme
Court Packed b,y Pres1den' Grantlll (4). and Yaterial
marked lIpollcra. whieh President J!IUq find helptal
it be eomes to the point ot exp1&1n1ng wb;y the pre- '
9'3Ut plaD 18 the best (e).
~

P.P.F. 1820-f3r first carbon

-'

.

-,
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copy
Nnitrb §tatl"s aiirruit (£ourf of Appeals
Ninth 1rubicial CEitrttit



g,nn !lTrnnrisro. <aalifomill
etlt_mbrra of

J1lUliam lIenman

March"19, 1936.

lItrifrZl Mate-- etirruif Jullge.

Hon• .HOmer Cummings,
' :.At t or n ey General,
" W~~h~ to~ J D • .C.

11y dear

KT. Attorney Gener.. sl;

Re-

Re~e~

denying

Federal

£or .justice

delay~ in ·
courte~

The' suggestions of my .-Review" have to do
only with .tne . civil side of: courts. ' 'While I heve had'but
little experience in criminal cases, my ~1ends among'District

Attorneys advl!e me that the:delays

~

the civil side are

paralleled by those on the criminal side or the courts'
dockets.


. '.-

, .

;-/ ~'~ ~': " -''' -~' ' _ '' ~_:~~~Q~y'_~_~.l ~_:· ine t~t' -"r itb:. ~erY:·ehS.nge of
Ai;Sin1n-tstrs.tion th:ere ·has: ·to~ bE( 'a~ :c:l.en-1l1LgL~se8, ~ or , ';
. -'whi ch · ·juBt1ce·requ1r~s 'to. be .prosecut.ed, ~t7uliwJ:d.d 1i·:·."bY,.;' ;:.___. . . '"
·:d.e l ay , ·t he -criJli1n:a1-.escapes' becauseol"·.'~i:sper81on of' w1~es'eesi' , ' '- 
fading '. memories" · cle st~e t ion" o r . ' lo~.s :of', :r e e1 ev1dence. : . ; ~ , '

of - ; ,

.

_
r-

:

-,

'

'.

:

.

.

.

.

,

.

•

,

I

. The _Depar.tment~.t ~;'st atlst1c ~ -do -.n.o.t " kc~~"

- : .

; . ~.

-

: ;th1-s in .t he" same , 'flay that the ' arres..rages '-9f' : c1v11 ·ca'se~· ·doj . '. _ .
hence ~he 'evil 's ·~ShOuld ·be made.lIian1f'eJit': by aame'.other"'anaiys1s··: , .. .. "

t .• "

.. ·

..

.."

'\

:'

\ f

..
t

'O, :

..

;;," . '

-::... .

.

~.:: ~ ~ ; ....~.; :

::;'" . ... . :

:

i .. ~ •

I ,' :. ! . ' . ~ \ , ' .
:
_. :It . i~ .ot i J.1tt.le ~ ~ :t·gn1f'tcane·e ·"th a't.:·1n - 1;h~ ..
' \t!iousm ds of eriminel -eas ea; D1-str.1et ' Court 8 ~ d±s~ 8e 'of .a s '.
..
· many 'a s are filedlo~ ·The vast nUmber' of .l11ri.or 'cases .and ·those " :'"

. "

t

1n... ..~.. ~h. there .Ls a pl~fl '1).f· -i;u11ty ·~ .~ he ~ , s i¢:r,i.emt f'aets.- ~
. .
..
..'.
. ... .
,-' ..
-,
.
, ,
In the :tmd ecl de'd cases. r~ai.il1ng: 'at: tbeend
.~

of the :ye ar are . those ' :tha t consume the t:1me"'of'-.'tli~ .courts .
because of their greater 1mportanceEnd ·compl . x1 t y of proof.
I.f,· as I pray,' your_.Administration intends to bring the
administrative standar4 of the Feder&l .courte to an appro~a
·t l on 'of 'that· of"our'-1.nauatr1al. genius, I ·.t rus t someon~ like'
J(r. Holtzhotf ,,111 con.bine vi th Kr.' Edgar Hoover ' f'or an
analysi. of the ef1"ect or delay on ~1m1nal just:1ce.

~ . r e~l cert~.,:-th~~ .sueh. '~ -~YS1a will

Tend stUl: greater tprce .' to the .Showin·g of the rie'ed for
-aubs t ant i a.l inereaae in ·Fede r al. .judge"Sh.1ps.

·
'
· .' .', ' :. ' ' .' :
." ' . Very" l'ai tb.1'uJ.ly- ,.our oS ,
.
.
.
. :.. }. : .-..

.
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Se c t i on
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Se ct i on -215
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tl:
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'::o iie of

t~ e

Uni t ",s.. St2. t e s is

t o re r d DS fo110" :3:

2~ 5 •

. ju's ti c e

no v acency ~ h.,~l l b e fill e d c:m ~e(l. b;r the d.e n t~ , re d g:'l~tion

0:'

:-etire::!e:lt of

" c: j u s t i ce , except: t !2e C!:ief Judice, un.l e s s tile fi1.1ir. . ~· o:::.~ ~u ch v ncaacy is

ne ce ss ary

to

!:4~ r. t ci n

t he number-

0:

::1e::b e r s ro t

110t le ~::; -t!~ .:-:.:1

nine ;

or-~· ·

< •

unl e ss;

;justi ces Q2. tbe court ..no hm-e-- "'e~ die c. ·sel~el! t; ;,,-~ ':;..r er!.rs of f!JZf!. .-i s· l si'cer -: :

""
... .,.,... .L'-'.
"'- -

.

)

1=

the 'n~b er

0=

~~mb e ~s

~ ,

of

t~e S~~re~e

.~

-....

-::::

. '

.

Court . i s
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Cour t of th:; Un::' ~ed St::tes

~f'..ll

con s i, ~t
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ju.dice in t?le
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of justices, fo r

no v~c:"=-~ cha.Ll. be filled cauced "b-.f

to

nece s s ~~J
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. not less
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.

the ·n~~b e r
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so
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of te:ip6r~!"'J :"':p:Pointrients

0ourt. ' I :

tt03

e:cc-.~

- ."

to t cl 

nine

'1 8 7

- ,

CO~TT.T

2:SCTIO~l

THE rEVISED DFJ..FT 'If

I"J::.OPOSAL

I

Certain, 22,€m.d!:!cnts in the pr-oposed ciraft are necessary to
ensure that section 1 till ca.rry out the purposes intended.

nent.s ere i.r'Jte:dined in the attached dr-af't.,

':'he s e e:.:end

Ttese rug-ge c'ted amcn dment.s

briefly provide:
(a)
~~es

Tne insertion of the '.70rds -\le.t t.he ti.r:ie of the nomiriatd.on''

it clear that

~1e!"e

is no need for the

a9Poin~ent o~

additional

justices unless justices over 75 still continue on the Court at tte

t~e

the noraina tion is IDE.de.
(b)

The expression nbEs reached the age of seventy-five years"

is used to avoid the ambiguit y in 'the
seventy-five year s ,"

eA~re5sion

"bzs

Das~ed

the age of

It might po ss i bl.y be argued tbat a. justice has not

passed 75 until he becomes 75 2nd a half years or possibly 76.
(c)

The i.r'Jsertion of the

~ords

nfor e~ch cal£~c~r year (~hether .

or not the nom.ination or appointment ac tual.Ly be made in said calendar ye2.r, n

melees it clear that an additiopal appointment sh aLl, not be lost becan se the
. confirmation of the appcdrrtmerrt is delayed or because the nonination is not

actually me-de in the calendar year in which the appointment
ized.

The

nominat~on

\7BS

first author

of an .additional justice might be unavoidably delayed

beyond the calendar yef>,x because the Congress might not be in session or

.

because e justice may only P.,?V"e become 75 in the lest month or t;-:"O of the

caLendar- yer:.:r.

The President should not 00 under the pressure cf haste in

the naking of appodntzaent.s , nor should. the Senate be in

C'..

position to make

en appcdrrtraent; lapse by delaying its confirlile.tion.

(d)

It is Decessery to

n~.e

the

inse~tion

nunless immediately

prior to such death, resignation or retirement from the court,

~e

nU=iter

- 2 
of juctices
nu~ber o~

z-eason ,
~cnt

of

justice

~ho

have

justices

rc ~ched sG~eJty-five ye~rs

~J ~h i ch

of

c~e

is larger than the

the court then exceeds nir-e" for the

follo~in ~

-i thout ::;-<..· ch ("~ualifi" c ati on t he a dv; ::t2.ges secured by the appodrrt-
t~e ~~0ition8l
; ~ ~,

die

l~

justice ffi2.Y be

~ ~onth

For

after his appointGent,

ey.2~ple
~n

no

the 2Qditional

successo~

could De

·a ppoint ed , e1ttca;:n t.he court i"s coapo sed exa c t.Ly as it rras before the a ddi 
tional justice

\72.S

eppointed.

the same calendar year,

a.>J.Q

Or some other justice under 75 may die in

no succes SOl' could be appo'inted, although the

proportion of justices over 75

".~cu1d

then

the appointment of an addi t i on a l justice.

like

~r.

Branceis

shoul~

c.e

as great

Or if a

aie, resign or retire, no

85

it

li~eral

i-i'C.S

prior to

justice over 75

~ccessor

could be ap

podrrted , and the li'"ceral elements on the Court rrou.Ld be weakened.

(e)

It is necessary to pr-ovf.de that "the t.erm 'justice' shall

not L'lclude a justice

~ho

out such Language it may

bas

ret~ed

c·e argued

retired justice is still a justice.

from regular, active service."

~i th-

under the decisions of the Court thE.t a
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::;ti tut b
ex:: ~ct cncy

of

t ~e

of one 8.:;:? oint !.1ent c. :: e C! Z' by

fol1o~in G

:il~i!! .: ~;:c.:-.!1cie s

f act s:

(1)

to the Court

o c cc.sd on ed.

in

~

ye ar

ri;tl have no f u rther

e~rlier

i ;). ce~ t iv e

for

likely to be a ctuat ed b" ir.rculses
/#

'"

-

t he Cou :' t ;--1. 1::" r:.ve be coZJe thf!

e..~ at-sun li l~er:::lien ~nd

0:

r.re f c:r

=.:O!'G

r-evence ,
•

""

.A~:! ~ ill s t!'::,. t;

on. I ~

1I~ <:,.c!-:ed.

cO"J.rt ll -- c e;.-r:!!a.

t hei ~~~ n ~ke it i~~os~ible to ap~oint a successor on the ce~th. resi cnc tio!!
or retire!:.e.."1t of (a) II~ D.d.clition~l justice ll fEY. i'-I o !' (b) Branr.e t s , ~ rtr~o ;>; o ,

L'

.~ !

v.:..

t0o-li::el~;"

s i tuc t l on over t 1!6
t~e

ns

_ .. , 1

\. _ . .. 
~

follo~s:

Liberr>l
:2rE'11c..ei s

Hug~"'l es

P.oo ort5

C ~:,d ozo

~:c?eynol(~z

Stone

Sut h? r1 rmd

Vcr! !)evL'nter I ~ cucce s so r-

Bu t.Le r

\1i th t!:e

libe:rcls a '70:O:-\ :::':J.:;:: DE..j ori t ;r .

lzt to

,-,

, 0':: 0

-

-, ,-, oJ

succe as or or 1la.rl.Ci. t ronal,

3ny one of
~ 't:. s t i c .::

Br2~Geis,

St one, C£:rcQzo. '!c:Il Devan t ez- IS

nunber 1", c.:'e =:. refl i£;!l? or !"etires.

Ur.d.er

the language _,r 0:90 zec.. :li s ~l~.ce could not b e filled. r. :-i o r to J~u~!7 1
and t here ".-i l l be a conservative !:1t?jori t;y on the Court.

SaypOSt no deaths,

Gor..e GT7~ t.:.v e

retire=en~e

or

resi~c~ions hap~en

until

J~u~;

Li'ber~l

Rub~e s

BrE'';l ~ei s

~.~cRe;;..-no l c.s

Ct: rc.o:::o
Stone
VL:'n Dev nn t e r l s ~tcce ~ sor
ecdi t i o il~l jugtice #1

?.ooertc
S<lth -rl~d

? ..ltle r

nddi t i oncl

ju~tic c

#2

1.

.-
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The Court '!:ill then have a -..-or kan g libercl ill2.jority of one.

if either

~

or

t~o

E.ut

of the licerals die, resign or retire tteir places

cannot be filled end the Court goes back either to ba.l.ence or a working
conservatave LDc_jerity because the Cour-t; shrinks back to nine rithout al
lo~ce

fo r the

n~~Qcr

of

still over 75, and no further justices

~ enl~ r s

can be appointed until ::.o_ditional justice

#3

is appodrrted on January 1,

1939.
Even if

:.:1'.

Justice Sut.her'Land should retire dur-Lng 1938 there wou'Ld

tITllS 'L--e no aseurance of a Li,c€c:'::l IU::.j ority durdrig

tb~_t

1938.

It seems very i.:.portant tha_t:
(1)

The Court should r-ea c h its maxiraun liberal strength as (~uick1y

as possiole because the crucial year s for decisions under the New Deal
ere the next h.-o when the stE.tutes passed this yeC!-!' dll be under- adjudi
cation.

(2)

Because of the accusations of

f er public confidence in the I!e':1

be a s \1:i..de

£.5

possible as

Under such

~

circum~tar.ces,

a.

packed Court and the necessity

deci~ions,

the-liberal majorities should

as possible.

it

~oulo

seem that the

A~ strati on l s

- suppor-ter-s in- Congress inte:ioed th£;t the. idea of one new judge 'a yeE.r
for each j ud f;e over 75 should not be
to tbe-normal filling of
retireme~t

vac~~cies

1!l

in

~-,-'bstitutio n

the

for but, adell tioncl.

C~~ ?cca~ione~

by the 6e Qth,

or re8i gnll.J.:icn of 2..ny justice The: .r.er or not ever 75.
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THE: WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

f

February 8, 1937

CONFIDE:ITI AL ;,iE.:JORMm U;d FOR 11i£ PRESIDENT:

Regarding the resolution introduced in the Texas
Stnte Senate today, which denounces your proposal to the
Congress for increased membership in tb.2 Oni te Q St.a tes
Supreme Court, etc., I telephoned -the Vice President this
af'ternoon. Later, with the Vice President's approval, I
telephoned

Gove~or ~~red.

The Governor has just called back to say that he
bas given over his entire afternoon to efforts among the
SteLte Senators, but tha.t the s i, tuation "is bad". He says
the resolution was introduced and drafted by Senators

Holbrook and Small.
Governor Allred says he will- continue to d~ _ all
in his power but he expects the resolution will pass the
Senate by a'<subs te.rrtd af majority when the _v o t e is t.aken
tomorrow.

I heve advised the Vice President~ He and Senator
Sheppard are working tonight, telephoning 'friends in Austin.
The V. P. safd , confiden tially, that Tom COrL'1E.1l.;r
would not give him or Sheppard any help.
It is interesting to note that all but three members
of the Texas Senate are Lawyer-s,

,

i' .- :;:--.
-, \

.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 8,

CONFI DENTIPL

MUJORt~ DU M

FOR THE

PRESID~·IT:

You might know, cefore luncheon tod ~J' that
Hatton Sumners held en "o.ff the recol'c ll conference wi t h
newspapermen this aorning. At tbis conference, he ~as
s ava ge in at-tack upon your proposaL He called it "infamous".
He refused to let bim~elf be quoted.
insisted that tbe conference be lIoff the recoro".

He

One of the newspapermen present just tele
phoned me and said that Sumners gave the proposal "Hell,
sp ecifically and. gener-af Ly ",
This, of course, \', -ill lead the press into
more and w.ore stories ~bout bitter opposition by
Congres~ional leaders, etc.

~Titing

STEPHEN EARLY

:-J c: T

\

::>

r

I
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rk . :
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"ana Spr1ogli. a.org1a
.Decrl>er 1.. 1935

_

j

- ~ .

'

.At the pnnnel recaption to the Supreme~. I
- UdDk the Chief Ju.aUce -pulled a fast one on me..
After he had been t.al.k1~ with me h1!u&11' for un

.mi lmt es be got up.86.1d he thought .ame other-embera
of 'the Court could bu'e a talk wi til 118 8Zld Wilt aerC)88
t.i1e room and ' brought Yt3Re)"DOlda &I1d pl=J,l8d h1.E1 down.
'.IDe Chief Justice has e. aense of m.or tbaagh feY
people real1ze it. ~ God no pbot~ were:

. - .. .P1".• cant~

.

..

_Protenor J'el1.z 1PraDltturter..
. ·1 92 3Jrat t l e Su.et•

...

:

-"

.:.Cambr1Gge•
. ....·laanaebnset
\8.
.

P::'5.
,.

Alice Doer 1I!111er ·e an do • lot of pod.
)c.

t:nb

:
;

"

.

--. - -

-.
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Dear-Georges
!"hs:ve' your 'recent l.ei;ter .suggesting t.h& ,creation''Of', eo rie~ court,

. Tt.t~( ~ liJdted. -f inal ' ]ur1sdiction,.to relieve the:'&1preme;-Court. of_a

porti on :or-its :ri.~··1nc:re&.8ing -labor s . , ~ .. --~.: .. \ -"~_. . . , "" .~ .:
. -<t

~; ..

..

"\

_

_

.

,

•

, . ... It 18 "iIlpo881ble ·"'to ~ sake :--en; ~ eoapar1:eon ..betweeJl .the _work .. of

th([':c(;1L..-t ;~t- the ·-pNMzit· · t.1iie~~·~ i1 ]g69,"'~ -its ~_~p. waa:~~
~

..

.l.

...,.

-

.

•

•

J

•

•



at' m.ne.' ; 'There,'h a.ye ',been: ~ed :changee~~: ,:'the :~ or.~ •.~

.

in ""'1te :·eotrt.rol -ov~ 'the D8.tuN:.&ad -ai-se t¢:,tits :calende.r .
-

berore~t '<mid

Witbout: ~stion, the -court. 8~ burdens have c1.racreued.
t~y ; years'

_

.

o!'

"

~ .1.be .. lAst

"

tl'ie nineteenth 0M1'tm"7 "only about 450.;.ea.aes ~2."e dock£ted

eacli 'jenr• .on the ·aTe..~ge. "'l'h1s grNmsl1y:·.rose during:..:UI.e : periocLprior
.-,..... .

.,.-

-.

..

~

.'

.

.

·t.ij(.1.9 25 1lD'tU ~e " a~ ' was ·.aboIIt 150 '-ca&e& .'~" ~Il ' -theJa.atf"£e.... ¥~
t
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;

.
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•
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~
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....: -
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"liMeii' · .oiil"d· ~eriiae 'hne"i1tne1ot*1. ~ti '189O.:th8~-t..,.,cnzrte
t 9f
.
.
:"~re' e'stib118tied 'tii;·ari· ert"ort":tto·:ft11eYe 'the 8upNae".~ of a

appe&1/

l'Yt":-""

-,.'
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•
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.#- •
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~VJ.-n
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•
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,

_

t'

'

.

.

..
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'-oerta1n '"tJpe!s'~ ca888.

"'"r . . ,. -: ." '"

'~i:if ·CU:screti

~

.-

..

1'ti8 '-COi:Jrt".:~ €'theli ·rgl'ftll. a·~aeNt.iOJlfir1 ~aer to
..

!

'~tl~ec .:JwUc1ary. -:Aat.~Di' :"l.925
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the.:;principle

:
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:rf€.~Jis queit1cine.ble-~o :tie1b.ether, ;.1I1thou.t ~i~t1V!t aid.
the necessity for keepi!l(; abreut of its

~ocket

"

can be

..

'

o

J

sat1afactor~

;.:
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reconed.Led with proper

c0L~idera.tlon

of the . 1n cre.f:~.$ i.ng number of i:&

portant cases t.hich ca.ll for deci£ion by t.l-.ie Su prel!le Court.
Several considerations raise doubts as, to the e.dvisabill t".1 of:
C1"~ting

another court for final di.sposi td.cn

legal issuec:.

0.'"

s;)IIle of

t.~e

fede:ral.

The state courts d821 ;;ith a ride varlet:r of fede.z-G..1

probleuua, and each of t.hecl.rcu..it courts of appeals exercises a jurisc3.iction more or Leas independent of the others.

davelop

co~PIict

in

decl~lons.

I should think it difficult
the

Supr8lll8

to

There . BlUst inevi te.bly

often on questions or first importance.
devise a 6a.ti6fB.Ctory e:r.st~ by lfjic!l

Court could resolve t..l,.e conflicts in sone

ty?6S 0:

cases

and a new cour-t decade thoBe ..hich arise 1n other types of casea,

Es!t&cial.ly is this true in view of

~e

appe.-'""etlt 1JD.possibillty of' seg

regat.1.ng the types of" lit1.gstion in 1drl.c.h .1m.portant l{"llsEtions er-e apt

to develop.

Serious con.st.itutional questions,

moo

&J3

the re-eent

dad.ions under the Soc1.al Security· Act, ot'ten arise in t.heC>Ur8e of

tax

~tigation or,

~8..i.nBt

for another exaaple, in t.he adjudication of cl.a.1sns

the GoYerllJl.ent, .such as the re.fund ftt' proceaaiDg taxes.

gat.1Dn bet.ween cl..tiaens of ·c!:1..ff erent Ste.tes 1e .. field
&S

that o.f

t~6

1.4'" itsel1".

Liti

al..aoat as broad

For the 8Ake of un1.f'orsity,l I feel that eo

tar &·6 poa&lble fine.l decl.S1.on ebou.ld be le!'t 'to 'the SupN&8 Court.

It bas eeeaed to ae that the eolution aust be found through.

-one

or t."O

appro&cl1e~,

or 'through a eQlllb1nation of both.

permit the ~ e Court

eo se.lect

1nto corta1derat1on the l'llblic

One is to

C8.S65

1Ihich it Will h6Sr. tAking

~ee

of the caae J the necea6i.ty

or

reaolYin.: C011-1"l1cts betlfEten inferior cottrt2, and the desirability that

197 .
~.

c:

-3
the Court keep abree.st or its docket.

number of

jUdtr8S

on the C')1..l-....t"

&0

number ~ eases to be considered

The second is to Lncr-ease the

t..h.et it nil be

on thei:::-

of its rif,ht to select . the caees vhich

.~t ~uld

I eannot; but feel that

for a Iftrger

aerits, or ~t Least, tor a

hear,

of hastening decision of constitutional (.u.estions
rle:tt.:~l. ?olicie~.

~o6sible

Ti i

e~cept

~ich

as a neana

involve cavern

th an incrense in the Bize

of mlt.'dng the b:1rden1Dc :m the Court as liJ;ht as poss1.ble, has disad

'Your

interest in the

~tter

is

l!lin~7 ~ t e d..
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f~,r

L~-r-

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 16,

' . 1"'"
.nn
. J:..ARi..Y:

..--...

i:1r. Suydam cal.Led - said Co1urobi€has extended
an invi to. tion to we Solid tor GeneriI to s peak on be Court
~e, Sunday night - t:r. Suydam and :~ . Reid thin..ia ~.
~o~ld be inepproprie.te for him to accept, inasmuch as ~r. !
Reid argues cases before the Court all the time. They Vi ou Ld
like to have your opinion before ecce~ting the refusing this

j0JI

t,j

I) ,

f II
f{ /il-

!~
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"' ~' -: ' ' -. ~ %8al .~~llu·. ·1U -.lhe:

faat-tbat

'too

great- I1tftalnea. in-..d e:.tin1ng· 1ndu8~ tipctl,. - . :
engaged 1n 1:!1'ten'b.te , C~ seems 1;0 present
a riddle no one baa" Je't 801 ved. Tha bea' legal
and C0B&8roial: .lna1Ds . I can ge"- hold. o:r agree- 'ULa" ~
somewha%8 be 'been- 81%ty and n1ne~:rlY8 per oed
of all- COmm8:rce 1&-, 80 ~ed up with d1rect inter
state implicat1ons' that in effect 1 t 1s 1n~ers-,ate_· ,
wi thln--pe%haps an)!' fairly. liberal- In'terpreta:l1oD. ", '
of the rale. . I't 1s \he -d101nai! 1n 'the-:-Schech~:r'
caae op1n1on that 1s ~8~b1ng because. aga1n.
If the · -dictum--i. tollowed',·1n· the- ~:..the - _
Coun .would probably :.t1nd only: ten·. pe%::ced F~ .
actual 'tran8aot l ona to ~ directly in interstate-=
~::roe ,;.
'." ~ -'

-;

?"or' •
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AnybodJ' who 08D lI01"k the thil1g .au"t_a
11 ttl. :taster ''Ulan the ~lft to. ten Y~-l men.~OD .
:. wiU'-.:1"8celD a :-gold'medal~ 'at t~ banda -Of"~ --PreslaenU:~- _'. _ ~. _~'
. -:- .- ,
.. . . _ .
'. . .

.

;~ -

.

.... _.' . :>: .: - 

~ _:-_ ~..-

..

- .

Po

•

•

•

_ _

: -: ~. < . " '.: .. ' -, lleaftPhtl • .'X.'aan-··u 8UWI' J'OU--..-that,;! 8Il
-. bJ.1ntJ.:'to ·look ·a t .~al aDglee 'and · tbat!: 1·~ hOpe
. .... . .' 8011!1a'tb h lg. pzaot1oal',C8Jl ~'" 1fO%:ted- oat. . J'-8It,.~ .~. m1gh'Q. :gl¢;~. :1r%O'Ie:.. ' :.. .... . " . ', - _ .~ .- : :.. .:' _ _ . ,
- -

...

:~ : • • : . -: -: z.

: ~ ~:••; ''''''''• .=. . . :

.:

--... ..__

" e ,1 <15.

.

. :

_

..

_

I .

..

.......

-..:.......

--..

.

.~. \. ...

.-

. -- - .

.

. . . ..

- . ., "'. . ...
.'

,;"

THE WHITE HOUSE

~_ _ . ~

( t: f/.. . )
-,

-

_.

/'

THE WHITE HOUSe:

wASHINGTON

WASH'HGTOH

JanUB.:ry

24, 1936.

MEMORANDUM FOR AAA FILE

(OOPY TO RAY MOLEY)
It has been well said bv a
prominent historian that fifty"years
from now the Supreme Oourt's AAA
deoieion will, in all probability,
be desoribed somewhat as follows:
(1) The deoision virtually
prohibits the President and
the Oongress from the right,
under modern conditione, to
intervene reasonably in the
regulation of nation-wide
oommeroe and nation-wide agri
culture.
(2) The SUpreme Court
arrived at this result by
.. seleoting from several possible
teohniques of oonstitutional
interpretation a speoial
teohnique. The objeotive of
the Oourt's purpose .was to
make reasonableness in passing
legislation a matter to be

-2

settled not by the views of
the eleoted Senate and House
of Representatives and not by
the views of an eleoted
. President but rather by the
private, social philosophY
of a majority of nine appointed
-membexB of the ~preme Court
itself.

I
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I
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\: ~8
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMO

.Wll l

Cardozo in to Tea with me: alone
I

on my desk?
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1937

HEi'; DE:l.1 CASES

DECIDED BY THE

COURT

SOPR~

lIHOT OI11' srI:rurs, Pe.~I' Re fin1ul! Co. v ; Ry&n, 293 U. 8. 3S~.
Held iuvalid, on the bround or delebe~ion of power, $~tio~ 9(c)

1.

~

~etioncl Industr~&l Hecovery ~t, ~thorixin[ L~e 'P r e ui 
~ ~ro~iDit ~1e interst~te tranbpor~tion of oil ?roj~c~~

of the

" dent
in excess of s te..e-i'ixed ouo te s , O?ir.1on &.1 t.'le Chief Just:!.ce.
Dissenting ·opinion by". C&rdozo, J.
~

GOLD CLAUSE CI.SES. h'ormen v , 13u timorc & Ohio Rp.ilroe.d Go.,
S. 240. Held valid the. Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933,
ebrogetin G gold C!Lu6£S, &S a?~lled to obligations issued by
private parties. Opinion~.1 toe Chief JU5tice. Disssttine
opfnf.on by ~yno1dsJ J _, in ..hicn Vsn Devl:L'lte::-, 6utht:rle.n:::l. c.nd
BuUe-r, JJ., joined.

2.

u.

Stete~,

Nort7. v. united

u. s.

294

317.

Held.
~tr.b

tln.t the orders e.nd re£Ulction::; pur-euaa t to the Ene r gency

Act of 1933, requi5itio~ine Eolci. certific.a.~s in exchange for
LaguL tender currency of equi,",alent .1."l1ce -amount, llIere ·velic.
-Opini on by ~~e Chief' Justice •. Dissent _~B ;-in ·the.No~an case,
· .~uorQ .
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application -to ~Qo..,.ernm8n t ro:ll~,S. : ~t- ··t.hat. the-oolderB ·o f such .-.\ ..
,..
."
bonds .ere :r.ot- . er.ti tled to recover in t.h.e·o'Court of Clii1.m.s BIO:"B
... " t._~:, ':than '
face amount there~r. ~ • Op1n1on'::by .the Cb.lef J"ustice.
: f, . ~eptU-a te concu rring opinion by .§t~ne. J :J • :::-J!.1 88-en t ...15 in" , the t~o
. ., . .
.. '
·,r . ~ . . ('Z0.' ·d . ~l : ."F;'.{ - .' 1..' -~ ;... , .
"
,'{ -p r e cedin g - Cbaes.
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' -~ ,- Pe!TV" :Y " ;·U!'l.!t ~d·~.st&te8>::294 u, s• . 330. Held
that the Joint . Resolutloo. oC' June"5;\ 1933.. was 'inv£.l i d ~'it~
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!. Holyoke ~&. tar PO\ler Co.· ~ ~v• .: AllIericnn ltri. tir.t.
. _ ,
paper Co., decided Jie.rch 1) .1937. -. Uel d tbat.:t..he-Joint -Rasolution":::' ·
is .a pplic 6.b l e 1,0 monE!)" cont.racts p6.Y6.ble in gold hal.H.on·.a.s wall
as 'to contracts ~Yfiblc in gale. coin. Op1.n.ion by Cardozo) J. ::'utherlc ••c ,
'Va n ~vanter, LtcReyno1de and BuUer, -.1J., . di.aeent.ed rl thout opinion.
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3.

RAILP~~D P£!IP~~~T

ACT.

R~1lroed Ret~rement

B~a~

v.

Alto~

Railroad Co., 295 o. .s. 330. Held inv&lid, under the cocmerce
and due process c Laueea oC i the .Constitution, a 6Utu~..e pro",idir. :::
for pensf.one for superannUllt.9~ rE.ilroac. eJ!ployee:s. Opinion b:;
.»
Roberts, J. Dissentine opinion by the Cm.ef· JU6tice, in which
br~eisJ Stone and Ckrdo~~;:JJ_, joined.
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204
"

N. R. 1.. Ooited ~·t.r". ~ ;, v , Schp.chtf-r Poult!""~ Gorp., 295 u. S.
495. Held tne code-::Jt;tini~ pr-ovf.e i.ous of -:..c£.: H. 1. H• .A. invt:lid /
on t ": le uoun::i of dclep,t.i.ol~ o~ p ~'r.e:r t.~1 :i ,:lso .. i..S tip;:,lied to t.:16
poultry dec.Ler-s invol..ed in tile usc, on tOe Lro~d of h .ck of
povcr undc r the coerne r-cc elf' usc. Opi:1ion b:,r the C!1icf Justice.
t:.6 p,,-I't.. '"e co acurr i.nr c?ir.ion b:, C~4do1.o I .r., in which Stone I J.,
~oined. Ko di~~~ nt.
t:

J.

~
r..•

U;:::.te:.
" " l .::«:»..... t
.~o'l ~
., 1'"
e :::o
v • .;;J'J.~ler,
-<-/
...:. o,. , 1 • lie
a 1.;-n·... "... l.. d /
U)6 J.Gl'iculturlol j-dj us U::€".nt s.c: t on the f-'I"ouni ~h(. t i t refUlt. ted.
k• •

•I ;.

t.er s r-e se rved to t h t> S~t'ltes b"<j tile T r.; n~h .J..Qe!t::l;J.!c:"":t. Opinion
J. Di6t-€ ;itin l~ opinion t.j' o toue , J., Ln ~iic ;--, brc.n
<ici ~ end Ce.r-doz.o, JJ •• joined.

Cll.. t

. "b y l'..obert~,

Hickert ~~ee ~~11~ ~. fo"tenot, 297 U. S. 110. "H~ld,
on t,!-,(: eu tncr Lty u :: tl.e B~tl~"!"" ce se , &u:"}ru, t :: <.;t A. l.; i ; ~xeB
pe Ld into cour t, ehour.d "r) 5 r-e tur-ned to the tE.x;kyer e.r:~ ~le col
Lee tor- enjoined [ro:'1 []t.J:.in!; eollec~ion. O?inion by Roberts, J.
tic ~~esent.

c.

T. V. L
r.::. h .. ~;: d (·r v , Te !"'.nct:.::.ee V~llev il.uworit:r, 297 U. S. 2S:;;.
nl:ld vl::.lid L.h e 'I'euae s sec \·c.lle.y Luthori ty ",-ct as 6.;>?lied to the
~~1c of ~oy.~r produced
fit WilBon DaQ. Opinion Qy tile C~ief Jus
tice. Sep~~6te concur!"'ir.g opinion ~' lirenneis, J., in ~h1ch
Stone, koberts c~d C~rdozo, JJ., joined, to ~~e effect ~.ut tr.c
co:llt>la.ininr, etockho1der hed no s~din[: to chf:.lle:l[e the trE:.:ls
6ction. Di66entio& o?i~1on by ~eynoldG, J.

7.

SLCtrrUTIES ACT 0: 193.3. Jonee v , Securit.i~s ~d r.::o:c!"ulnCf: Co:r.
c1ssion, 29~ U. S. 1. Held tnct the Co~iz~ion he~ icproperly
refused to permit "the ntildre.tttll. of" t.::te rebistration atb.L.elllent
6.nd therefore hf:.d no poe er to continue ~1 t.h a s top order proee~d
ing. The vel1c.ity of the atLtute VHS not pe.ased upon. O?1.nion
by Sutherlhnd, J. Dissenting opinion by Carooao, J., in tihich
Brendei6 hDd ~tone, JJ., joined.

8.

BI"tOCrllO~S COi.L COt\SERYLTIOr; I.CT
v , Ce.rber Co,~l Co. J 298 U. S.. 2)G.

or

1935 (Guffey J.ct). C~Tt.e!"
.i:ield thb. t Congra~s. 13 wi t,h
out po~er under ~"'e eomro~rce claU6e to subject the ?roducer~ of
bitunin~l5 co~l to the reF,Ul~tion of ~hees ana hou~~ of e~?loy~es.
The price ?rOViBio~5 .ere not p656ed upon. Opinion "~- &u~lerld~~,
J. DiBt:iSntinc; op i.nf.on b:,' t:"\e enief Justice, to the effect Ulet
~"'e price ?rovision~ hrc vblid and h~ce 6dherencc to v c~~e mcy
oo required. Separl:te di6~er;tic{; op1nioo by ~rdozo, J., in y-hich
Br'ande Ls end Stone, JJ., joined, &I:reeicr. v-itb t~le CnLe f JU6tice
a..nd addinG ~~:, t the Y:llg,e and hour provisions "were pre~ tu.rely
at.Utcked.
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United ~Utee v ; Curtiss-r.'rir,bt 1:.xport C~rpantion.
decided December 21, 1930. HGld v£lid the Joint ~ebolution of U~y
2.8, 1934, and 'tllC Pres Ldentd.a L Proclt..mation pureuan t t::ercto protint; the expo t, of ar-es t-a Df: tlOX:;5 e~L:j:cd
~rcll:3o
t
iu the Cne.co , Opinion by butbcrl~ndJ J.
W.c.b.eynolce; J., da as errted
.. i t.hout opinion.

i.11.::tS EU.BARGO.

h i

b i

r

i n

Q72Z& SUPrt£tE

C~Onr

c o n f L i , c

DZClcIONS

IiiVG~nHG

lliPJP.1'Lr;T C0ltSr-:.£ESI01U..L .tHD
EXECUTIVE ACTIO~ SINCE ~Cn 4, 1933.

1.

2.

-3..

PRESIDEliTIS REUJVA~ PO~EFL. ~-~i'hrp.y'~ Ex~c~tor v. Unite d
~te.tesJ 295 11. s. 602. ll~ld inve.lid, on. toe (;rot:.n:i of sepe.:e:t.ion
of po.~rs. ~~~ ?resi~entls rc~ov&l of ~ me~Oer of t~la Federl~
Trude Cocmiesion 00 grounds not ~p8cified in the Fe~6r~ Trado
CQmmis~ioa Act.
Opinion by Suther1Lnd, J. ~o diS5~nt.
FiU.ZIl:;R-r.~.KI:

keT. 1.ouiov.ille J'oict Sto~k knd B~!'"d. v , Rbc.ford.
<95 3. $. 555. ~eld inV&li6, 00 ~e (;round of ~bitr~1 inter
ference T:ith the riGhts of taQrt(;tigees, 'the .ftU"IR b8.n£ru.pt.cy sct ,
Opinion by En..ndeis, J.. Ru di£>s£nt.

LrolC!CIPJ.l.

ECH~t.'?TCY

2~ov~~~nt

Di6trict, 298 U.

l.eT.

bCl.
lleld invalid, on the &round

.Ashton v .. CUQerou- ~ou.ntv t;·flter

s.

513.

of in'\"G.sion of po T.e=-s reserved to the StR teE>. the mur-.iclp!:.l
~~ptcy &ct.
Opinion qy Ycaeynoldo, J. Di&scotiuG opinion
by Ce.rd0:40, J., 1l'J. 'Chich ~he Chief JuaUce, BrAlldf::16 and Stone,
JJ. J joined..

4.

ASm:r'nS'!'-StoolERS CONV!CT-~J.DE G'.)()DS J.CT.

Co. v.

Illinoi~ Ctnt~r-} HL ~lro~d

Co.,

JanUArJr 4, 1937.

vbl:'~

TRAKS~j: DF SHIPPING iYJ:.P.D FU~~C'f!J~D..

, .I

[ec"';lck\.· ¥.bip &:. Col1l..r

deciQ~d

t.":.e t.c t ?roaibi tine; t.he: in ter8u t-e trans PO=-Ul tion of
)convict-m~dc f.00~5 irt~ Stc.tes ,,-hE:re tll~ DUe of such eOOd3 if;
unlc.'ll'fcJ.. Opinion bj. the Chief J"uctica. No disaeut.
Held

5.

"

,

....

:6brl;:.r:ctscu-:':olhr Co ..

v : United St~lte6, decided Februe.z-y 1. 1937. h£old Mbt. t.~e trlJlIi
fer o~ the f~nctiona of the Shlp?iuG DOcrd to ~e Sec=-e~ of
Co.ce~·cc

by' Ex('cu ti ve Order r.£e er!"~c"li 't'«:"

in Yie1l' of eubscquen t
rt:..tificE.tio::l of such. trenBfer by the 6lerchent )iill.rine iLct of 1936.
the Court fo'~u it ~~ecee5~ry to cC~6idp.r the T~lid~~ of the
tr~nsfer unner thc oricinfil Oraer £lone.
Opinion by koberts, J.
No diSS8::1.t.
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Washington Minimun Wage case

(~e8t

COast Hotel Co,

the Supreme Court at long last has upheld state mn:'::;Ui!1

../ '
~e legislation
,

for women and has reversed the position that it had

taken in the Uew York minimum

trB.o&e

case (Morehead. y. Tipalc.o)
-

June and the District of , Columbia case (Arlkins v. ChiLdren's
fourteen years 'ago .

last
HOsDita~)

Those who have accUsed President P.oo~evelt of

seeking to amend the Coostitution must now admit that the Supreme
Court itself has in effect amended the Constitution.

And this judi

ciaJ. amend.lIlent of the Constitution was brought about by a shift in the
vote of a single justice~ because the Court in the Washington case di
Constitutio~

vided 5 to 4• . So it happens that the

on Mondiy, March 29,

1937, does no t mean the same thing tha t i t meant on Mondey, June 1.

1936.

For on Monday, June 1, 1936. the Court stated:
Utbe decision (the Adkins decision in
reasoning upon which it rests clearly
State is without power by any form of
prohibit, ehs.nge or nul.lify contracts
ployers and adult women workers as to
wages to be . paid. n

1923) and the
show that the
le~slation

to

between em
the amount of

.

,

"

"

And on llonday. '.Jlarch 2~. 1937. •the Ccurt ,de cl ared that the' .Adk:i.ns
,

."

.

..'

. .

decision is no , longer the law of the land.
,

.

,

Of course, the Chief Justiee
'wbo 'spoke for a .majority of
,
the 'Court in the, Washington

case might be.ve explained 't hat the change of

heart was d.ue to the fact thet both th ~ Democratic and R~liee.n pa.rtie~
vigorously dissented from the interpretation given by the Court to

the Constitution in the

~orehead

case on June 1 and that the election

returns in November had conclusively de::lonstrated that the people of
the United States were not

prepa~ed

to accept the Court's narrow inter
:

pretation of the Constitution.
/

'r
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The Chief Justice, however,

w~s

someuhat disingenious in

explaining why some member-s of the Court had c.etermined to yield tbeir
own personal economic predilections to a higher law of political ex
pediency.

The Chief Justice stated:

"the Court (in the Morehead case) considered that the
only question before it was whether the Adkins case

was distinguisheble end that reconsideretion of that de
cision had not been sought. Upon that point the Court
said: I the petition for the writ sought review upon the
ground that this case (Morehead) is distinguishable from
that one (Adkins). No application has been made for re
consideration of the constitutional question there decided.
The validity of the principles upon which that decision
rests is not chaf l.enged., This court con£ines itself to
the ground upon which the writ was asked or granted • • •
Here the review granted was no broader than that sought
by the petitioner. •• He is not entitled and does not
ask to be heard upon the q~estion whether the AdYJns case
should be overruled l " .
It is very strange, however, that the Chief Justice did
not choose to erplain why the Court had refused to entertain a peti

tion for rehearing in the Morehead case, wbicll was made not only by
~he

state of New York whose statute was 1nm:Iedie.tely

1nv~lved

but by

the state of Illinois whose statute was necessarily effected by the
Morehead decision.

The petitions of both states begged the Court not

to permit the rights of millions .of working women to be jeopardized and
obscured by legal technicalities.

The petition for rehearing by the

ste.te of New York ste.ted:

v

UO n a constitutional issue of such importance, the
decision of' this Court should not be left obscured by
possible doubts on principles essential to the legal
rights and welfere of millions of citizens. In the
light of the quoted excerpts from the petition from the
writ of certioreri which this Court granted; in the
light of the fact ~h~t four members of this Court sought
to have the issues thus })resented determined, . it is
earnestly urged on the Court that the ap!J8.rently· re
stricted basis of the Court's opinion be ~nlarged to
cover the truly vital issues 'presented.

208
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UBecause of the importance of the Lssues herein,
whatever be the ultimate deternination of this Court,
there sbould be a finality to its decision on the
principles of constitutional law involved. It sbould
be free of possible misconstruction by reason of pro
cedural technicalities.
'
nThe New York statute at issue was fremed with a
zealous regard for private rights and with a .deep re
spect for the decisions of this Court as found in
prior cases. The New York Court of Appeals certified
that 1 ts decision ~ based upon the A.d.kins case.
Surely, before such statute is finally struct down, a
deliberate end full reconsideration should be given of
the issues on the merits, and a decision reached that
will leave no doubt ",bere the WBY lies and wbere action
by legislation may or may not tread.
UWherefore, on the foregoing grounds it is respect
fully urged that this petition for a rehearing be granted
and that the judgment, on such reconsideration, be re
versed.. II
The petition in support of rehearing by the state of, Illi
nois stated:
"When the immediat'e ' welfare of millions of American
working women end the constitutional powers ' of the
~tates of the Union are at stake, it seems imperative
that there be nd;-even the remotest ambiguity ' as to
the scope of a decision of this Court. • ••

"The prevailing opinion in this cause was expressl$
based upon a supposition that the State of New York had
not asked this Ccmrt to reconsider the constitutional
questions decided in Adkjns v. Children's Hospital.
261 U. S. 525, and that the validity of the principles
upon which the Agkins decision rested were not challenged.

, In its petition fOT rehearing the 'State of New York has
clearly indicated that it desires 'this Court to recon
sider the Ad,lri ns ease and the principles therein de
clared end to review all const! tutional issues involved
. in the ins taut proceeding wi thout lim! tattOD or re~
. striction. No technical. obste.cle now stands I-n the w2J3 of
such a reconsideration.
uThe State of Illinois is not unmindful of the proper
regard which must be given to orderly appellate proced
ure, But the decision of this Court in this case does
, not merely discharge the relator, Tipaldo, from custody.
Although it does not technically affect the validity of
the legislation of Illinois and other states, the decision

/ "

209
~

I

. •

will unques t i onab.Ly obstruct t2:l.e en:forcemmt of minimum
wage legi slation throughout the union until such ti.I!1e as
this Court autho!"itativel:r restates the principles d..e
clared in the Adkins case and detenninea their applica
tion to existing l~slat!on. AS a practic~ netter,
the Tip?1do deci sian e.f.fe ct s the interests and the wel
fare of millions who ere not familiar wi. th the niceties
of Legal. procedures. Four members of this Court were of
the O'Pinion th.e.t no procedural difficulty stood in the
way of a clear-cut decision on the merits. Cert~nly it
1s now within the 'Dower of this Court without viole!lce
to the req.uirement-;' of ord.erly ~ellate procedur-e to
. consider the substantive constitutional issues.··*
"Whatever may be the ultimate decision of this_Court,
the issues involving the const:Ltutional rights of the
states and welfare of millions of their ci ti zens are too
s1gni£1cant end momentous to be decided with ap'p8-~nt fi
nality withoat fill consideration of the merits."
Thus after twenty years of unabated struggle, miD.i.I!ro!n wage

legislation 1s for the first time susteined by the
bare majority vote.

Supre!!1~

Com by a

Four members of the Court still insist tt];>On put

ting en interpretation upon the words "due process" end "equal protec
tion of the law", with 'lVhich not one lawyer in a. hundred end not one
citizen in a thousmd ·would agree.

Only by the vacillating vote of a

single justice was the ~.onst1tution.al. right of the state leg! slatures

reinstated after what seemed to be a

hopel~ss st~e--to

"J u s t i c e Holmes- to educate the Justices "in the obvious ll •
:

~ne

Four out of

'
I

the

pe.rllphrase

.

Justices have dramatically reveal:ed that they still .entertain

e. vier. of the Constitution strikingly at variance with that of Chief
Justice l!ershall and the FoUnding Fathers because the view o:f the four
dissenting judges would obviously cake it imoossible for the Constituti01
"to endure for ages to come and to be ailapte.ble to the various crises of

human events."

Unless the :present personnel of the Court is enlarged.

fSVery new and debatable constitutional issue will come before the Court

,"

210
"
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rn. th

four Justices defi.nitely hostile to errr theory which would

pe~t

the Constitution to be enopted

t~

the needs of the time.

If there should be any difference eQong any one of tbe five Justices
whose ' minds are at ell open regarding the

~p11 calliE ty

of the Con

sti tution to new problems - the efforts of the leglsletures, state
or federel t to meet those problems will be nullified.

It is intolera.ble

that in this period of ·s oci al and. economic change the ~tability of

the Constit;ution end the ocntiJroi ty of legal gr'owth should rest·-up on
the vacillating judgi;lent arid human frailty of a single Justice.
The history o:f miniMum wage legislation bei'ora the Supreme
Court has shown. that it is perfectly futile to attempt to avoid the

rigors of the decisions of the Court which are determined: by the

.

Economic viel';"s or prejudices of the Justices by improved draftmnan
The New York Mi~ We6e statute was drafted with the gree.te~;'t

ship.

.

,

care. end competency to meet the objections speci:fically raised by·
the

Co~

in the Idp r.s Cese.

And

~ef'

Justice H-aghes. di ssenti:lg ·i n
"

the )(grehee4 case, expressly took note of "1 ts (the HeW York Sta.tutes)
. provisions for cerefuJ. end deliberate procedure"

end found that

"

J

the

1

,

~

.

"

New York statute was free of the feature so stro~ly denounced in the

Ada ns

case.

Yet the majority struck down. the caref'u1.ly clr81\'D. statute in

the llQrehead case

m. th

even E;1'eater ala.cri ty than it struck doTnl t:!le

statute in the Adkins case.

And then in the Washjngton case it reverses
.

,

i teelf end sustains e statute which ' contains the very feature which, more

than SIJ.Y other, -- the co·urt

sta~ed

statute as erbi trary end invalid.

in the Adkins case- stamped the

Economic predilections do not yield

to skil+ed draftsmanship. althoug!::l sometimes they yield to political
~ediency.

.,

HG ~.I1 ~ 'CtH !'-:2..:,:
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co.:.."', L:::.;T l iU- ;

1'0 'be ~ l d rl in ,:5'.:'h I C'l' C0 ~ ':.:-' ID.::;l';CE
110 p or tio n , :;ynq .:: :'3 ) or i ll ·; :,!"'::-ti on to b e
jlu c lish cd or Gi v er: (.; '.l:' u rrt i L t ~(2 '2 .Ul D ,G o f t ne
? .:'c s i d. en t I s :: (· s ~ ;~l:',r; !~ '-l :') "u e f .1l:1 i II t he '::>cHe t e or
<If.')

t he 1:0' \ Z e 01' lZ£;)j:c: :; t:n ~ :.: t. ~ v e s .
::::- :-' ~ (': :le c a r-e ::11, s t.
be e :( ~ ~.-- c :' ; . ·; :", tJ ~vo i ·~ ·~ , .:.· e : ~.c.:, t 1"l1 ~ ·l · ~ i (. f .

t ~ r ; J · e for~
~ i o n.

I have r'c cen t Ly c 'i l l ;,. ' t h e c. t ·,; e:;t ~ o,:1 of t h e Co.. gr'e s s
to '.. : '.~ cl e a r ne cd fo~: :::. cO I.' ":l J' e·i.e n') ~_ve r-r o :: ::- ~l'~ to :r ~ .:>r;::ani z e
th f~ c:: -;. :in i s t r ut : v e J • • L ch i :~ez-y 0:: t he Ex e cut i ve Br'<1n c h o f our
Co\" ..: : -n.:-:-:c n t.
I now ma ke a s i~ r; i ::" ;):- ::-eco;:1.UI'l :r:da t io n 1.0 t ;:e
CO."1 r',:-e s s i n regard t c t he Juc i.. ,: ::;,1 D r:, !'. c ~ l of t, e Gov c :!:n...e nt J
in or:ier t ha t i t also ma v f''J::(;Uon in. ac co rd 'l i t h mod e rn
necessities ,
T!:C' Con s t rt :..t ':'o n p r c v i d e s th ~t t.rie Pr-e s id ent .r ~ h <:.. ll
r rom t Irte t o t i re g i vr:: t o the Congr e s s i 1~fO : 7:: a +;i. o n of t he
St ~: -,; '3 0:1.' t h e Un i on , ar.d r CC01:':'1" id "'v o ~ L e ir c ons i d era t t on su ch
mea sur e s a s he sr.211 j :d g c n C C€; S S Ii ' J a d exp ed Lerrt , It
!Jo on e
e i s s is g i 'l e n a s i ."1:1Rl' rr.2ndG-t,?
It i s t ~1 sr e:-o ;- ' t h e d :ty of
t~,~ Pi-e s i d errt t o adv i sc t~~ Cong z-es s i n r c ~rd to t h e J ud t c i a r'y
·,:~ e r. (.v cr
dee::1S s uc h i nf'
or r l?cc ::-crenc :.:~ ti o n
n e

o

r n a

t I o n

n o

c

e

s s a r - y .

I ~G d ::..' c s s yo u for t h e f ur t h('r r-e a son t;w.t t ~. e
Co _s tit ut i cn ve s t s in t ~ e Cong r ess dire ct rc spon3~ bi l i t:r in
t h e c r e ati on o f co ur t s ar d j ud i c LaL off i c e s u :-.":' i n the
ror m lat i o n. of ru Le s 0:- p r a c t i.co a nd p ro cedur-e ,
Ii; i.3)
t h 0 r~fore, o ne of t~ e d ef in i t e dut irs of tee Con g r ess con
s'tant Ly to m~ i nt L i :1 t he e f fe c t i v e :'u:lctioning of t he Fed e rc L
.Tue ac i arv ,
.

Tn e J UG i c i a :' y -h a s oft en fOlL'1G i tS 6 1f hand i c a pped
p e .rso nn el, ~ it :. wh i ch to rne e t a g r o\';i!',[; a nd

j L sUl~.::' i cie n t

by

c02?l cx b U5i ne s s.
It ~ 3 true t~at the ~hys icai ruc~l itie~
of co nduct rng t.n c bu s me s s 0 :1' ti e courts hav e bee n e :' 0~·:'ly
ic~~ov e d, in r e c errt year-s , t hr ough t he e r-e c't i on of su rt cbl,e
qua rt ers, t h e p r ov i s i on of c d e qu a t e Li br-ar i e s and th e a c d i ~ ion
of su.bord ~ nat e c ourt o f ficer s.
But in ~a ~y ~ay ~ the s e ~ e
T.le:'c,ly t ae t r a pp i n g s
jud ic i a L of fice.
They playa i nor
part in t he proc e s s e s 0.::' justice.

mo ~ e

o f

n

S i nce t h e e n :'l i e s 't c ays of t: o P epub I i c , tnc prob.l.em
of the 1)0r s0:1:1el o f t :-l e co ur t s r.a s n eeded t :18 a t t en t i cn c::'
t . Car-gress. Fo ex,~"';l pl e ,
t ne b eg i n n i n g , over
ed
pr ute st s t o Pr e ai.dcrrt \;,::l. sh~ngt o r. , th e us t Lce s o r' c he St.::;::-el"!e
c our-t we re r-ccu i r -od t o "r i d. e c ircu i t " [.:10 , as Ci ::- cu.it Ju s't i c e s ,
to h o l d tri(', l~' t.hr-ou gh ou t -::. ~c.l'~th ?'1Q 'bre2c:t. h of the Lard -- :'.
:Jrn ct i ce ;';~ i ch end ur ed over a ce nt ~ ,;:,y.
e

r

f r o 7

r - a p

e a ' t

212

~ii

~~l(.:"\..:f'jrr,. t!~:lt Lilt: nccccc.l ty of
rli1''-··J~ ~!· ~·r'-=~'~1t. <- t·r"::, ·s4. : ·\n ... :-:tc:~( :~ ~ .) ~~:L : ": :"' : ~ t ~ ~ ;:' :-' ~. : : : ; ~ ,:!

It. :h.:'..:::l:; c Li .ar

1/1/

L!Ju

,.'

,.r

...

. ' : : ' )1 ' 01':

i. Ly ur 1·1 L L':'(: J

I

'J ' ~ ;- :l l

(;.)\11'1.: '. •

A par t; of the l)! . ~ l c;:) cf ()bt<~ini:1g 11. sufficicnt
nunbe r of j nd r;t:s tv c. :LS pO ~ c f casu; Ls tn ; capaci, ty cf the
j u dr;~s t~l:;:}s·~l Vl15 • Tili5 'to!'i n f;s I'o r-'.. CJ.ri:~ thG quca t i on of C.gCcl
or infir:J jude::::; - a .swj ··et of dcl.Lcacy ~·)(1 y ct, one r.hich
requi r es I'r-ank d:i. scussi on .
I I I [,1; 1: i\.L; ~::'<Ll <':·JU;· ~.:"; Luc rr. "}'( ir. :.ul -;:' :'7 life
T·: :~nf,j-r.i.vc 01 1.1: t.::-; en..: no"..
i~ -~ l d by j uj g e s ever ccvcr- to" yc« r s o r :J i:0. :~r'.(~ cliCib Lo to
18ave U:c :> e n \';~1 on ful l pav ,
Ot·i:).Tl <:.lly uo I cns i on 01:'
tm ;'JI'(;

pLr; ~ il..\ l (: l.t ';u (h ;('~: -,:iT)~.

r oti'(~i :Il;;r.t ll.l.la',-,,:j"H:<? \';D~ ,-)':"(JViued 0:.' t.~1C (:UJ) .' ;I 'C:3:;.

r:n-=D

ai't.e r e il:: ll:.j· y r:: :,!';:, of our : '.TJ t!..o~~l !li:.;::'orJ V :P. C:Or.(; ·I·CS~ ; ::i.l~C
jlru\'i::;iorl f o r pen .ri.ons , it f'ound a •.:r:l~ . - C1" l trcnc r.ru t:'~ ::i t.i on
a~Ctng j Uci g8:3 to c13.n i{ to the-it' pon t s , in many Lns t un ce s f :ll:
oy
yP. .r of j):l:·...:i.e:,l or ::; · : ~ : t "l c ~: p : :c:i~y.
~ul~d.cs v:t:::'c; smat.L.
,\5 I'li ch l>th E: l' r.:C:1, ~·():;L' \) l l :" ibU. i. "'.:.i(':>
and o:ili c a t .':.on 3 acc uaul.a tc d ,
~ o a l, t!-: r:la t.2, v c } ::..d c ecn open
t.o thL:~ n <::r.CCj>t. Lo <l. t ~pm t ) t to perfor'::1 Lhl~ :-dut~ ~:s of t ! 8i.J.'
o:·fi~l.;~ t o Lhe VCl J 8dg e 01' tile grevt»,

b

o n d

t

h e i

r

in

s

T

r;~~ <:~ ~ )Ll."lll ul.. C.').:"'C:;,

or c our s e ,

j \ ~ r: (: ;.;,

h

o

i

. r

l i y..~

o Lne r .nen , r o t.a i n to !..:: :.1(:':; ll :ccd .!~ ~~ f'ul.L ::1(';l t nl an d ~ i ' y s i c a l

'Jicor. '~ h o:3e :-~ Q t so J'o :.. t.: J:i i i.t·,:; "''tl.' otLon :;.. eb Lc t.o pc r c c ivc
thc;ir ov.n il lfi.r::-:i. ci (;s . 1:-t':il7/ ~; e t:!J1 t o he t" : t;H;io' l:; 1)[ ~i e
bilpc;.:1rmll.,;E: of t:. d 2 Itu::.e~'. u 'i n'.. ; "Jal\~ n t : l l "Y r( .: ~i! ~(; l il G ~lt :!.Lr.'; of
.1·L.l\:'L
:- r.. .. _cr'o r c
0' ',!
,L
r, - .. . . ~1",., ·' t
l \,.r~ r; o:J p rov
.... .. i.d
_\J. ed
.. u,
....~ c. \ '..... so
oJe v Lul.L
v _o:
L.1I':' , s t i L l, i .:. I'o r cc , ~~n~ no t, ~) :'0v (; d e: f 1 <.: Ct i v c j:l i nJ ::c i r:g
u.g~d ~ut.lC{;:$ to rc :ir~ on a f ,G1Si;)\},
\"oj

. '

,

......

l-'<"~l.

~l .

I .. .......

'!':I"i S rl;:::; l.llt h ud been fG,(. ~ nL ii i:l Lt ~~ doba t.es
the r. , e a ~ : n t' C V;::S be:ir:::. cons i dcr cl . It :":1;' t:-,c-n p r o poa c d
t~l:lt wl: €.n a ~ul " I; e re f':... :;(;tl t o r.:ti::-e ~ !)O;; rc;:· c:: d.r ~ t~ 10 ar-e
of sevcn ry , a n Lld d i t1 .G :~:U. j u dge G; -,o :.J ::" (·~ h r: <.:.j x .r i. n ~ r.. G. "..0 :>..s.; ~ l..it.

\':~(;r.

in ~h ~ "': \.'rk o f

out

17U,::;

t!'I(; C;lurt. Th e pror--.':'::iul p a s :::: .::d.
cli;:li:w.t.e d. in t.!'l': 3m::lt.l:,

LjH~

ii,)usc

":i th t:'c o pc::nir_~: of the L ·;.~:lt,ic::t~: cC:""I1..,urJ, or:d t he
i nerc :> f.r:: of rl ') rJ ul a~ i l ) ; ~ 3.J~d c C'':l ',;r, r (; c, ,.:.d tlH~ ~~C·I; t:-t of
a r.lcrl"l cOi.lp l (;:;( 1.:1 :>(: of l i t..i_i.; u t i o l1 , :, i ;, .il tlr" r- l ' o J: n ::; ['~ .3 -I:e , (:
i n t roduc _ci ~n t(l ':'. C o n g r~ ~; ". To Jj (; (,;t, t; l ~: ~ i -L:HJ. t i l ) J: , i ;- 1 9 13 ,
J.914 , l U15 :.md. l ',!':'o , t h e i\~t c!'n €:;s ~;.; nc :" .Jl t. h t: l~ in ~ ::.'f iec
r cc.:oi:-::,:C:l,licu. t o i;: i C Cong=-r';;3 t h n t. Ff: €:1 a d i :;· Lr i c t 0[' a circuit'
j uc!.lze f ~i l (;d t o r r:'.. .i l'r; a'.. 1.:-.0 q~ c (I f sC',I Gl t:" ~n a rl:.li Livnal
j uc1e e b e ;j ) :j o i n t , ~ ( t j 11 or, :. (;~, lh :.lt t.! :I ~ ,:;.f [ai c:; o j' the court

Cr() {-it

1 ~l i L:h t

b e ~ ):" ,) ; :r p t :;' :1 <.n:: t::l -:: ~j.w.tcly ci,i s ch D. l'i::': U.

In l 'Jl !, '-t i:i'''' :: ("~::; fi l'1 !tlly · !",z-ssrd p r o.... i<ii n i~ t :i;J.t
?resi d <? nt 11 :::.:l:/ 11 C:o.-:poi::t : t: ; it:: o~ :J..l d ist ~ · i i : t a nd cir-cuit
- judges, r.u t only 1: . )') :1 ~.l ~·ir. ~:i l i: t h nt t!1C i :il C·u::-.h en t j ud~: c
ov ~r :"ev €;nty IIi:; 1l11:':ble to ...i i s c ! ~ a r f(: ~· r...icic:, t }y ~ l l the
dutie::; or ~i i.:.i off i ec b:' ; ~ e ~ ~ c .l cf r.en t'.: l De phy s i c a l tlis
t:~c

abili::'y e,f ;)Cr;. <l:, .::nt C:Hlr~ct.£I". \I T!',c di:;::::rction3ry ~nd
intle fi nite nnti.lr~ C1 t.hi ~; l.( :si~l<:"t-:-,i on r,a:> I"CJ:t:.t.:rClG. it
i~wffecti ve.
No ?rE:sid cr,t sho uld t e ~ s1:<-:d to Il etor;:!ilic
t h e ~~ility or discbility of any p urtic'~~r judGe.

[j 1r,08 t
'.1\1 ~r:! G' ' .r ; e ~)i nc e 17 p.:1) cna ~:~(j:::; ~2. v e be en
CO'r£rJ?!ls \"lhe::-€.1)- .- 1 =: e ~u""='!L :··r0 of .il ~ (.~~~ and t11C
cut ies of j ud ge s in I'eder aI on r-t s have be en a Lt cr cd in one
way or enot.l.cr ,
T!1e Supr e.. cour-t wes c st acr t shed ~'!ith s i x
-reeIrb e r's of 1789; it V!~.:; reel c cd to five in 1801'; it. w.i s ~;-:
crce scd to SCV/3!l in 1807; i' \'1":5 me rea sen 1:0 nine ill lE;)7;

l1"l

rnad e by
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~~e

. it was increased. to ten in ' .1.86:'); it \,:F.1::i r-educ ed to seve" in
.,' ,.1866; '. it ..cas i nc r-ee sed to n be in 18G9.
Tile :;;i'::;)ls fact. is t..h'-,t.. tOC'lj' z; nc> I:'cr": l ~ i'o r lE:t j ,5
t:~i; r ::L·,-.;r·. :)cl 0: ih" F~: '_: (-:' 1 1 1
Judici~n:' is Ln auf'I'Lc i en t:. t·.; mc: e t 1.\11:: [)u;-'l ;,:(; s :, h(·'t'O::'l~ Lhc1.
II. :.;r o \':i r' G bOcJ:I uf our c i -:"i :~\...I; S COj ';:)l~i!1 01' t.h,..: con pl.rx. .i t,iC3
t ?"l 8 i! -; 1 :lj 5 , awl \.:1" JXP';~l:; ':: of lit,j.g~1;i.·jn in Un i Le d Sl.".l'..c s
Cour-tc •
l.~tj·/e 'lC~,:i.~1i ~l:·i:;(·:-; h:~I;"'J ':;('

j

;\ 1 e t {.. i. ~ r r~~O:i\ :,'A!i) ji t, ~~ (-':' : i l ·Y (' '-.. : .l " ~· :J l , ~" ~·Ji ,..:h J ~~ ~ : ~ ) ::1 it
Ili..: r.c';ith, jus t i fi ,::; ~)~. rcaacrri.n g and st:.~ ti:;tic~ th e coanon
i c~ r 0 ~ s i 0 n cr ~a tc d bj our ov crcro~d c d f~~ s~al rioc~ c t~ -
end i t pcov u::, toc: need for ftddi tiOl:011 j \l!~Gr;:3.

W1;I. C ~ J. :l\~· ~' u i t !; [:, J..\l:<U1J' nvc.i Lao Lc on Iy to the
o, {' ;- I'd ,, : , .; Jo. or \....
.. \0. . rLv ~·~..L-'I ·'"
""".,.u
? I :nv (;· Pi.., op ..
. • " " .l"" l·..
",S t,0
;.I r~t!:ct ·::!l i eh ar-e suf'f'Lci cn ::-ly l :-L r;;(; to rC !J~ .~· t~ c cos t .
Poo r e r l i t i:':;:'<11 t :; a re co.npe Ll cd to uh :'!.n c:)ll vcLuab Lc r::'r 1':t s
. o r to !:.cc r,;)t Lnadcqua t,c 01" un j us t, ~ {; ~, tl i2 ::I (; :"1t s b r cuusc of
:·jh(;(;. r i n:-:1:,i l i Ly t? fi: ~ ance o r -::." ; :\";a1 . t, ::,1, (; r:nd e ~ :.: . l e n €:
11 t i t: ~ t i X i . O:'"JJ.y ;:;' S P C ~:(ii {l ! ~ u ::, U: 0 ~) rV '(~ 3:; C :> ~;t L:1G l :y;;
(trl G t:~(; l " (;h :! r l::h lcin b t~ ,ci r cos t , c; \'1 ·t :U (: r ~ \(lic'-!. t ~ t il :; g l "{) 'd l i [
i::-I~Jr'..asi.on th~ "t Lhe court.s 3.~'C: C:JiLf1; A. ;! (,:','·c n f'o r tlt" :'; ,:11

It

.••,
l ": ,r .•.•

' -~o\ ' ..

C, <.:.J
' ...

,1.. . ... , .

'1.,.

to-~o.

sr~...,(;

D'..;lC'.ys i n t ur Jf'.ti:rT.lin< ~i 'XI o f :,);)~-.:l~I; :-':'iV'-o t:lC
~·,i O:": : D"I· (.:r, if t:"i~l~ (; 1' ':ll"i2.i:l~l 'd,;ti'jn=:i Di'C

, ~ff:::f.;t.

,: c cu7li.:L r Gi :lj::> ::;i' :::;5 .;1' :; I '~ 1·:..J 1 U<.: ': U
:,~ ,~ vo Lu.ao of i" OI·k i :n;;o 5 f;l1 OJ
the Cj rcui 1. Cui.\l~:~ 01" ,\:;opu lls
'. -ill fur't.::t...:r inCl",;. c,Ss.

. c- x i=J.::cli

".:,',.:-:1

i.n d

~:d ~ ti n ~

j

Th", :l:'; t:, ':" ];~ i1 ;r~ t ~.~ i :::pc ':":Li ~ t' .i u s ~,ic r..: i:1 VlI; ~0\17' Ls
::cl')\:' ':.'1 11 onLa r.; c th.:; Lt :';~: .)i' t .le S ll ;' >~' 8:-;(; C::" l: ;:-t i t::;c:l f .
I,rd stil l ::,0 r e: ":, :; ~' f: ~" r) :; l d 0(; :.:.d-:.J. c.r,~ ~\~, th · ~ t', .r.':', ~ : I :: : C: : l (kt.iol\

"'hicl1 I rnke l.::.t':.:t, il~ t l i s
T:"!in:l t ior. of ':~n:; tic.u·ti or"::'Il
1':'1':':11 :t t

:'ILS5~;": <;

fO e'

qUL:S ti :' :1[; ': ; ~'

t:1('
~~: ~ ':l

~\:i d: c

Li

.. d t,,; t e r 
c'Jur t .

l.:;hr~ s t

to) C· 2'-~iJl'~':>;; C::>u.rt is
'au ~'~c:.. It:; ci:U"f.ieul ti ':'s in t:li,j
l"(;:3?e.-c~~ -:1;r~ su!,)Crl'ic i:.:.l"l~· liebtC:!lC':l S O.7c C yf,or:.; "b) ~~y
3.ut~.orizilii.:. the c ,r,lrt s in it,;;; di:;C l'(;ti c-n, t~ l~(.fl':' '; (' to ::c -:.r
r.:.;Jpt: al:. i~~ :;;:'i.!'..j' c.:l ::' s ~>::':J of r;U ~ 8 S. T11l,:3 d. i zc:,!.:ti:>tl rJa ~ so
1'.(:01:1 ':-:~Lrcis,:;J t~):'it j n tho:: last fi ~(;~l y cr", altll~>UC:l 867
pcti ti(;ns f~r revi~i.- l;pr u prc5\:a1t~d t o t~H: . S t: p r (;::1 ~ Court,
it dccl:inui '1':' ji '::~l' 717 cus~s" If lX:tit.icm; in u :"' balf ,af '
the Gavcrn~,l(mJ" 'J.l'G E:xc1uclcd. i t appe~r-s ~h n t t!1C court )cr
r.ittc"d. ·jl 'l'i VG.k liti b \"'lJ1 'u s ~.) prosec'..lt<::: :':pjJE;a.l" in 'JDly 108
caSC5 out of 80?i [j,~plic;Qticn~ •. 1.: :,ny of the rc-fusals ~ :ers
' . cbu!Jtlc;ss -:-:Cl.::-r':':ltcu. But C:'J1 it be :;.:U.~ t;'I:'!.t 1.'1.1.11 ju~tice
is llchic\'c.d i7!lCl1 :.1. court is forced by t~c s:,{;:,;r nr·~Uj!,;ity of
1:C'::pi!l(; '.1;) ":i t~l i l;~ bu::inc::;.; to c.:ccli~:c, -;: i ~~l:.ut CV,~~l 1111 .
1~:<'i}ll:lHIU · :.t!, t :, r:·:;:,r U7;:'; Gf t.:t4: cc.:.::;\.~:; i)("r_~':l.tA ·d t:-> j.:" b::
~ri 'It! V. li. tir:~l!.::.
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of Law ca s e s to c :q is v e t: tly g!."ee:.ter and more corn p.l i.cat.ed
than eV2!"! tw cnty ycar s ~ b0 . Records and b r.i.ef s must b e read;
stat~tes, decisions, ana G~ t o!1 s i v e ~~terial of a technical,
Gcif;!1tific, s t nt i s t i.ca l, ,J~'1 d eccnord c nat.u r e mu s t be searched
an d studied; opinions ;.JU S +J b e f'o rnul at.ed and \1ri t t.en , The
@odcrn tasks of j u ~ges c311 for t~e ~se of full c~e ~gies.

Mod0rn comp1ex'tics eall also for a co~stant ·
infusio!1 of r.e x ::>1001 in th G e ou r t,s , just as it is nee-J e d
ill executive f'uuct.Lons of' the Gove rnnen t end in private
b us i n c s s , A Lor-e r e d ncn t.o.L or phy s i cal vibo~ leads ne n to
avo i.d 0..'1 exaraf.nnt.Lon of c"Yi:p1icated and chan ged cond i ti ons.
Little by little, new facts bE:CO[!lE; b Lur red throl..:bh old
gla~ses fitt8d, as it ~ c ~ c , foc the n~eds of un ~ th c r [encr
ation; older ~en, ass'L~ine th~t ~he Gcene is the sa~0 as it
was i n toe past, cease to expl.o r-e or inquire into the present
o r th e f'ut.ur-e •
.... ... .

- 4 
\ i€l }.ovc r-ecogn i ze d t~l.s truth in the Ci 'ril ~ ; e !' ·Jl.ce
cf t he na t i on an d of ;1£J)'j s t e t o~ by cO;l: pelling r-et i r erac n t
en pa y et t he tlE C ,)f ceven t y.
';;e na ve r e c ogn tz ed it i n t he
l,rmy and J.Jcvy b y r~ti!'ing officers e t t:~e 0.(;0 o f s i7.ty -fr:.u!' .
it mzi.bei - of :;tn t ':: s i e vc r ccorm i ze d it by pr ov i d I n r; i n t !1!.;;i:
c cnc t i t.u t i on u r or c crnoul.scr-v re-::ire:; C:J1t of erc d j uc 5cs .

L i f e> t t: n'Jr8 c f juG[::e :J. a ac u r -c d t .., t he C O :-l s t i tu ~ ' on,
".;a ::; deni g: e d to p La c e 7 tO ccur t s be yon d t emp t .at i cn a or
i.nr Luc nc e s wh i ch rai £.ht i: a'~~ i T t!leir j uuL,-.:€ n t s : i t ';':~ s not
in ten ded to c z-e a t e IJ. s tn tic jud;'c b!':~/.
A cons-t e n t cnc
sj'3t e:m:lt ic a du I t i on of youn ger t.lood 17111 vi tali zc tho courts
r,:1G Qctter e qu i p t hem tc ~·ecc[.!iize and apj.Ly th e: e :::; c nt i :-~l
concepts of justice 1" t.. :18 li.G r,t of trLc needs a nd th~ fa c ts

of

~n ever-c~AnGing

world.

I t i~ ouvious, t i~ T e f o r e , fTOr. beth rec~~n and
e xpc r i enc e , t i:e ',; so~ ,e pr ov i s i on rcus t be n. r:o ;)'~ ed, TIl Lch ';:i l l
c per e t o ? 'J t c~, . 1 ; t i c ~ ll y to s upp Lemc n t the wo r k of ol.cer judge;,;
and a c c e Lc r-e t .e ... : e y:c:-:( of t he c cur t ,

I.

~ be r e f c r e ,

ecrncs tly

rec oc~ a nd

ttct the

necc ~sity

01 en "ii.c r e s s e i n t b :, nu...:.b er of j 1.i-ir e s c e s ·..:.~pi i ed 'b y l e Gis
~ ::.t i or. p r o7 i-.hn,::; f or t ne l1FPoi r;t ",.::.nt o" e'.1 d i t i o ~ ~ l j u c.s e :3
i n a l l "f€ d er~ l co ur t s, -.-:i t l out e xcejrt i cri , .:her e t.r,o r e a ~ 'e
Lncumben t j udc:e s of l 'E; t i rcme nt ;;.r,c t/ho do ncc choose to

r e tire or t o r e s i fn .

If fin ell er

j ui S ~

is net in fact in

c z.pac i t u t e d, on l y 1300 C3:1 c or .e t'r ot. t a o :-: J' 8 S C :1 C ~ of an
a dd i t i cne L j u go i n h I:: cr-owde d 3 t 3: e of t ne cocke t s ; i f
t he C8 P8Ci t y of a n e l :; ~ :, j 'l:uge i s i n I'ac t i l;lpa i r e d J t:1C

appoi ntmen t of
seCffi 3 to

b~

D~

3d~ i ti o nn l

ju ~ ~e

is

This

in ~i 3pcn sB ble.

a trut h u h i c h CB:lnot to contradicted.
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t l; e lcng p c c e s s e s o ~~ pr €l i I:.in ery
,,:; : i t i o ns f o":' r ~ h er:~in h s , G . ~ e n 1 s ,
r -evcr s e Ls or: t e chru c r.L G :· · · · ~'! ·l ::; "t'8Cj;. i r i n r-: ::' e-t r i <~ ls, r::.c t i o n s
b efore t he: Sup re: :(~ Cour t ;" .d th e fi Er- l h e ~r i n ..: o~· .the h i ghes t
t ribun c.l _. d r i11g ";11 t h : ., t i me l '~':)or, inc '~ s t r y , <-: I;1'i
cu l t ure, c c rzne r-cc :::.:-.d th e.; f;c Vs r lliTl€n t i ts e l f ;;0 th ou gh an
un con s c i.cnab Le p er i.cd of' un cc r-t at rrty c!:d er.Jb, r rGs5:7lcr.t . . ; ,f.:::l
i t is we l L to r-emcmb e r t h ~ "v du r Ln g t h e - e 10n 8 p r cc e s s e s the
nor rnnI ope r c t i on s o f scc i o t y und g:o iTi- ::-rz.a: rt e r-e t' W1dic rJp p ed
i n man y c a s es y d i :' f e:;:i n;; C J d. i v i d cd o p i rri or;s i:l t h e Lower
court s en d by t h8 La ck o f ..n y c r er.r gu Lc e 1'0:' t he d isp::. t c h
of busi n e s s'- Th e re y our It ~cl s ystem i s fest 10 3 i n an o t h er
es s e n t i a l of j us t i c e - - cc:'tcinty .

:io r e ov c r , du ;-i r.,

r.:otions, :>r i gil. cl t r i " l.s ,

Fi n,:" l l y ,

\'18

fin d t h o pr-o c e s s c s of g cv er-nme n t itself

brough t t o c. comp Let e c t op from t i me t o ti e b y j.nj unc ti ons
i ssu e d ~l ;.ost cu t o~£ ticully, sornctines even ~~ t hou t no ti c e
to t he Goy e.rnment , ~J1d Eot inf~equ. en ~ ly in cloc!' v i olc ~lon .
of t he pr I nc Lp Le of e qu i ty th:-.t rn j un c t .i or s shoul d be gr!::n t ed.
onLy in t hose r-ar-e ca s e s of nan i r ea t i l_c Gc.li ty end i r repar !::ble
Qc.mc. ge cgci n s t whi c h t he o:::-d i n<.: r y c ou r s e of . . . e lev: o f f e r s
~o prot ec tion. S~ ~ ~u t c s whi ch th e ConGre ss enact s cre s e t
asi de or suspended f or l c~ g per iode. of time, CV8 n i n c ~ s e s
to ""hi ch t h e Cove nnen t is n ot a }:- c.rty.
In t he un c e r ta i n s t c t e of the lc~, it is ne t di f f i
cult for ~he i ngen i ou s to devise ~ovel re~ ~o~s for c tt~c4in g
t he v a Li d i t.y cf n ew l e gisl nt ion 0 ::.' its c.; p li c c :i o n . V:h i le
t he s e qu e stion s ur e l~borious l y brouG, t to issue en d d 8~ ~ t ed
~ p~ ou gh e s eri es of co urts, t he GoverTh~e n t r.ust sten d c _i de .
I t mct t e r s r.ot thr t t h e Cor-gr e ss ha s e n a ct e d t he l ew. thc t
t ne Ex e c ut i v e h e s signe e; i t r:n rl t hc t th e c dmi m s t z-e t.Lv c
!:";:.chi n e:-:,' is v:c.i t i ~s t o fun ction . CO·.. . Grnrr:e n : b y Ln j u n c t i cn
l cys ~ hocvJ ~ 2 n d a pe n n o rrr.~ l proc e ~ s e s; cnd no i ~ or t ~fit
s't.atu t e c -i n t ake eff e c t -- cgei r,s t (m y i ndi v idu :::.l or o r g~. i
zation vn t b t he ~e3n ~ t o e~lo y I nvD'ers end en g~g e i n ~~d8 
flung lit i g~ti on -- unt il it hAS p~ s sed t hrough t h o ~~ ole
o f t h~ c ou r t s. Th l S the ~ l : i c i ery , by pos t .pon i ng
t he e f f e ctive d~te of Act~ o~ the Cor.g~es s, i ~ 8 $su min g cn
8.dd i t i ona I f unc t ion E'nd i::; coning mor e and mo r-e t o constitu t e
a s c at t cr cd , l oos e ly cr &cnized and s lov: l y op c r-e t i ng third
.ou s e of the Nctiona l Le gi s l ~ ~ ur o .

h i. er ~I: c:1 Y

This st~ t c of ef fc i r s hc.s cor.:e u pon t he nf'. t i on
f;:::-eciu e 11 y ove r a p e r i cd 0:' ccc c d e e , In rr.y a nnu a l, mes s c e
t o this C ;.gr e s s I expressed scr.e v i ev.s and SO::1e hop es .

~17

-

[;

-

1':0\7 , <! G nn i Il:r:Jl3d'n t e ~tI1P, I r-ec onrse nd t.ha t t he
pr ov l (:0 t , :)t ro o de c i ~ i c n , i n j ur.: t ion, j udP;T":e n t or
decroe en ~r. y co~s t i u t i o ~ A l c uesti on CC pronul~6t~d by

COr. grc;3~

any I'edcr-cL cour-t ':;i ~ .ou t pr-c v t ou s and amp Lc no t i.c o t o the

At. t or n ey ~;e!,} c rn l and on oppoz-t u n i t y fo~: t h e united St~ t n :;
to pr e 3e nt cvi c nc e ~ nn be h c e r~.
Thi3 is to prevc~ t co~rt
ac t i. on on the ccns t i t.ut Lona Lt t y of Acts of t he Gonr:rc :;::; j n
s u it s b e t ·:.. ce n pr tv a t o il" d.:.vi ·:; 1l ~!15, whor o t he Cover-nmcr.t, is
not a pc.: :rt y 1;0 ti .e su i t , 71ith cllt ~ivir~~ oppor-t unt ty t o t.no
Gov e r mnent or the Uni t ed S ta tes to c1efE: nrJ t~v- lnTo of the
Land •
I Hl ~; Q · e f. r n r:- s t ~y ~'v~ :';;;l.! . -:~d t~:-It in ca s e s i n '::h i ~ h
er.y court of r i. r s t i ~ 3t? n ~ e c.r·tsT'rr:ir:G:j a ~uo s t i o n o f c o n
s t i t u t i oI1!:l l i t::, t h e Co, .r-c a.s pr ovt ~c t }:nt t: ·r e su a l L be 3
direct and i !T.1 din t o c pp ea L to ·~he S ·..l '::·c ~ Co r-t I a •.c t t " t
sue' cus e3 t ~k e rrec e i enc e over all othe r ~tt e r s pe~ding
Ln t. ;i t cour t.
Such lC' : i s l u ti o n \";"ill J I arn cc n v i nc e d , go
fHr to Dlle vi~te th8 i r.e q lal i ty, ULccrta~ n ty a~d de l ~ ~ in
the d i s p osi tion of , it a l q ue s t i c ns of c onc t i tu t i onr .l.I ~y
I

~

ari s i nc under our

f u nd ~~~n t al l~~.

My d6S i r p. i ~ t o s tT e ~ p.t~~n tn~ ~~ mi ~: s tT & ~ i on of
jus ti c c and t o ier ke it 8 r:0 1'<E: f:f f e c t i ","0 so r va n t of p u b l.I c
n e e d. I n the lu. c r i c ....., i d0al of li o ire r::r:;r~ t he c o ur t s fi r:.
an e s s c n t i e L r.n d cor. s t I t u t.i on r-L p Lr.c e ,
En s tr ivinG to
ful f ill t.ha t i d ·~ &l , n ot on Ly .:w jndgGs but t i1 ,~ Cor.", ':: 5 5
and t he Ex ec u t i v e a s "ell, mus t do ell i ?1 t h o. i r powe r t o
bri ng t he judiciol oT g ~ni z ~ t icn ond pQTs on r.Gl to t hG h i uh
sta ~ 0. ~ rds of use ~ u lr. ~s s whic h sound and effici~nt govc r lli7~nt
end r.Ddorn co ~ d i tio~3 Te~uir0.

Fir st , to (;; 1 : :1ir.nt e c onr-e s t.Lon of caLcnd e r-s -md to
!!'£.\.;. e t h e j ud i c i a r y r s -r. wh oLe L e s s s t r. t Lc b:r t:lt~ c o n s t.s.n t
a nd sy s t c mn" i c ~ d d i t i ori of n f.7l b l o od to i t.s p sr-s on ne L;
!1l:'. K~

t h e j-..:di c i c 1'y rio ro e l c s t i c by prov i ir.g for
of c i rc~it nn distr ict ju , 8 S t o thoso
p La c e s whe r-e f')dG r~, l c our -ts ~ :- .:.: :::ost in <" r z-oa r s ; t~ i r<i , to
~urnish t he S U~~G~~ Cour t p r 8c t i c n l ~ 8 s ist~ ncc i n s u ~ e r
vis i ng t~ e co n~uct of bus in~ s3 in th~ lo w ~r co~rtz : fourth.
to elimi m·.to t nequa Lt ty I unc c. r tr.Lrrt y Ln1 o ol r.:· n 0 7: ~ x i st i ng
in t he d 8te~in~tion of constitutional questions ir.~o lv i nG
second, to

ternpor~ry trr ~ s~ c rs

feac~al

stntut0S.

If ~G i nCr &8S& t he p ~r s ~ nnel of the f adar~l cour t s
so thr.t CUS8S ~. y be pr o:!lp t l y -. s c i de ti i n t he f irst i ust.anc o ,
a nd m:::'l b e Gi v c n r.de qu n t e c nd I..:'m'1p t he ar i ng on (,11 a p pc a Ls i
if ~c i n v i Gor ~ ; n til l th ~ c~ur t s b ~ t~ e ~ G rs i s t e nt irS us i on
of :,8 ;-: b lo od ; :"'f ?: (;: (;r :~ r. t to ~ .. :3 Supr eme Cour t r ur -the r o~(; r
~ n ~ r ~ s p o n s i b i l i t y i n n ~ i n t~i~ i n g th~ eff i c i e n cy of th e
ent i r e fer- er nl jlAc ici ~r:r; end Of ..... e a s s ure gC'l:"er:-~nt f.C iti ci 
pat i o n .in t he spc cd i c r- cO!i.;,ic '; r:-~ ti o n end fir~:-ol dc t c r mt nn t a on
of u,ll ccns t t tution" l que st i o n s J Vie shz Ll, ~o :1 lO ~ G wa: r t o .c r d
our h igh c'::lj e c ti ·....e s , If t hc s {;; raor.sur-os r_c~ l i .:: l' c t.he i r o i m, ~·: o
Li
d
~h c: ncc
i t,y
i
f u:-,d r....
c ha n g es in t h e po wer' s of ths court s or t he cons t i, tut i on of
our Oove r nrncn t -- c hcngos ';';~l.:;'~ :-~ i nvolve c or.s equenc e s so f e.r 
r e n~ h i n~ ~ s t o c nuse unc~r t~i nty p' S to th~ ~ ~sdom of 3uch
course.
m a y
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